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Foreword 
This study presents the findings of a research project carried out by the 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspoli-
tik, (DIE) from November 2005 to May 2006. The research team consisted 
of Dr. Markus Loewe, senior economist at the DIE, and five young profes-
sionals: Jonas Blume, Verena Schönleber, Stella Seibert, Johanna Speer 
and Christian Voss.  
The DIE research project had two major objectives: (i) to find out how fa-
vouritism affects business in Jordan, and (ii) to find out what can be done 
to combat it.  
The study’s recommendations are addressed first of all to the Jordanian 
government and to businesspeople and others in Jordan who have the 
power to contribute to the fight against favouritism in their country. In ad-
dition, the findings of this project may be of interest for foreign donors 
who are willing to support Jordanian initiatives against the use of favourit-
ism as well as, of course, for academics. 
The study is intended as a contribution to two important strands of litera-
ture, which are particularly important for the countries of the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA). The first concerns the question of how to 
strengthen the business climate of developing countries and thereby their 
economic development. The second reflects the international debate on the 
promotion of good governance and democracy.  
These two strands of literature are not independent of each other. Ac-
countability, transparency and the control of corruption – of which favour-
itism is one form – are core dimensions of good governance, which are 
very relevant for a good business climate as well. 
The Arab world is a particularly instructive example of the consequences 
of a lack of transparency. Rulers there enjoy immense discretionary pow-
ers. They favour clients and cronies in many ways by their political, bu-
reaucratic and judicial decisions. As a consequence, the fulfilment of for-
mal rights depends to a large extent on the ability to curry favour with de-
cision-makers.  
In Jordan, favouritism is referred to as ‘wasta’, which means ‘connection’. 
Many businesspeople in Jordan rely on wasta rather than on their legal 
rights or their ability to compete. For them, having and using wasta is vital 
for attaining their individual ends; it is a social norm with positive rather 
than negative connotations in large areas of Arab societies. Resorting to it 
is individually rational, but collectively harmful. 
Jordan was chosen for this report not because the use of wasta is particu-
larly widespread there or because its business climate is extraordinarily 
bad. On the contrary: Jordan performs better than most other Arab coun-
tries. Rather, three other factors were taken into consideration:  
First, Jordan’s political leaders have themselves put the fight against the 
use of wasta on their agenda. In the spring of 2005, King Abdullah II 
started an initiative to curb corruption in which he mentioned wasta as a 
form of corruption. As a consequence, the government drafted an anti-
corruption law (adopted by the Jordanian Parliament only after the conclu-
sion of the present study). In addition, a second initiative has been under-
taken in the form of a recently issued ‘National Agenda’, which empha-
sises the need for public sector reforms as a tool for business promotion. 
The research conducted by the DIE team and presented in this study was 
meant to provide further input for both of the above-mentioned initiatives. 
Second, Jordan is to some degree ahead of other Arab countries with re-
spect to reforms in its public sector and the improvement of business con-
ditions within the country. As a consequence, it represents an especially 
interesting case: During its research mission to Jordan, the DIE research 
team was able to study not only the negative consequences of widespread 
favouritism but also the initial effects of the country’s recent reforms. 
Third, empirical research on such a sensitive issue as the role of wasta in 
the public sector is much easier in Jordan than in the rest of the Arab 
world. Although Jordan, like all Arab countries, has an authoritarian re-
gime, its legislation is more liberal and its government is more supportive 
of foreign researchers. 
The DIE research team started its work in November 2005 by reviewing 
the relevant literature on wasta, governance, and doing business in Jordan 
and by planning its research mission to Jordan, which took place from 
February to April 2006. In Jordan, the team co-operated with the Ministry 
of Planning and International Co-operation and the Ministry of Public Sec-
tor Development as its two official partner institutions.  
  
A preliminary version of this study was presented and discussed in Am-
man on 26 April 2006 during a workshop at the Center for Strategic Stud-
ies (CSS) of the University of Jordan. The Jordanian media reported ex-
tensively on this presentation and on the results of the study. The two lead-
ing newspapers, ‘Al-Ray’ and ‘Al-Dustour’ published lengthy articles, one 
of them with the title “Scientific Study Confirms: Wasta is a Handicap for 
Investment” (Al-Ray, 27 April 2006). 
As a consequence, the study has led to an intense debate in Jordan among 
politicians, parliamentarians, businesspeople and journalists about favour-
itism in Jordan. Some members of parliament released statements in this 
regard to the press. One of them said: “It is true that some investors have 
excellent relations with the government and can exert influence on politi-
cal decisions. It is even true that a law was changed for the benefit of a 
single investor.” Another said: “Investors have no access to functionaries 
except with the assistance of their money” (Al-Hayat, 5 May 2006). 
In September 2006, the Jordanian parliament adopted a law explicitly ban-
ning the use of wasta in state-business relations. The present study had al-
ready concluded its research early in 2006 and was unfortunately unable to 
take this law into consideration. 
For political reasons, most of our interlocutors are not quoted by name. 
The DIE project team assured each of them beforehand that all informa-
tion received from them would be treated confidentially. It became appar-
ent during the interviews that this promise was a prerequisite for the inter-
viewees – especially some businesspeople and functionaries – to articulate 
their opinion frankly. 
Bonn, October 2006  Dr. Markus Loewe 
 Jonas Blume 
 Verena Schönleber 
 Stella Seibert 
 Johanna Speer 
 Christian Voss 
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Executive summary 
Introduction 
Wide-ranging agreement exists today that a good business climate is 
central to economic growth and poverty alleviation. However, many 
questions remain open with respect to the role of the state in creating a 
good business climate. The intention of this report is to contribute an-
swers to at least some of these questions. 
The World Development Report 2005 argues that governments should 
aim at improvements in areas such as stability and security, regulation 
and taxation, finance and infrastructure. In many countries, however, 
it is even more vital to address the quality of governance by enhancing 
the credibility of the government, fostering public trust and legiti-
macy, reforming the regulation of markets, strengthening the rule of 
law, promoting accountability and transparency in public administra-
tion and the judiciary, and, last but not least, controlling corruption 
(World Bank 2004; 2005f). 
Enhancing the quality of governance is particularly important for the 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which reveal 
the most severe governance deficits of all countries worldwide. The 
Arab Human Development Report 2004 argued that without improved 
governance the MENA countries could neither attract investors nor 
achieve sustainable economic growth (UNDP / AFESD / AGFUND 
2004). 
Widespread favouritism is one of the main obstacles to good govern-
ance and economic development in the MENA countries. It can be de-
fined as the tendency to provide preferential treatment to friends and 
relatives. In the MENA countries, favouritism is often referred to by 
the Arabic word ‘wasta’, which means ‘relation’ or ‘connection’. 
However, while favouritism in Asia has found growing attention in 
recent years, very little research has been done so far on the use of 
wasta and its effects on the MENA countries (Hutchings / Weir 2006). 
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With Jordan as an example, the present study therefore undertook 
(i) to investigate how the widespread use of wasta affects the business 
climate and investment activities and (ii) to identify measures for cur-
tailing the use of wasta and thereby promoting economic develop-
ment. 
The study shows that the widespread use of wasta adversely affects 
the business climate in Jordan by making state-business relations inef-
ficient and unfair. In addition, the study argues that the use of wasta 
persists (i) because many people are not aware of the fact that they can 
reach many of their goals without wasta, (ii) because there is little in-
centive to refrain from using it, (iii) because of socio-cultural norms 
which keep it in existence, and (iv) because of Jordan's political sys-
tem, which benefits the political elite. 
Business climate, state-business relations, and the impact of favouritism 
Business climate can be defined as the set of factors that shape the de-
cision of both local and foreign firms to do business in a given coun-
try. This includes inter alia that country’s endowment of natural re-
sources, its geopolitical situation, the level of education in its labour 
force, its quality of regulation, its degree of taxation, its infrastructure, 
the access to finance which it provides to entrepreneurs, its quality and 
rule of law, and aspects of its governance such as the control of cor-
ruption (World Bank 2004). A good business climate is characterised 
by reasonable costs and low risks of doing business as well as by low 
barriers to competition.  
Many of the factors just mentioned involve state-business relations, 
that is, interactions between private firms and the public sector on the 
administrative level (registration, licensing, taxation, public tendering, 
etc.) as well as on the political level (where private companies lobby 
for their interests). Viewed in this light, state-business relations are 
very important for the business climate. This means that the costs and 
uncertainties incurred by private firms when interacting with the state 
should be minimised, and that all private firms should have equal ac-
cess to government services and political decision-making. In other 
words: state-business relations should be efficient and fair. 
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Favouritism, on the other hand, is preferential treatment of relatives, 
friends, and neighbours or other acquaintances. It is a widespread pat-
tern of social interaction in many parts of the world – known as blat in 
Russia, guanxi in China and wasta in the Arab world. Favouritism 
does not constitute a major problem when the person who favours 
someone else acts on his own behalf. But it is a form of corruption 
when a public or private office is abused, i.e. when preferential treat-
ment is provided at the expense of a third party such as the employer, 
the state or the general public (Kaufmann 2004). 
Research methodology 
For the purpose of this study, we conducted an eleven-week field re-
search project in Jordan in early 2006. Preparations started in Novem-
ber 2005. 
In Jordan, we followed an iterative research approach in accordance 
with the principles of grounded theory: re-analysing interviews and re-
formulating premises allowed us to align theoretical considerations 
with empirical findings.  
Our research in Jordan comprised four elements: (i) interviews with 
99 resource persons from the government of Jordan, non-governmen-
tal organisations, academia, the media and foreign donors, (ii) inter-
views with 58 businesspeople from different economic sectors, (iii) in-
terviews with 18 managers in the Jordanian public administration, and 
(iv) an anonymous, standardised survey among 180 low- to medium-
ranking civil servants.  
The business climate in Jordan 
Although the quality of Jordan’s business climate is slightly above re-
gional and international average, some significant deficiencies remain 
– especially with respect to state-business relations. 
The country’s macro-economic parameters have improved in recent 
years. However, this has been due to windfall profits rather than to a 
rise in productivity and competitiveness. The country has benefited 
from a rise in budget transfers from the Gulf countries and from the 
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West as well as from an increase in private transfers from Jordanian 
migrant workers in the Gulf and from wealthy Iraqis who have in-
vested in Jordanian real estate. These external effects will, of course, 
not last forever. In addition, current growth rates are still too low to 
reduce Jordan’s high unemployment and poverty rates. 
Jordan must therefore encourage and promote development in its pri-
vate sector in order to become independent of windfall profits. A bet-
ter business climate is crucial to this goal, since it will not only facili-
tate the activities of domestic entrepreneurs but also help to attract 
foreign investors.  
Jordan’s business climate leaves much room for improvement. Al-
though progress has been made in some areas during the last ten years, 
Jordan’s business climate is only mediocre in international and re-
gional comparison. According to the Growth Competitiveness Index 
of the World Economic Forum (WEF), for example, Jordan ranked 
only fifth among 12 Arab countries in 2005 and was No. 45 among 
117 countries worldwide (Blanke / Lopez-Claros 2005; WEF 2006a). 
Jordan was 6th among 17 MENA countries and 78th among 175 coun-
tries worldwide in the World Bank’s Doing Business in 2007 ranking 
(World Bank 2006). 
To overcome such mediocrity, Jordan must look beyond its natural re-
sources, which are severely limited, and its domestic market, which is 
quite small. In addition, its geopolitical location is precarious. The 
country must therefore offer extra-ordinary conditions for investors in 
other areas to compensate for these drawbacks. 
Entrepreneurs in Jordan complain particularly about state-business re-
lations as a major weakness of Jordan’s business climate. In our inter-
views with businesspeople, 33 % of the respondents stated that they 
had faced difficulties in registering and licensing their companies, and 
a total of 80 % mentioned problems in at least one kind of interaction 
with public administrators. These results are in line with the World 
Bank’s report on Doing Business in 2007, which ranks Jordan 110th 
worldwide regarding the registration of property, 118th regarding pro-
tection of investors, and 133rd regarding starting a business. 
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Our ongoing inquiries about problems faced by businesspeople when 
interacting with the state found that state-business relationships in 
Jordan are characterised by a lack of efficiency and fairness: More 
than two thirds of the interviewees stated that administrative proce-
dures took too much time, that they were too complicated, and that 
they were too costly. At the same time, 33 % complained of unequal 
treatment by public administrators, and 26 % declared that decisions 
of the bureaucracy are unpredictable. 
Four reasons were identified by the businesspeople for these deficien-
cies: (i) Nearly two-thirds of the respondents said that there was too 
much regulation in Jordan, that existing regulations are inappropriate, 
or that they are changed too often. (ii) 50 % attributed their problems 
to low qualification and lack of motivation on the part of public sector 
employees. (iii) 10 % complained about deficits in the organisation of 
the public sector. (iv) 39 % stated, finally, that decisions made by civil 
servants depend very much on how well the applicants are connected 
with influential people in public administration. 
Wasta in Jordan 
Most Jordanians use wasta wherever they can, although a majority 
would prefer to see it curtailed in their country. Exploitation of per-
sonal relations is common among all groups in Jordanian society. 
86 % of the businesspeople interviewed by us stated that wasta can be 
helpful in all kinds of interactions with the bureaucracy, and 56 % 
admitted to using it regularly. 77 % of the 180 civil servants covered 
by our standardised survey indicated that wasta plays an important 
role in the recruitment and promotion of public sector employees. In 
addition, wasta can help in gaining admission to a university, earning 
good marks at school, obtaining a job, a scholarship or a bank loan, 
being granted a tax deduction, getting high-quality hospital care, and 
avoiding fines or penalties. 
In general, the public perception of wasta is ambiguous. Many Jorda-
nians disapprove of it on the grounds that wasta is unfair to those who 
do not have good connections. Others, however, endorse it because it 
can help people to enforce their rights. While some Jordanians con-
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sider it a form of corruption, others believe that “wasta is not corrup-
tion because it is not linked to money”. A third group claims that was-
ta is a form of corruption when it serves to circumvent the law but not 
if it is used merely to speed up procedures. For this reason, although 
almost all Jordanians condemn bribery, many legitimise the use of 
wasta in at least some situations. Furthermore, many of those inter-
viewed stated that the use of wasta was closely linked to traditional 
values and social norms and is therefore “an integral part of Jorda-
nian culture”. 
The impact of wasta on the business climate in Jordan 
Our research showed that the widespread use of wasta harms Jordan’s 
economic development in three different ways: 
First, it makes state-business relations unfair: The widespread use of 
wasta affects the fairness and predictability of state-business relations 
on both the administrative and political levels: 
— It enables well-connected people to speed up administrative pro-
cedures and to get access to public sector services, information 
on business opportunities, government tenders, tax exemptions, 
jurisdiction and credit. 64 % of the civil servants interviewed ad-
mitted that people with wasta complete procedures in their gov-
ernment department much faster, easier and cheaper than others. 
In addition, they sometimes get confidential information, which 
allows them to exploit monopoly rents. For example, some inves-
tors in Amman were told by friends working in the public admin-
istration where new streets were planned in the next couple of 
years. As a consequence, they were able to purchase land in these 
areas before anybody else did. Likewise, as the head of a research 
institute explained, “When there is a new business, for example 
when free media are allowed, those with the most wasta get the 
first licenses. People who are close to the government and the se-
curity forces always have the first draw”. But wasta also affects 
public procurement. An expert on foreign investment stated that 
“tenders are often ‘window dressing’. Decisions are made before 
[publication of the tender] following informal criteria.”  
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— In addition, wasta is also used by businesspeople to influence 
legislation and policy-making in their own favour. Many have 
friends in parliament or relatives in the government. A journalist 
explained, “In many families there is often one branch that goes 
into big business and another branch that goes into politics”. As 
a result, many entrepreneurs can manipulate laws in such a way 
that these laws set up effective barriers to competitors. A member 
of parliament said, “It is true that some investors have excellent 
relations with the government and thus exert influence on politi-
cal decisions. It is even true that a law was changed for the bene-
fit of a single investor.” (Abdel Rahim Malhas in Al-Hayat, 
11 May 2006). A journalist reported about “One case where the 
prime minister owned an insurance company and the government 
changed a law so that premiums were doubled.” 
Second, the use of wasta makes state-business relations inefficient: The 
prevalence of wasta in Jordan also affects the duration and complexity 
of procedures in the public administration and thereby causes ineffi-
ciency in state-business relations: 
— On the one hand, wasta affects the recruitment and promotion of 
civil servants, which is a major reason for overstaffing and the 
employment of unqualified staff in the public sector. Many civil 
servants in Jordan have been employed mainly because of their 
wasta. 77 % of our interviewees in public administration admit-
ted that wasta was ‘important’ for getting a job in the public sec-
tor. The director of a human resource department explained, “If a 
minister or engineer tells you to employ someone, you cannot say 
no.” Likewise, wasta is more important for the promotion of civil 
servants than their personal qualifications. 
As a consequence, many people hold positions for which they are 
not qualified, and it is almost impossible to dismiss them. Many 
entrepreneurs complain about this problem: “People in public 
administration are not very helpful. They are lazy and lack the 
necessary commitment and interest for their job.”  
In addition, because of wasta, far too many people are recruited 
every year for the public sector. All managers strive to employ as 
many people from their family, village and tribe as possible. To 
keep superfluous civil servants busy, additional steps are added 
to administrative procedures like registration or licensing; which 
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in turn increases the duration and costs of these procedures and 
makes them more complicated. 
— On the other hand, weaknesses in the legal framework for doing 
business in Jordan can also be attributed to some degree to the in-
fluence of wasta. Most members of parliament (MPs) are not 
elected because of their qualification with respect to legislation 
and policy-formulation but because they are seen as a good wasta 
for their constituencies. As a consequence, they have little incen-
tive to make good laws. A parliamentarian admitted: “Most MPs 
came into parliament without any program. Their only aim is to 
promote personal interests.” Likewise, many ministers are ap-
pointed by the King because of their wasta and not because of 
their competence. As a consequence, they often perform poorly, 
and many of their decrees are of poor quality. 
Third, the wide-spread use of wasta also affects private investment in 
an even more direct way: In the course of our research, it became ob-
vious that the use of wasta affects not only Jordan’s business climate, 
but also have a direct impact on the investment decisions of entrepre-
neurs. Many businesspeople devote very much time and money for 
networking, i.e. they invest in social connections rather than in ma-
chines, business ideas or innovative products. This behaviour is ra-
tional in a context where the success of entrepreneurs depends on their 
wasta rather than on their competitiveness. From a national perspec-
tive, however, it is rent-seeking, which entails a misallocation of re-
sources and constrains Jordan’s development. 
Measures against the use of wasta in Jordan 
Initiatives against the use of wasta should naturally address the factors 
that contribute to its persistence. Some measures have already been 
implemented but much remains to be done by all relevant parties: the 
government, businesspeople, the society at large and foreign donors. 
Reasons for the persistence of wasta: During our research, we also 
found evidence for the second hypothesis mentioned above: The four 
factors mentioned above can in fact explain why the use of wasta is so 
common in Jordan despite its negative effects: 
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— Lack of awareness: Most Jordanians know about these effects, 
but are unaware of the fact that changes have taken place in some 
areas, i.e. that they no longer need wasta in many interactions 
with the state bureaucracy. 
— Perverse incentives: Many Jordanians try to make use of their 
wasta simply because all others do the same. They have no in-
centive to change this practice because they would be worse off if 
they did.  
— Socio-cultural values and norms: Jordanians themselves explain 
the widespread use of wasta in cultural terms. They associate it 
with cherished values such as solidarity and loyalty and refer to 
Jordan’s tradition of tribalism. Even though this link is much less 
obvious than it might appear at first glance, the argument is very 
relevant, because it helps many people to justify behaviour, 
which they themselves know to be in fact objectionable.  
— Opposition to change within the authoritarian regime: A fourth 
factor is the neo-patrimonial character of Jordan’s authoritarian 
political regime, which contributes to the persistence of wasta in 
two ways: On the one hand, the regime relies on informal per-
sonal networks with influential social groups. The ruler acts as a 
patron who provides privileges to his clientele in exchange for 
loyalty and support. For example, the clients receive influential 
posts, which they can exploit for their own benefit or for the 
benefit of their respective clients. Many parliamentarians, minis-
ters and tribal leaders therefore have no interest in measures 
which might curtail the use of wasta or undermine their influence 
and power and thereby destabilise the political regime. On the 
other hand, the authoritarian regime makes it very difficult for 
the media, NGOs or political parties to organise and push for the 
eradication of the use of wasta in political procedures.  
Past measures taken to curtail the use of wasta: Only a couple of days 
after his accession to the throne, King Abdullah put the fight against 
the use of wasta on the political agenda. As a consequence, the gov-
ernment has worked out several programmes to reform the public sec-
tor and to curtail the use of wasta in state-business interactions. It has 
streamlined and standardised some administrative procedures and re-
formed human resource policies in some segments of the public sec-
tor. The improvements achieved in these fields (e.g. taxation of cars, 
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issuance of passports) are tangible. In others, however, no progress 
has been made at all. 
The government has also drafted new laws and regulations penalising 
bribery and favouritism, and plans exist to establish new government 
entities to fight corruption more effectively. However, most of these 
plans have not yet been implemented. The Ministry for Public Sector 
Development, for example, has designed a code of conduct for civil 
servants, which includes a clear ban on any kind of preferential treat-
ment, but the cabinet has not even discussed the draft code so far. 
Some NGOs have organised – with some support from the govern-
ment – public awareness campaigns on the negative effects of the use 
of wasta. Others have conducted research and disseminated studies on 
the topic. 
At the same time, however, very little has been done to address the 
political and socio-cultural factors of favouritism in Jordan. 
Recommendations: The parliament and government of Jordan should 
make the fight against favouritism a top priority on their agenda: 
— They should make people aware of the negative consequences of 
the use of wasta and show them alternative ways of getting their 
business done. In addition, they should strengthen people’s iden-
tification with the public interest. 43 % of the businesspeople in-
terviewed stated that a mentality change was crucial for curtailing 
the use of wasta. 
— The government should change the incentives of businesspeople 
and government employees. It should punish people more se-
verely than in the past for providing or asking for preferential 
treatment in state-business interactions. It should take steps for 
better monitoring of administrative procedures and decisions 
made by civil servants. The civil servants interviewed during our 
research pointed out themselves that their respective administra-
tive units were not well supervised. To this end the judiciary 
must be strengthened and an independent anti-corruption unit 
should be built up, since the existing unit at the General Intelli-
gence Department lacks transparency and effectiveness. Parallel 
to this, positive incentives should be implemented for rewarding 
Jordanians who refrain from the use of wasta. Prizes might be 
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awarded, for example, to the fairest and most service-oriented 
government departments or employees. 
— An even more effective approach, however, would be to make 
the use of wasta completely useless. When citizens realise that 
administrative procedures have become so easy, cheap and quick 
that using wasta is superfluous, they will change their behaviour. 
— Likewise, measures are required for fostering transparency and 
accountability in the public administration. The division of re-
sponsibilities should be made more clear-cut and transparent for 
citizens. Public sector employees should be made accountable for 
the consequences of their decisions. Modern information and 
communication technologies should be employed. For example, 
e-procurement and e-tendering have helped in many countries to 
bring down government spending while accelerating administra-
tive procedures and making them more transparent and predict-
able. 
However, all these reforms will probably have only limited effects as 
long as Jordan’s political system remains unchanged. Lasting suc-
cesses in the fight against favouritism require transparency and ac-
countability not only in Jordan’s public administration but also in the 
political system itself:  
— The government should start by implementing its own National 
Agenda. Particularly, the party law should be liberalised, and the 
election law should be reformed to allow for a more representa-
tive parliament and stronger parliamentary control of the gov-
ernment. 
— In addition, the parliament should be empowered to hold the gov-
ernment accountable for its decisions. 
— A freedom of information law should be enacted.  
— The government should realise its plan to establish an independ-
ent ombudsman for citizens’ complaints.  
— All government budget plans and monitoring reports should be 
published in the Internet. 
The private sector is the second stakeholder in state-business relations 
and therefore also has a key responsibility to fight the use of wasta in 
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this particular field. Business people, as well as business associations 
and professional unions, should contribute to a heightened awareness 
while lobbying for institutional change and refraining from the use of 
wasta. 
Although NGOs and the media are not direct stakeholders in state-
business relations, they can support the efforts of the state and of the 
private sector. They should act in the public interest by: (i) increasing 
public awareness of the topic and lobbying for reform, (ii) mediating 
conflicts between different stakeholders, and (iii) speaking out for 
those who find it difficult to voice their concerns themselves.  
The possible scope of action of foreign donors in fighting wasta in 
Jordan is limited. Jordan is able to finance and organise most action 
against the use of wasta itself. What donors can do, however, is first 
of all to set a good example and to abstain from providing or benefit-
ing from preferential treatment themselves. Second, they should en-
courage the government of Jordan to intensify its efforts in the fight 
against the use of wasta and to undertake more fundamental political 
reforms. Third, they can consider to provide technical assistance 
where needed. For example, they could support NGOs and the media 
in their efforts to fight the use of wasta. 
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1 Introduction 
Purpose and main message of the study 
Wide-ranging agreement exists today that a good business climate is cen-
tral to economic growth and poverty alleviation. But questions remain 
open about the role of the state in creating a good business climate. This 
study is intended to answer some of these questions. 
The World Development Report 2005 argues that governments should 
provide above all for stability and security, more efficient taxation, finance 
for entrepreneurs, infrastructure, and the necessary education and training 
of workers. At the same time, however, good governance is at least 
equally important. Governments should therefore foster public trust and 
legitimacy, bolster the accountability of public institutions, and control 
corruption (World Bank 2004). 
Enhancing the quality of governance is particularly important for the coun-
tries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which is why this 
study focuses on one of these countries. All indicators put the MENA 
ranks at the bottom of all world regions in terms of governance, and this 
has not changed over the past decades. In contrast, all other world regions 
– with the possible exception of Central Asia – have seen considerable im-
provement. The Arab Human Development Report 2004 stresses that sus-
tainable economic growth cannot be achieved in the MENA countries 
without improved governance (UNDP / AFESD / AGFUND 2004). 
One of the core dimensions of good governance1 is transparency and the 
control of corruption. The latter in particular is important for a good busi-
ness climate (World Bank 2005f). Corruption can take different forms, one 
of them being favouritism which is very widespread in the MENA region. 
It is usually referred to there as ‘wasta’, which is Arabic for ‘relation’ or 
‘connection’, and describes the use of personal relations for preferential 
treatment. Cunningham and Sarayrah, who studied the phenomenon in de-
tail, state the following:  
                                                          
1  Other dimensions of good governance are: voice and accountability, political stability, 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law 
(World Bank 2005 f). 
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“The inability of some Third World nations to demonstrate long-term 
economic growth is often associated with government corruption. 
Wasta figures prominently in those charges and may be interpreted as a 
causal antecedent to poor economic performance.”  (Cunningham / 
Sarayrah 1993, 159) 
However, while Cunningham and Sarayrah recognise that wasta is detri-
mental to economic development, they do not show how this occurs. In 
fact, only a few studies to date have been published on the impact of 
wasta, and all of them focus on its role in the social and political sphere of 
MENA countries (Aysan / Nabli / Varoudakis 2006). 
The present study therefore focuses on the economic effects of wasta. It 
has a twofold aim: first to find out how the use of wasta in state-business 
relations affects the business climate and investment and, thereby, eco-
nomic development at large, and, second, to identify starting points for 
curtailing the use of wasta. All reference is hereby to Jordan, which has 
been selected for this case study for pragmatic reasons. 
The study does not attempt to measure the effects of wasta. The reader 
should not expect to find quantitative data on the extent to which private 
sector development suffers from the widespread use of wasta in Jordan. 
An assessment of this kind cannot be achieved with the methods used in 
this study. 
The main message of the study is that the use of wasta adversely affects 
the business climate in Jordan in many different ways. It leads to ineffi-
ciency and unfairness in state-business relations on both the administrative 
and the political level, thereby increasing the costs and risks of doing 
business in Jordan and setting up additional market-entry barriers for in-
vestors. 
In addition, the study shows that the fight against the use of wasta must 
address several factors, which are responsible for its prevalence and per-
sistence: Individual incentives for using wasta must be changed by legal 
and administrative reforms. Public awareness campaigns must be carried 
out. And, of course, the political system must be altered. 
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Methodology of the study  
This report is based on two sources of information: literature on the sub-
ject and primary research.  
The literature covers the business climate, state-business relations and 
wasta in Jordan. The business climate in Jordan has been amply described 
in country profiles and comparative studies, for example by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU 2000; 2005a) and the World Bank (2005b). State-
business relations in Jordan have been less well researched, but some stud-
ies on the political economy exist, for instance those of Wils (2003) and 
Knowles (2005).  
Unfortunately, only a very few studies focus on the economic effects of 
wasta. Of these, the work by Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993) already 
mentioned is the most comprehensive. Some international cross-country 
analyses have provided evidence on the economic effects of corruption in 
general. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) and Mauro (1996), for example, 
demonstrate that there is a significant negative correlation between the 
level of corruption in a country and its economic growth rate. They also 
show that corruption limits growth – not vice-versa. But they failed to ana-
lyse why and how this is so. Kilani and Sakijha (2002) surveyed Jordani-
ans’ perception of wasta and their reasons for using it. Even though this 
data is not representative, it at least provides some interesting insights into 
the ambiguity of the phenomenon and the complexity of its causes and ef-
fects.  
The empirical findings of this study come from a three-month research 
mission to Jordan between February and April 2006. During that time, the 
authors’ conducted  
— 99 interviews with representatives of the government of Jordan, non-
governmental organisations, academia, the media and foreign donors; 
— 63 interviews with businesspeople2; 
— 18 interviews with managers in the public administration and 
— a standardised survey among 180 low- to medium-ranking public sec-
tor employees. 
                                                          
2  Only 58 of these interviews were used, since five were devoid of substantial informa-
tion. 
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Structure of the study 
Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework of the study: It defines first 
the key terms and concepts of the study: business climate, state-business 
relations, favouritism, and wasta. After that, it discusses in general terms 
why and how favouritism may affect the business climate. Finally, the 
chapter draws upon theoretical literature to give possible explanations for 
the prevalence of favouritism in a given country. 
Chapter 3 is based on the results of Chapter 2 and delineates the hypothe-
ses tested by our empirical research in Jordan. In addition, it gives a de-
tailed account of our research methodology. 
Chapter 4 outlines the main features of the business climate in Jordan: It 
identifies the main problems perceived by businesspeople and discusses 
possible reasons for these weaknesses. The chapter concludes that state-
business relations are a major area of concern for investors in Jordan. 
Chapter 5 turns to the role of wasta in Jordan. It shows how the use of 
wasta permeates all areas of economic and social life and gives an insight 
into the ambiguous attitudes of Jordanians toward wasta.  
Chapter 6 is devoted to the effects of wasta on the business climate and on 
investment. It shows that the prevalence of wasta in Jordan makes state-
business relations unfair and inefficient. In addition, wasta establishes in-
centives for investment in social relations rather than in productive capital, 
thus lowering the rate of capital formation in Jordan. 
Chapter 7 concludes with policy recommendations. It first discusses why 
wasta persists in Jordan despite its negative effects and explains this phe-
nomenon by (i) perverse incentives for all those involved, (ii) a lack of 
awareness of alternatives to the use of wasta, (iii) the impact of socio-
cultural norms, and (iv) a deep-seated opposition to change. After that, the 
chapter investigates what has been done up to now to limit the use of 
wasta and its impact on the business climate in Jordan. The chapter ends 
with a list of things that the government of Jordan, the private sector, 
NGOs, the media, and foreign donors can do to limit the future use of 
wasta in Jordan. 
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2 Business climate, state-business relations, and the 
impact of favouritism 
Widespread favouritism has significant, adverse effects on the business 
climate. It leads to inefficiency and unfairness in state-business relations 
and thereby increases the costs, risks and impediments for investors. 
Eliminating it is often difficult, however, because of a lack of awareness, 
perverse incentives, political interests and the influence of social norms. 
In this chapter, we will approach the subject from a theoretical perspec-
tive. We identify the criteria of a good business climate (2.1), define the 
term ‘state-business relations’ (2.2) and portray the phenomenon of fa-
vouritism (2.3). We then formulate assumptions about the effects of fa-
vouritism (2.4). Finally, we discuss possible explanations for the preva-
lence of favouritism in many countries worldwide (2.5) and how the phe-
nomenon must be addressed in order to reduce it (2.6). 
2.1 The business climate 
In recent years, the debate on how pro-poor growth can be achieved has 
increasingly focused on the role of the business climate, which is the main 
determinant of the level of private investment in a country (World Bank 
2004). In turn, the rate of investment has been found to be the single most 
important factor for economic growth (Levine / Renelt 1992). 
The term ‘business climate’ includes all factors that shape the decision of 
both local and foreign entrepreneurs whether or not to do business in a 
country.3 Some of these factors are related to the geographic location of 
the country and therefore cannot be altered. This includes, inter alia, the 
country’s size, morphology, climate, and natural resources. Other factors 
change over time and are likewise beyond governmental control. A good 
example of this is the political stability and economic development of 
neighbouring countries. A third set of factors, however, is directly affected 
by political decisions: the quality of the infrastructure, the availability of 
credit, the quality of the work force, the extent and efficiency of taxation, 
                                                          
3 This definition follows the World Bank’s explanation for ‘investment climate’, which is 
defined as “the set of location-specific factors shaping the opportunities and incentives 
for firms to invest productively, create jobs and expand” (World Bank 2004, 20). 
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the regulation of markets, the enforcement of property rights and contracts, 
the accountability of public institutions, and the level of corruption (World 
Bank 2004). 
The World Development Report 2005 stresses that the quality of a business 
climate depends on three aspects: (i) the costs of doing business, (ii) the 
risks of doing business, and (iii) barriers to competition. 
— High costs limit the revenue of businesspeople and therefore discour-
age them from investing. These costs may arise, for example, from a 
lack of infrastructure, difficulties in gaining access to finance, high 
taxes, and burdensome administrative procedures.  
— High risks are also a problem because most businesspeople are risk-
averse, i.e. they tend to avoid high-risk investments even when the ex-
pected rate of return of such a high-risk investment exceeds the rate of 
return of a low-risk investment. The risks of an investment may vary, 
for example, with the capacity of the state to enforce property rights 
and contracts, to provide for a stable macro-economic environment and 
to guarantee the transparency of administrative decisions. 
— High barriers to competition hinder new firms from entering a market 
and thus benefit powerful incumbent companies. They are usually the 
result of overregulated markets (World Bank 2004). 
2.2 State-business relations 
Many of the factors, which are relevant for a business climate, are linked 
to state-business relations. From an investor’s perspective, these should be 
efficient and fair. 
In the past, many initiatives for improving the business climate have fo-
cused on market liberalisation, infrastructure development, and the provi-
sion of finance and consultancy to small and medium-sized enterprises. In-
stitutional deficits have long been neglected.  
During recent years, however, more and more emphasis has been put on 
the importance of good governance for investors (Aysan / Nabli / Varou-
dakis 2006; World Bank 1998, 2005b). Governance can be defined as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for 
the common good.” (Kaufmann 2005a, 41). Good governance therefore 
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commits itself to principles such as accountability, legitimacy, efficiency, 
transparency, and the rule of law. 
The quality of governance affects not only the relationship between citi-
zens and the government but also all kinds of interactions between private 
firms and the state. This includes not only administrative procedures such 
as the registration of new companies, licensing, taxation, contract en-
forcement, and the submission of tenders, but also contacts on the political 
level: businesspeople long for political representation and participation in 
legislation and policy-formulation, while governments sometimes try to 
use big companies for their own goals. 
We argue here that efficiency and fairness are the main criteria for the 
quality of state-business relations. Efficiency reduces the costs of inves-
tors, while fairness ensures fair competition and thereby also limits the 
risks of doing business. 
— Efficiency minimises the input required for a given output. The main 
input of businesspeople in state-business interactions consists of time 
and money. Efficiency is thus proportionate to the speed, ease, and 
cheapness of administrative procedures. 
— Fairness4 implies that all individuals have equal opportunities to 
achieve specific goals (World Bank 2005g, 2). State-business relations 
are thus fair when public authorities treat all businesspeople the same 
way, i.e. when no one is favoured and when everyone has the same 
chance to enter a market. One result of fairness is effective competi-
tion; another is that the risks of investments are limited: Equal treat-
ment requires standardised procedures, which make the decisions of 
the authorities predictable. 
2.3 Favouritism 
The word ‘favouritism’ has two somewhat different meanings: (i) the gen-
eral inclination to favour one person or group over others, and (ii) concrete 
                                                          
4  The term “fairness” refers here to the principle of equal opportunity: “The outcome of a 
person’s life should reflect mostly his or her efforts and talents, not his or her back-
ground. Predetermined circumstances […] and the social groups a person is born into 
should not help determine whether people succeed economically, socially, and political-
ly.” (World Bank 2005g, 19).  
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preferential treatment of those to whom one has personal connections, 
such as relatives, friends, neighbours or other acquaintances.  
Favouritism can arise in different situations: in interactions between public 
sector officials and businesspeople (e.g. when the latter request a permis-
sion at a state office), but also in interactions between different private 
sector agents (e.g. when a job-seeker applies for a post in a private sector 
company). 
Favouritism does not constitute a problem when only two people are in-
volved. Relatives and friends may, of course, favour each other when they 
assume all responsibility for the consequences themselves. An entrepre-
neur, for example, is free to employ only members of his family. His deci-
sion possibly creates disadvantages for other people, but the entrepreneur 
himself bears most of the risk, when his employees are selected on the ba-
sis of a personal relationship with him rather than on the basis of their 
qualifications. 
Favouritism is more harmful, however, when a third person is concerned: 
for example, when a public or private officer uses her/his position to dis-
tribute the resources of someone else to a friend or to a relative. This con-
stellation is well represented by a principal-agent model, where the officer 
is the agent and his employer (a private entrepreneur or – in the case of 
civil servants – the state) is the principal (Andvig / Fjeldstad 2001). In 
granting preferential treatment to a friend or family member, the agent 
misuses the position and power that he owes to the principal, who is un-
able to control the agent because of asymmetric information. As a conse-
quence, favouritism is very widespread where interactions are not trans-
parent and officials are not held accountable for their actions. 
The primary victim of such misuse of public or private office in the form 
of favouritism is always the principal. The principal loses, because the 
agent awards, for example, an order to a relative or friend rather than to 
the best tenderer. In addition, however, there is a secondary victim when 
the principal is the state and a civil servant the agent. This secondary vic-
tim is the general public, on whose behalf the state and its employees are 
expected to treat all citizens equally. When a public sector employee fa-
vours his acquaintances, he impinges upon the rights of all other applicants 
who may have submitted a better offer or are better qualified for a job to 
be filled. 
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In the latter case, favouritism is a form of corruption (Utstein Anti-
Corruption Resource Center 2005). Corruption is usually defined as the 
abuse of public or private office for personal gain or as a unilateral privati-
sation of public goods (Kaufmann 2005c). The relationships upon which 
favouritism is based may be established by birth (e.g. between relatives), 
by shared experiences (e.g. between people who have gone to school to-
gether or live in the same area), or by active social network building. Giv-
ing small gifts and favours to influential people, for example, can help to 
establish relationships that may be helpful in future (Olivier de Sardan 
1999; Khatri / Tsang / Begley 2006).  
Depending on the relationship between the agent and the person who 
benefits from preferential treatment, favouritism may take different forms: 
nepotism is the abuse of public power for the gain of family members. Cro-
nyism is preferential treatment of friends or colleagues on the part of public 
officials. Tribalism is the inclination to favour people from the same tribe 
(Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Center 2005; Pope 2000, 197 f.). 
Favouritism is a widely accepted pattern of social interaction in many 
parts of the world: Preferential treatment of family members and friends is 
associated with social norms such as solidarity and loyalty and therefore 
seen as an acceptable form of behaviour, while other forms of corruption, 
such as bribery, are associated with illegality and illegitimacy. In some 
countries, favouritism has even become an informal institution5 that de-
scribes ‘acceptable’ and even ‘normal’ behaviour (Andvig / Fjeldstad 
2001; Olivier de Sardan 1999; Tanzi 1995).  
Favouritism is called blat in Russia, guanxi in China and wasta in the 
Middle East. Wasta is the Arabic word for ‘relationship’ and refers to the 
use of personal connections to obtain preferential treatment.6 Often, three 
parties are involved in this process apart from the principal: (i) the client 
who desires a certain service, (ii) the agent who is supposed to grant pref-
                                                          
5  Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society, enforced either through law or 
through other mechanisms of social control that shape human interaction” (Mantzavi-
nos 2001, 83). Favouritism is called an informal institution because its use is enforced 
by society rather than the state. 
6  Unlike favouritism, however, the word describes this preferential treatment from the 
point of view of the person who is granted a favour rather than the person who is doing 
the favour. 
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erential treatment to the client, and (iii) a mediator, who helps the client to 
get in touch with the agent and perhaps puts in a good word for him.  
The mediator is himself often called ‘wasta’. But he/she is not always 
needed (even when the agent does not know the client personally). If the 
client comes from a well-known family, he can get many things done 
merely by mentioning his family name. This kind of wasta is acquired by 
birth, while other kinds are built up through investment in social relations 
(Cunningham / Sarayrah 1993; Guthrie 1999; Hutchings / Weir 2006; 
Lovett / Simmons / Kali 1999; Olivier de Sardan 1999). 
Favouritism can be distinguished from other forms of corruption such as 
bribery in that it is based on long-term social relations and mutual trust 
rather than on an immediate exchange of material favours, as in the case of 
bribery, where a certain amount of money or a gift is given for a specific 
favour. In contrast, favouritism creates a more implicit, indirect and un-
specified obligation. Although reciprocity is also very important for fa-
vouritism, the person doing a favour to another person does not know 
when and how the latter will reciprocate. In many circumstances, the re-
cipient of a favour must not even reciprocate to the donor himself. Rather, 
especially in the context of family networks, he is expected to reciprocate 
by showing solidarity to any other relative in need. This is a form of ‘gen-
eralised reciprocity’ (Khatri / Tsang / Begley 2006; Tanzi 1995; UNODC 
2004).  
2.4 The impact of favouritism 
Widespread favouritism affects the economic, social and political system 
of a country. While there has always been general agreement on its overall 
negative consequences for social and political development, many re-
searchers have long believed that favouritism can be positive for economic 
development as well. However, recent research has provided broad evi-
dence that widespread favouritism is harmful for the business climate of a 
country as well as for private sector development and economic growth. 
This is presumably due to the fact that favouritism makes state-business 
relations inefficient and unfair. 
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The social impact 
Although favouritism also has some positive effects, its overall impact on 
social development is negative. 
Favouritism can strengthen social ties and networks and thereby deepen 
social cohesion. It is based on solidarity, loyalty and mutual trust among 
tribesmen, friends and neighbours. Asking for a favour and granting a fa-
vour are ways to profess these values and reinforce one’s social relations. 
Favouritism can thus strengthen the ties within kinship groups, thereby 
creating social capital (Hasan 2005; Lin 1999). 
However, favouritism is not always integrative. It can also cause cleavages 
between kinship groups. In a tribal society, favouritism may even be an 
obstacle to nation-building. In addition, it intensifies socio-economic dis-
parities. Those who are less well-integrated into society or who come from 
lower social strata are not acquainted with persons who might be able to 
do them useful favours, nor do they usually have the necessary means to 
reciprocate favours. As a result, they have fewer opportunities for gaining 
access to good jobs and services and thus improving their living condi-
tions. In particular, minorities, the poor, and women are often penalised in 
this way (UNDP Jordan 2004). 
Favouritism can also create or perpetuate dependencies. Where formal 
rules are persistently undermined by preferential treatment for well-
connected persons, people conclude that each and every service provided 
by a government employee is a favour, even though each has a right to 
these government services (Cunningham / Sarayrah 1994, 39). 
Finally, favouritism reduces the incentive for individuals to develop their 
talents and ideas. Its prevalence makes the reputation, recognition, and 
success of people dependent on their connections rather than their efforts, 
skills or manners (UNDP / AFESD / AGFUND 2004, 136).  
The political impact 
The effects of favouritism on political development are thoroughly nega-
tive. For example, favouritism can help to strengthen authoritarian regimes 
which are based on patron-client relations. Where a small number of key 
supporters suffices to secure power, the reciprocity mechanism of favourit-
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ism can help to stabilise this political rule: the rulers grant favours to their 
clientele and receive loyalty in return (World Bank 2005g, 108). 
The economic impact 
For the purposes of this study, we were most interested in the effects of 
favouritism on economic development.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of researchers believed that the 
economic effects of favouritism are positive (Krastev 2006, 19). Their ar-
gument was that favouritism reduces transaction costs and facilitates the 
flow of information. It thereby smoothes the path for all kinds of inter-
actions between businesspeople and the state (Haggard / Maxfield / 
Schneider 1997, 56). 
There is some truth to this. Favouritism can have positive effects, for ex-
ample, when the person favouring someone else acts on his own behalf. 
Thus both sides benefit when someone is hired by a private company be-
cause he was recommended to the company owner by a common friend: 
the job-seeker obtains preferential treatment and the employer important 
information which helps him to reduce his risks: he has been told that the 
candidate is qualified and assumes this is true because he can make the 
common friend accountable. 
The situation is different, however, when the person who does the favour 
does not feel the consequences. A public administrator, for example, may 
employ a relative or friend even though he knows that this person is not 
qualified. He does not suffer personally from this decision, but the public 
does: the employee receives a salary from the state even though he is un-
able to do his work. In addition, favouritism benefits only those who are 
well-connected and discriminates against all others. 
It can thus be assumed that favouritism leads to unfairness in state-
business relations. People with good personal connections are likely to re-
ceive business licences much faster than others – if the others get such li-
censes at all. Some may even benefit from tax or duty exemptions and 
thereby gain an advantage over their competitors. They may also receive 
exclusive information that allows them to identify future markets ahead of 
others. Likewise, people with good connections are likely to win govern-
ment contracts even when they do not submit the best offer. 
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It may also be assumed that favouritism causes inefficiency in state-
business relations. When licences are granted on the basis of personal 
preference, for example, the costs and risks of applying for it may be too 
high for those who have no personal connections in the public sector. En-
trepreneurs with good connections will benefit from such barriers to com-
petition. They will have little difficulty in obtaining licenses and permits 
and can exploit rents. Favouritism thus distorts competition (Fan 2002).  
Likewise, favouritism may affect legislation and policy-making. Entrepre-
neurs may cultivate contacts not only with civil servants but also with min-
isters and parliamentarians. As a result, they may be able to exert influence 
on laws and government decrees, thus lobbying for regulations beneficial 
to themselves but not to their competitors. In this way, favouritism once 
again distorts competition and ultimately harms consumers (World Bank 
2004). 
 
Figure 1:  Correlation between the level of favouritism and the  
quality of the business climate in different countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from: Lopez-Claros / Schwab / Porter (2005); World Bank 
(2005d) 
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Such effects may significantly affect the business climate by increasing the 
costs and risks and raising barriers to competition for the large majority of 
investors who lack the necessary personal connections with decision-
makers. If favouritism really has these effects, the level of investment can 
be expected to be lower in countries where favouritism is widespread. 
Numerous econometric inquiries have confirmed that the level of corrup-
tion in a country is negatively correlated with the quality of its business 
climate, its level of investment, and its economic growth. Some of these 
studies have also shown that the direction of causality is from corruption 
to economic development but not vice versa: the level of income has no 
significant effect on the amount of corruption (Alcala and Ciccone 2004; 
Kaufmann 2005c, 84; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002, 26; Krastev 2006, 20; 
Mauro 1996; Rodrik and Rigobon 2005; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 
2004; Wei 2000). 
 
Figure 2:  Correlation between the level of favouritism and per capita  
income in different countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from: Lopez-Claros / Schwab / Porter (2005); UNDP (2005) 
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However, none of these studies has focused explicitly on favouritism. 
Rather, all have been based on how experts or ordinary citizens perceive 
the significance of corruption in a country as a proxy for its effective level. 
Their objectivity thus depends on a well-selected sample of those inter-
viewed. In addition, these studies do not say much about the level of fa-
vouritism because many people have only bribery in mind (rather than 
other forms of corruption such as favouritism) when they speak about cor-
ruption.  
Figures 1 and 2 above provide additional evidence for the correlation be-
tween favouritism and economic development. Favouritism is represented 
by a component of the Global Competitiveness Index for ‘favouritism in 
decisions of government officials’. The figures do not indicate, however, 
the mechanisms by which favouritism influences economic development. 
2.5 Reasons for the persistence of favouritism 
Favouritism persists in many countries despite its detrimental effects on 
economic, social and political development. Theoretically, four different 
factors may explain this phenomenon: (i) disincentives for individuals to 
change their behaviour, (ii) a lack of awareness, (ii) the jamming force of 
socio-cultural values and norms, and (iv) the opposition to change of an 
influential elite. All of these factors must be addressed when fighting fa-
vouritism and its negative impacts.  
Favouritism may constitute an informal institution when it is very common 
and accepted in a society. New institutional economics define institutions 
as “the rules of the game in a society, enforced either through law or 
through other mechanisms of social control that shape human interaction” 
(Mantzavinos 2001, 83). According to Mantzavinos, individuals are per-
manently engaged in solving problems in order to maximise their utility. 
Due to limited cognitive capacity however, they cannot decide anew each 
time how to solve their problems. Therefore they tend to use a solution re-
peatedly once it has proven to be useful for a specific class of problems. 
Within this framework, institutions are solutions for recurring problems. 
They are used whenever a problem appears to resemble previous ones. In-
stitutions – like favouritism – are called ‘informal’ if they are enforced by 
society rather than the state. 
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Unfortunately, such institutions are not automatically replaced or changed 
when they are no longer the best or even good solutions at all. New institu-
tional economics argues that such institutions are maintained until a criti-
cal mass of individuals within a society experiences that they are no longer 
satisfactory solutions for their problems. Only in this case will people try 
new solutions and adopt the most successful one as a new institution 
(Mantzavinos 2001, 7). 
Substitution of a new, more beneficial solution for an old one can thus fail 
to take place for different reasons. Four of the most important are: 
— People are not aware of the disadvantages of the old institution. 
— Although the new institution would be more beneficial than the old one 
for society as a whole, it is not for the members of society from their 
individual perspective (perverse incentives).  
— The old institution is connected with or derived from other institutions 
on a meta-level (social norms and values). 
— The advocates of change are unable to overcome their opponents. 
Lack of awareness 
A first reason for the persistence of favouritism is a lack of awareness. On 
the one hand, people may not think about its effects. They may disregard 
the fact that favouritism in state-business relations leads to unfairness and 
may fail to consider its cost to the state and, thereby, to taxpayers. In addi-
tion, even if they are aware of these direct consequences of favouritism, 
people may not think about its far less obvious long-term impact on the 
social, political and economic development of their country.  
On the other hand, people may still adhere to favouritism even when they 
know about its negative effects on the micro- and macro-level. This may 
be due to a lack of awareness of alternatives, i.e. people may not be able to 
imagine other patterns of interaction that are based on formal rules rather 
than personal relations. If they have tried during their whole lives to solve 
their problems by favouritism, they may not realise that it has become pos-
sible to solve these problems in a legal way (Newell / Simon 1972, 72). 
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Perverse incentives 
Favouritism may also persist due to tension between collective and indi-
vidual benefits and costs. In this case, the incentive structure may resem-
ble the model of ‘collective prisoners’ dilemma’ already mentioned (Eigen 
2001): Every member of society would be better off if all adhered to for-
mal rules rather than favouritism. However, as long as all others continue 
to provide and seek preferential treatment, the individual only worsens his 
own situation by abstaining from favouritism. And even if all others were 
to comply with formal rules, every individual could still improve her/his 
own possibilities by reverting to favouritism, unless this behaviour is pe-
nalised. As a result, individuals are better off if they use favouritism – re-
gardless of what the others do – until collective action is co-ordinated, e.g., 
by punishing favouritism and rewarding the adherence to formal rules. 
Social values and norms 
A third reason why favouritism persists is that it may be considered as a 
social norm and is associated with values such as solidarity, fidelity and 
the reciprocity of giving and taking. Many people believe, for example, 
that loyalty to friends and tribesmen manifests itself in the provision of 
preferential treatment. To refuse a favour is perceived in such circum-
stances as a violation of the rules of society (Andvig / Fjeldstad 2001; 
Tanzi 1995, Shunnaq 1997). 
This does not mean, however, that culture is at the root of favouritism. 
Cunningham / Sarayrah (1994, 182) write that solidarity and loyalty to 
relatives have “top priority in the Arab value system” and that wasta is 
seen by many Arabs as an expression of these values. In addition, they 
state that wasta within the family and clan, but also among friends, is a 
matter of course in Middle Eastern societies. This does not mean, how-
ever, that favouritism is a specific feature or outcome of Arab or Middle 
Eastern culture. A link between social norms and favouritism can be found 
in every country and every culture, which emphasises values such as soli-
darity and loyalty. In addition, the link must not necessarily exist in real-
ity: favouritism is difficult to overcome even when people only believe 
that it is tied to their norms (Kaufmann 2005c, 89; Krastev 2006, 20). 
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Opposition to change 
A fourth factor for explaining the persistence of favouritism is opposition 
to change. Even a large majority of the population can fail to eradicate fa-
vouritism if an influential minority resists. Two arguments explain why 
small groups can be so powerful. 
The first is public choice theory. As Olson (1965) explains, small groups 
are better able to team up and achieve their aims than large groups. They 
incur lower transaction costs in organising themselves and defining com-
mon goals. They can more easily implement positive and negative incen-
tives for their members to act collectively. They face less information 
asymmetry as to the effective behaviour of their members, and are there-
fore better able to punish deviations from the rules of the group. Last but 
not least, the members of small groups accrue comparatively large gains 
from collective action, while the members of large groups acquire only 
small shares of collective gains. 
The second argument can be derived from political economies. Minorities 
sometimes consist of the most affluent and dominant members of a society 
and can thus influence policy-making more easily than the majority. The 
elite group often benefits disproportionately from widespread favouritism 
and therefore has no interest in measures against it. In many countries, a 
small number of key supporters are sufficient to stabilise a political re-
gime, which is based on clientelist structures and informal, personal deci-
sion-making. The political leaders use the reciprocal mechanisms of fa-
vouritism to strengthen their position. They grant benefits to their support-
ers and obtain loyalty in return. The elite is thus composed of people with 
privileged relations to the regime and substantial influence on political de-
cisions. Since any action against favouritism would weaken their position, 
they resist reforms (World Bank 2005g, 108). 
2.6 Possible starting points for the fight against favouritism 
in state-business relations 
In many cases, the struggle against favouritism must start from different 
points. As already pointed out, it may be necessary to eliminate incentives 
for resorting to favouritism while also increasing public awareness about 
its negative impact, disentangling it in people’s minds from prevailing so-
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cial norms, and defeating opposition to change. The approaches of choice 
for reaching these four goals are as follows: 
Public awareness: Information and awareness campaigns can be initiated 
and run not only by the state but also by non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), the media, academia and business associations. Their first aim 
should be to make the negative effects of favouritism better known. Sec-
ond, they should try to help disentangle favouritism in people’s minds 
from cherished social norms and values. The message could be, for exam-
ple, that everyone owes solidarity and loyalty not only to relatives and 
tribesmen but also to every compatriot and to the nation as a whole. Third, 
public awareness campaigns should strengthen the identification of citi-
zens with their state and the responsibility of civil servants with the gen-
eral welfare of their country (World Bank 2005a).  
Transparency in politics and in the public administration: Transparency is 
prerequisite for changing the incentives of individuals to adhere to favour-
itism. The collective prisoners’ dilemma of widespread favouritism is a re-
sult of reciprocal information asymmetry. As a consequence, the general 
public must be informed about the actions and reactions of all parties in-
volved. In addition, the rules of the game must be publicised. For example, 
everyone should know the conditions for submitting government tenders 
in advance and thus be able to judge, after a decision has been made by 
public administrators, whether it is in line with the initial conditions. 
Likewise, citizens should be able to monitor legislative and regulatory 
processes so as to control the decisions of policy-makers. A free press is 
another key to reaching this goal (Martini 2004, 14).  
Accountability: At the same time, accountability must be required from 
decision-makers. If an agent is regularly monitored by the principal, he has 
less discretion to favour one person over another and is more likely to act 
on the principal’s behalf instead of his own or on behalf of any of his ac-
quaintances. Accountability is crucial to enable citizens monitor the deci-
sions of public administrators and politicians and to punish misconduct 
(e.g. in democratic elections) (World Bank 2005a).  
Changed incentives: The pay-off structure of the current situation (collec-
tive prisoner’s dilemma) must be transformed into an incentive structure 
that renders adherence to favouritism unattractive. This requires both posi-
tive and negative incentives. Simple and cheap administrative procedures 
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are a good example of positive incentives because they make it unneces-
sary for people to ask for favours when their requests are handled very 
quickly anyway. In addition, examples of integrity in state-business rela-
tions or in the fight against favouritism might be rewarded in public to 
serve as an incentive for other citizens to do likewise. Negative incentives 
may include, among others, rigorous penalties for offences against formal 
rules. On the political level, competition in electoral processes is the best 
mechanism for punishing misconduct (Pope 2000; UNOCD 2004). 
Alternatively, the pay-off structure can also be changed by decentralised 
action, i.e. by persons from the private sector themselves. They can build 
groups in which they agree to comply with formal rules. Transparency In-
ternational (TI) has proposed, for example, that entrepreneurs who tender 
bids to the government create ‘islands of integrity’, where everyone can 
monitor the actions of all other parties. Successful cases of such ‘islands of 
integrity’ in Latin America and Africa have shown that recourse to favour-
itism vanishes in them because everyone can ensure that competitors do 
not use personal connections. The advantage of such decentralised action 
is that entrepreneurs must not wait for the state to take legal action (Eigen 
2001, 7; Martini 2004, 10; TI 2003). 
Adherence to the principles of democracy: Democratic decision-making is 
crucial for limiting the influence of well-organised groups, i.e. for prevent-
ing a minority of people from benefiting from widespread favouritism and 
obstructing political and administrative reforms (Martini 2004, 7). Democ-
ratic decision-making includes the participation of citizens, freedom of ex-
pression and association, free information, equal and effective voting 
rights, the right of every person to be elected, and free and fair competition 
in all kinds of elections.7 
A coalition for change: Those who suffer from widespread favouritism are 
usually a more heterogeneous group than the beneficiaries of it and there-
fore far less well organised. As a result, they should try to form a coalition 
of pressure groups lobbying for the fight against favouritism (Eigen 2001). 
                                                          
7  Criteria of democracy, formulated according to Dahl (1971, 2 f.). 
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3 Research methodology 
The aim of our research in Jordan was to find empirical evidence for the 
assumptions exclaimed in the preceding chapter: That is, we wanted to 
learn (i) how favouritism affects the business climate in Jordan and 
(ii) what can be done about it. For this purpose, we formulated four work-
ing hypotheses to be tested during our three-month stay in Jordan.  
In this chapter, we will first describe these hypotheses (3.1) and then out-
line our methods of data collection (3.2). 
3.1 Research hypotheses 
We derived our research hypotheses from the theoretical considerations 
presented in Chapter 2. The first two hypotheses are formalistic in charac-
ter and were intended to guide our research on the role of favouritism in 
the concrete context of Jordan: 
Hypothesis 1:  The business climate in Jordan suffers from significant deficits in 
state-business relations. 
Hypothesis 2:  Favouritism is prevalent and persistent in Jordan. 
The other two hypotheses are more exciting and were directly related to 
the double purpose of our study (see above). 
Hypothesis 3:  Widespread favouritism has a negative impact on the business 
climate and on economic development at large because it leads 
to inefficiency and unfairness in state-business relations.  
Hypothesis 4:  The struggle against favouritism in Jordan must address the 
main causes of its persistence by: (i) changing the incentives for 
individuals to resort to favouritism, (ii) heightening public 
awareness, (iii) disentangling favouritism from social norms in 
the public mind, and (iv) defeating opposition to change. 
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3.2 Methods of data collection  
Our research in Jordan aimed at finding empirical evidence for or against 
the four hypotheses mentioned above. We prepared our mission between 
November 2005 and early February 2006 and conducted the empirical re-
search in Jordan from February to April 2006.  
The research was done in four phases: (i) interviews with ‘experts (re-
source persons from the government of Jordan, from non-governmental 
organisations, from academia, from the media, and from foreign donors; 
(ii) interviews with businesspeople; (iii) interviews with managers in the 
public sector, and (iv) a standardised survey among low-ranking to me-
dium-ranking civil servants (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1:  Empirical research phases 
Num-
ber 
Group Selection  
technique 
Research  
technique 
Analysis 
99 Experts Snowball with  
individuals 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Qualitative 
58 Businesspeople Business  
associations,  
business devel-
opment service 
providers, 
industrial  
directories, 
chambers  
of commerce 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Qualitative & 
quantitative 
18 Medium- to  
high-ranking  
civil servants 
Relevance for  
businesspeople 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Qualitative 
180 Low- to  
medium-ranking 
civil servants 
Relevance for  
businesspeople 
Standardised  
survey 
Quantitative 
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In accordance with the principles of ‘grounded theory’, we followed an it-
erative approach: continuous analysis of our interviews helped us to adapt 
our hypotheses when necessary in order to ensure relevant and accurate re-
search results. Also, each research phase was designed according to the in-
formation obtained in the earlier phases. For example, after learning dur-
ing the second phase that licensing and registration is a major concern for 
many of the businesspeople interviewed, we decided to talk mainly with 
employees of the main public institutions involved in licensing and regis-
trating private firms: the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Jordan In-
vestment Board, the Municipality of Amman and the Aqaba Special Eco-
nomic Zone Authority during the third and fourth phases of our research. 
Interviews with experts 
The first phase of our research, which took about three weeks, was in-
tended to collect general information on the business climate, state-
business relations and the role of favouritism in Jordan. 
To reach this goal, we met with ‘experts’, i.e. with people whom we be-
lieved to have interesting and useful answers to our questions. All in all, 
we conducted 99 interviews with 55 representatives of the government of 
Jordan and other public authorities, 23 delegates of NGOs, 32 academics, 
journalists and consultants, 29 spokespersons of business associations and 
business promotion agencies and 33 members of the donor community.8 
At first we selected only three to five well-known persons from each of 
these groups. By asking each of them for further interesting interviewees, 
we received the names of additional people to interview.9 
All expert interviews were semi-structured, i.e. based on a guideline that 
left the possibility open for asking additional questions. The results of the 
interviews were analysed qualitatively with the assistance of the computer 
programme ATLAS.ti.10 In order to validate the data, we triangulated them 
                                                          
8  The number of interviewees exceeds by far the number of interviews because we con-
ducted several interviews with more than just one person. 
9  We also interviewed some ‘experts’ in later stages of our research in order to validate 
previous findings or to obtain specific information which we found still missing. See 
Page 179 for a list of all interviewed experts. 
10  ATLAS.ti was developed by Scientific Software GmbH, Berlin. 
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with the existing literature and with the results of the interviews with busi-
nesspeople and public sector employees.  
Interviews with businesspeople 
The other three phases of our research aimed at recording the perceptions 
and opinions of direct stakeholders in state-business relations: business-
people and public sector employees. 
During the second phase, we conducted 63 interviews with representatives 
of local and foreign companies in Jordan. Of these, five interviews failed 
to provide any substantial information and were excluded from the study. 
All interviewees were asked how they view the conditions of doing busi-
ness in Jordan in general and the quality of state-business relations in par-
ticular, what specific problems they have themselves, and what they think 
the reasons for these problems might be. 
To get a broad picture of the Jordanian private sector, we talked with busi-
nesspeople from very different economic branches: manufacturing, infor-
mation technologies, retail, consultancy, marketing and tourism. Likewise, 
we paid attention to all ranges of company size: Most businesspeople rep-
resented small and medium-sized companies, but we also conducted inter-
views with micro-entrepreneurs and speakers from large enterprises.11 
Most of the companies are based in Amman and Zarqa, i.e. in the eco-
nomic centre of the country around the capital. Only nine interviews were 
conducted in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the very south 
of Jordan, which was recommended to us because of the allegedly excep-
tional quality of the business environment in that free trade zone (see Ta-
ble A1 in Annex A for a detailed list of the sample). 
We selected some of the enterprises randomly from the Industrial Direc-
tory of the Amman Chamber of Industry (ACI 2006). The rest were identi-
fied with the assistance of different business associations and business de-
velopment agencies.12 Therefore, the sample is not representative and the 
results can only give indications concerning the significance of different 
problems for companies in Jordan. 
                                                          
11  See Page 190 for a list of all interviewed businesspeople. 
12  Random sampling proved to be difficult: most of the businesspeople who were chosen 
through the Jordan Business Directory did not want to cooperate. 
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Nevertheless, it gives a comparatively good idea of the chances and risks 
of investments in Jordan. It is only a little smaller than the sample on 
which the assessment of Jordan’s business climate by the Global Competi-
tiveness Report is based. In that study, 88 entrepreneurs were interviewed 
in order to compute Jordan’s ranking with regard to the Global Competi-
tiveness Index. However, 55 % of them represented companies with more 
than 100 employees, while in reality only 2 % of all Jordanian enterprises 
employ more than 100 people.  
In our sample, 6 interviewees (11 %) came from firms with more than 
100 employees. On the other hand, 90 % of all companies in Jordan (but 
only 50 % of the companies in our sample and none in the sample of the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report) have only 20 
employees or less (Lopez-Claros / Schwab / Porter 2005, Table 1; MoIT 
2006; see also Table A2 in Annex A for a comparison). 
Our interviews with businesspeople were semi-structured. However, some 
of the questions were asked in the same way in each interview; this al-
lowed us to analyse some of the results not only by qualitative but also by 
quantitative techniques. 
To validate our data, we cross-checked them with the results of our inter-
views with experts and with public sector employees. In addition, we 
guaranteed anonymity to our interviewees in order to gain their confidence 
and to increase the probability of getting honest answers. 
Interviews with medium- to high-ranking civil servants 
In the third phase of our field research, we conducted 18 extensive inter-
views with medium-ranking to high-ranking civil servants in different 
state authorities. The goal was to explore how Jordanian public sector em-
ployees see and evaluate their interactions with businesspeople, what the 
incentive structure in the public sector looks like, and what role favourit-
ism plays in the recruitment and promotion of public sector employees 
(see Annex C for more details).  
To be able to select interesting interviewees, we asked businesspeople dur-
ing the second phase of our research to name for us the state authorities 
which are most relevant for businesspeople in Jordan and which kinds of 
interactions with the state are most troublesome for them. The answers in-
dicated that registering a company and licensing a business cause excep-
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tionally serious problems for investors. Consequently, we spoke with 
managers in the registration and licensing departments of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (MoIT), the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), and the 
Municipality of Greater Amman (MGA). We also interviewed representa-
tives of the respective departments of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
Authority (ASEZA) in order to find out whether state-business relations 
are more effective and fairer in the ASEZ than in the rest of the country.13 
Again, all interviews were semi-structured and analysed qualitatively.  
We validated the answers of the medium- and high-ranking public sector 
employees mainly by cross-checking them with the results of an additional 
standardised survey among low-ranking to medium ranking civil servants 
at the same institutions. 
Standardised survey among low-ranking to medium-ranking civil servants 
In the fourth phase of our research, we conducted a standardised survey 
among 180 low- to medium-ranking civil servants at the MoIT, the JIB, 
the MGA and the ASEZA. The participants were asked to fill out a form 
with 14 questions concerning incentive structures for public sector em-
ployees in their interactions with businesspeople, including subjects such 
as bribery and favouritism. 
The main aim of the survey was to validate the answers of the medium- to 
high-ranking civil servants interviewed during the third phase of our re-
search and to identify the specific perspective of low-ranking to medium-
ranking public sector employees on state-business relations.  
We analysed the results of the survey quantitatively (see Annex B). 
To make sure that the questionnaires reached the desired employees, we 
distributed and collected them personally. In addition, we told the respon-
dents to fill in the questionnaires anonymously in order to encourage them 
to answer truthfully. 
 
                                                          
13  See Page 194 for a list of all public sector employees who were interviewed. 
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4 The business climate in Jordan 
The quality of Jordan’s business climate is mediocre at best in interna-
tional and intraregional comparison – which is certainly not enough in 
light of the country’s small domestic market and other competitive disad-
vantages. The results of our research in fact substantiate the first of our 
hypotheses: although major improvements have occurred in recent years, 
considerable deficiencies remain – especially with regard to the efficiency 
and fairness of state-business relations. 
In this chapter we show that even though the country’s economic perform-
ance has improved during the last five years, Jordan must intensify its ef-
forts to improve the business climate (Section 4.1). In Section 4.2, we as-
sess the quality of Jordan’s business climate in international comparison. 
In Section 4.3 we identify the main problem areas for businesspeople in 
Jordan. Finally, in Section 4.4, we discuss the problems faced by Jorda-
nian businesspeople in their interactions with the state and their opinions 
as to why these problems exist.  
4.1 The need for a better business climate in Jordan 
Reforms are due in Jordan to improve business conditions. Currently, the 
country benefits from comparatively high economic growth rates, which 
are due, however, to temporary effects (Iraqi investments, increased ex-
ports to Iraq, high foreign development assistance, remittances from Jor-
danian migrant workers) rather than to a rise in productivity. Jordan needs 
to attract more investment and to develop a stronger and more competitive 
private sector in order to become independent from windfall profits. A bet-
ter investment climate is of key importance for reaching this goal. 
Jordan’s economic performance has improved in recent years. After an 
economic slowdown in the late 1990s, the Jordanian economy picked up 
speed and grew by 4.5 % on the average between 2000 and 2003 and even 
by 7.1 % between 2004 and 2006 (EIU 2005a, 32; Oxford Business Group 
14 November 2006). Likewise, Jordan has reduced inflation, its external 
public debt, its unemployment rate and its rate of population growth (see 
Table 2). 
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However, these achievements are not due to a competitive, productive pri-
vate sector. Rather, they result from substantial international rents:14 
— The conflict in Iraq has led to increased foreign development assis-
tance to Jordan. The United States in particular has raised its transfers 
in order to safeguard the political and economic stability of its most 
loyal ally in the Middle East (EIU 2005a, 48).  
— Jordan serves as a transport hub for international trade with Iraq. As 
long as the ports of Iraq are not yet fully operational, huge amounts of 
goods are shipped every day to Jordan’s seaport Aqaba and transported 
from there through the desert to Iraq by Jordanian carriers, who charge 
high prices have tripled their sales since 2001 (EIU 2005a, 31).  
— Many companies and international organisations operating in Iraq have 
relocated to Amman out of security considerations. Their staffs thus 
spend most of their money in Jordan (EIU 2005b, 25).  
— Likewise, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have moved at least tempo-
rarily to Jordan to escape from the civil war in their country. Many of 
them have invested their fortunes in real estate, thus stimulating a gi-
gantic construction boom in Amman and a steep rise in real estate pri-
ces15. This hits the less affluent inhabitants of the Jordanian capital 
hard but also pumps money into the Jordanian economy (Devi 2006; 
Rößler 2007). 
— The construction boom is further spurred by property investments of 
Jordanian migrant workers returning to their home country as well as 
by investors from the Gulf looking for rewarding opportunities to in-
vest excess liquidity generated by the recent oil boom (EIU 2005a, 41; 
EIU 2005b, 30; Oxford Business Group 14 November 2006). 
                                                          
14  Rents are defined by economists as “the difference between the market price of a good 
or factor of production and its opportunity cost (the price needed to produce the good 
or keep the factor of production in its current use)” (Richards / Waterbury 1996, 16). 
Rents are thus a “financial income which is not matched by corresponding labour or in-
vestment” (Renger / Wolff 2000). Typical examples of rents are oil and mining reve-
nues, customs duties, but also development aid. Remittances from migrant workers also 
contain a substantial portion of rent because the workers’ income would be much lower 
if they did not have the opportunity to work abroad (Beck / Schlumberger 1998, 128; 
Moore 2004). 
15  The average rise in property prices is estimated to have been more than 15 % annually 
in recent years (Oxford Business Group 14 November 2006), while the index of average 
consumer prices has risen only by about 2.3 % per annum (see Table 2). 
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Table 2:  The Jordanian economy: facts and figures 
Year 1990 1996 2000 2004 
Total population (millions) 3.2 4.3 4.9 5.6 
Population growth rate (% per annum) 3.7 3.1 3.1 2.7 
Total GDP (billion US $) 4.0 6.9 8.5 10.7 
GDP per capita (US $) 1623.9 1712.3 1732.4 1902.7 
Real annual GDP growth per capita (%) –2.7 –1.0 1.1 5.5 
External public debt (% of GDP) 188.8 110.3 79.2 72.5 
Workers’ remittances (% of GDP) 10.8 22.0 21.7 19.9 
Net foreign direct investment (FDI)  
inflows (% of GDP) 
0.9 0.3 9.4 5.4 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 26.0 30.6 21.1 23.9 
Unemployment (%) 16.8 14.0 13.7 12.5 
Poverty headcount ratio by national  
criteria (%) 
21.0 17.1 14.2 … 
Human development index (score) 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.76 
Annual change in consumer prices (%) 16.2 6.5 0.7 2.3 
Source:  EC (2004, 15); Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2006b); IMF (2006); 
Loewe et al. (2001), Annex B; Lopez-Claros / Schwab (2005, 192), 
MoPIC (2004); MoPIC (2006b); World Bank (2005c) 
 
Jordan’s dependence on rent inflows is underscored by their impact on the 
national budget and current accounts. Excluding foreign aid, Jordan’s 
budget was expected to show a deficit of almost 7 % of its GDP in 2005. 
Foreign aid has reduced this deficit to around 2.5 % (EIU 2005b, 9). A 
similar case can be made for Jordan’s current account, which has shown 
surpluses in recent years only because of the substantial inflows of foreign 
aid and remittances of Jordanians working in the Gulf states (EIU 2005b, 
36; Moore 2004, 15).  
Jordan’s dependence on rents is dangerous, because it makes the country 
vulnerable to changes occurring in neighbouring countries and on the 
world markets. Jordan’s economy will cease growing quickly, for exam-
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ple, once the situation in Iraq stabilises: Iraqi refugees will return home 
and sell their property in Jordan. Foreign companies will relocate to Bagh-
dad. Trade with Iraq will be redirected to Iraq’s own seaports. And devel-
opment assistance for Jordan will probably be cut because of the country’s 
diminishing importance for Western countries. 
Moreover, Jordan’s current economic growth cannot reduce the country’s 
very high rates of unemployment and underemployment. In early 2006, the 
official unemployment rate was 13.3 % (MoPIC 2006b), while the actual 
rate is estimated to be at least double that (Loewe et al. 2001, 159). To re-
duce widespread unemployment and poverty, Jordan’s current growth 
must either rise to more than 9 % annually or become much more labour-
intensive, i.e. must be based on industrial investments and an increase in 
productivity and competitiveness rather than on rent inflows (Abu Libdeh 
2005). Jordan should thus aim at improving its business climate, which de-
termines incentives both for locals to engage in entrepreneurial activity 
and for foreigners to invest in productive assets in Jordan. Any major defi-
ciencies in the business climate may further deter international investors 
and pose additional obstacles to growth for domestic businesses (Petri 
1997; YEA 2006, 48). 
4.2 Jordan’s business climate in regional and international 
comparison 
The quality of Jordan’s business climate is mediocre from both a regional 
and a global perspective. This finding is confirmed by all generally ac-
cepted rankings: 
— According to the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Growth Competi-
tiveness Index 2005, Jordan is No. 5 out of 12 Arab countries and 
No. 45 out of 117 countries worldwide (Blanke / Lopez-Claros 2005; 
WEF 2006a). 
— The WEF’s Business Environment Ranking 2005 ranks Jordan 3rd in 
the Arab world, behind the United Arab Emirates and Tunisia, and 
43rd among 116 countries worldwide (WEF 2006b; see Figure 3). 
— In the World Bank’s report on Doing Business in 2007, Jordan ranks 
6th among 17 MENA countries and 78th among 175 nations world-
wide (World Bank 2006). 
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Figure 3:  Jordan’s international position with regard to the Growth 
Competitiveness Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from WEF (2006b) 
 
Such a mediocre business climate cannot lure businesses to a country like 
Jordan, which suffers from a small domestic market, a lack of natural re-
sources and a precarious geopolitical location. To compensate for these 
drawbacks, Jordan must offer extraordinary investment conditions to in-
vestors, i.e. it must provide much better regulation, taxation, infrastruc-
tures etc. than its competitors (Fanek 2006). The Young Entrepreneurs As-
sociation (YEA) maintains: 
“Productive investment is essential to increase output and employment. 
Every element of the investment climate must promote efficient and fair 
treatment of all investors. Jordanians should not be discouraged from 
investing in Jordan… Moreover, since domestic savings are insufficient 
to meet growth targets, further foreign direct investment (FDI) is indis-
pensable.“ (YEA 2006, 38). 
In addition, the competitiveness of Jordan’s economy is probably even 
worse than the above indices indicate, since they are based on the subjec-
tive impressions of entrepreneurs in their respective countries. These en-
trepreneurs tend to compare their country with ‘comparable’ countries, i.e. 
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with countries in the same region which have the same per capita income 
or the same size. Jordanian entrepreneurs, for example, compare their 
country with Egypt, Syria or Iraq, and perhaps with Indonesia, China and 
Vietnam, but not with Portugal, Ireland or Costa Rica, which apparently 
play in another league. Likewise, Italians compare themselves with 
French, British and Swedish, but not with Egyptians, Brazilians or Jorda-
nians. Only this consideration can explain, for example, why Italy ranks at 
approximately the same level as Jordan or why Croatia ranks even below 
even though nobody would contest the assertion that the business condi-
tions are probably much better in Italy or Croatia than in Jordan. 
4.3 Main deficiencies of the business climate in Jordan 
Business people in Jordan perceive deficits in state-business relations as a 
main weakness of the business climate. In addition, they have difficulties 
in areas such as access to finance, the training of workers, access to af-
fordable input products, and the saturation of the domestic market (see 
Figure 4). This result of the DIE’s research in Jordan is backed by several 
other studies (Boye et al. 2006, 6–8; Goussouss / Dababneh 2004, ii–iv; 
Keller / Nabli 2002, 17–19, Lopez-Claros, Schwab / Porter 2005, 342–
343; World Bank 2006; YEA 2000, 10–11; YEA 2006, 38–43). 
State-business relations: In our interviews with Jordanian and foreign 
businesspeople, state-business relations were mentioned most frequently 
as an area of frequent concern. Alone 33 % of the respondents stated that 
they had faced difficulties in registering and licensing their companies (see 
Figure 4 and Box 1). 12 % mentioned taxation, and another 12 % said that 
the government did not provide adequate support for them. 9 % criticised 
customs procedures and 3 % respectively mentioned the tendering of bids, 
labour regulations, and the protection of intellectual property rights. All in 
all, 50 % of the businesspeople interviewed voiced complaints about at 
least one of these fields. In addition, when the other 50 % were directly 
asked whether difficulties exist in state-business relations, 30 % affirmed 
this, meaning that a total of 80 % of the interviewees found problems in ei-
ther interaction with the public administration (see Table A3 in Annex A). 
Some admitted that improvements have taken place in several areas. Al-
though many believed that administrative procedures are easier and faster 
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Figure 4:  Main fields of concern of businesspeople in Jordan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from Table A2 in Annex A 
 
in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ; see Box 2), our findings 
shows that state-business relations in Aqaba are not much better. 
This assessment is supported by the World Bank’s Doing Business 2007 
report. It compares the business climate of 175 countries and finds Jor-
dan’s business climate to be mediocre with regard to most of the criteria 
used in this report. Jordan ranks even far below average regarding three 
areas which are most critical for the quality of state-business relations: The 
country is only 110th worldwide in the registration of property, 118th in 
the protection of investors, and 133rd in the process of starting a business 
(see Figure 5 and Table 3; similarly: Boye et al. 2006, 6–8). 
Many experts from NGOs, academia and the media confirmed the need for 
improvements in state-business relations. 
“Investment promotion was based too much on tax exemptions. But this 
has not addressed the main problem for investors, which is high trans-
action costs. These go back to a cumbersome bureaucracy. Investors 
face too many problems when they must deal with the government.“ 
(Kanaan, 16 February 2006) 
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Competition / lack of demand: Many of the businesspeople interviewed 
complained about the intensity of competition in their respective markets. 
This problem is in part due to the limited size of the Jordanian economy, 
which cannot generate sufficient demand for certain products. In many 
sectors, four producers may already be too many when the proportion of 
fixed costs to total costs is very high.  
Qualification of employees: Finding well-trained employees is another ma-
jor problem for investors in Jordan (Boye et al. 2006, 6–8; Gous-
sous / Dababneh 2004, iii). Some interviewees attributed this to deficien-
cies in Jordan’s vocational training system. Others referred to a lack of 
willingness among some people to do physical work. The general manager 
of a business consultancy in Amman declared: 
“The problem is, we have no good workers. All people send their chil-
dren to universities, most don’t accept to work in factories. They all 
want to work in the management or in the public sector. If I'd send my 
kids to be mechanics, people would not understand, even if the country 
needs mechanics.“ 
 
Figure 5: Jordan’s ranking according to different criteria of the Doing 
Business 2007 report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from World Bank (2006) 
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Table 3:  Selected indicators from the Doing Business 2007 report 
 Jordan Mean for 
Arab 
countries
Mean for 
OECD 
countries
Mean for
all  
countries
Starting a business 
Procedures (number) 11 11 7 9 
Cost (% of income per capita) 73.0 75.8 7.5 68.3 
Minimum capital (% of average per 
capita income) 
864 795 41 151 
Registering property 
Procedures (number) 8 6 5 6 
Time (days) 22 42 45 86 
Cost (% of property value) 10.0 5.9 4.5 6.7 
Dealing with licences 
Procedures (number) 16 20 16 17 
Time (days) 122 172 169 205 
Cost (% of income per capita) 503 493 78 506 
Trading across borders 
Documents for export (number) 7 7 5 7 
Time for export (days) 24 30 12 28 
Documents for import (number) 12 10 7 10 
Time for import (days) 22 40 14 34 
Enforcing contracts 
Procedures (number) 43 44 24 35 
Time (days) 342 571 398 541 
Cost (% of debt) 16.2 17.4 11.8 28.7 
Closing a Business 
Time (years) 4.3 3.8 2.0 3.2 
Cost (% of estate) 9.0 12.9 8.7 16.3 
Recovery rate (%) 28.2 22.9 66.5 30.6 
Paying Taxes 
Payments (number) 26 33 18 36 
Time (hours) 101 267 246 332 
Total taxes (% of gross profit) 31.9 44.2 48.3 53.8 
Source: Data from World Bank (2006) 
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Box 1:  Starting a business in Jordan 
The process of starting a business in Jordan differs from one economic sector to 
the other. Some sectors are heavily regulated, while the start-up is much easier 
and faster in others (e.g. the IT-sector). 
Normally, businesspeople must (i) register at the Companies Control Depart-
ment of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT), (ii) apply for permits from 
the municipality and other institutions and (iii) become members of the Cham-
ber of Commerce or Chamber of Industry. On the average, they must go to 11 
different institutions, and the process takes 36 days (see Table 2). 
The registration procedure at the Companies Control Department of the MoIT 
has recently been reformed and no longer poses an obstacle. If all necessary 
documents are provided, the procedure can be completed in one hour. Many 
entrepreneurs, however, must present pre-approvals and licenses that have been 
issued, for example, by the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Environment or 
the Ministry of Tourism. Obtaining these documents can be very troublesome 
and consume a great deal of time and money.  
In addition, those who wish to start a business must request a license from their 
municipality; this can also require much effort and patience. 
To facilitate the whole process, several One-Stop Shops (OSS) have been es-
tablished since 2004. In some economic sectors, businesspeople can register at 
the OSS of the Jordan Investment Board (JIB). Another OSS exists in the 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). These offices bring together represen-
tatives from all government agencies, which have a say in the registration and 
licensing of a new company. According to the JIB, the establishment of these 
OSS has significantly reduced the time needed to start a business in Jordan. 
Nevertheless, criticism remains: Businesspeople complain that employees at 
the OSSs are not entitled to make decisions themselves but must rather consult 
the directors of their respective ministries, thus prolonging the process and 
making it less transparent. In addition, businesspeople from Aqaba say that an 
OSS does not really exist in the ASEZ, since it is nothing more than a building 
with the representatives of all relevant ministries. Applicants still must go to 
each of these representatives. 
Source:  CCD (2006), JIB (2006), results from interviews with representa-
tives of the JIB, the Greater Amman Municipality and with busi-
nesspeople (see Annex A and Annex C) 
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Box 2:  Doing business in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) 
The Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) came into operation on 1 January 
2001 and was designed to become one of the most attractive investment envi-
ronments in the region. Covering the Kingdom’s sole seaport of Aqaba and its 
environs, the zone currently occupies 375 km2 of territory in the south of Jor-
dan.  
Investors in the ASEZ enjoy duty-free privileges, low taxes, 100 % ownership, 
ease of land purchase or leasing, and streamlined procedures. For example, all 
imports into the ASEZ are duty-free and a 5 % flat tax is applied on all net 
business income (except for income from banking, insurance and land trans-
port).  
All of Aqaba’s administration has been brought under a unified body, the 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA), which is vested with zon-
ing, licensing, and other regulatory powers. 
Due to its unique design, the ASEZ is often presented as an area where doing 
business is much easier than in the rest of Jordan. However, the complaints of 
businesspeople from Aqaba did not differ substantially in our interviews from 
those of investors in other parts of the country.  
Nevertheless, the overall impression is that improvements have taken place in 
Aqaba in comparison with the rest of the country. Customer service in the 
ASEZA, for example, is considerably better than that provided in Amman, 
where it was named in several interviews as a deficiency of the banking sector.  
On the other hand, many improvements in the ASEZA seem to benefit large 
investors only. Managers of small and medium-sized enterprises reported nu-
merous problems regarding their dealings with the ASEZA and other public in-
stitutions in Aqaba. One entrepreneur stated that “after they launched ASEZA, 
things became very bad for small businesses in Aqaba. The ASEZA only thinks 
of large projects.“ 
Another major problem mentioned by several company representatives is the 
duplication of procedures in Aqaba. For example, companies must go through 
two different customs clearance procedures, one with the central government’s 
customs authority and the other with ASEZA’s own customs department.  
Source:  Devi (2006); EIU (2005a), 35; Kardoosh (2005), 3; results of our 
own research, see Annex A 
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Access to finance: Large firms appear to have no major problems in gain-
ing access to credit in Jordan. Also, the situation of micro-enterprises has 
considerably improved over the last six years due to the emergence of sev-
eral very professional micro-finance institutions. Medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs) and start-ups, however, reported to us very serious difficulties in 
gaining access to credit or venture capital. This finding is confirmed by the 
YEA (Goussouss / Dababneh 2004, 10). 
Security and stability: Only four interviewees had concerns regarding the 
stability of economic and political development in Jordan. Two were ac-
tive in the tourism sector and pointed to the vulnerability of their business 
to regional turbulences. The other two complained about the steep rise in 
the price of oil in recent years and about the lack of predictability in the 
political course of the Jordanian government.  
Infrastructure: Most infrastructure is much better in Jordan than in other 
Arab and non-Arab developing countries. Nevertheless, some deficits exist 
(YEA 2006, 40). Jordanian businesspeople criticise especially the limited 
capacities of the port in Aqaba and of land transportation between Amman 
and Aqaba (especially the lack of railways), along with the inefficiency of 
border controls. 
4.4 Types and causes of problems in state-business relations 
Business people who complained during our interviews of problems in 
state-business relations were asked to give examples and to state what they 
believed were the causes of these problems. Their answers show that in-
vestors in Jordan suffer not only from lengthy, complicated and expensive 
procedures but also from a lack of fairness and predictability in adminis-
trative and political decisions (see Figure 6). Reasons given for these 
shortcomings were the bad quality of regulation, deficits in public admini-
stration, and the role of favouritism (see Figure 7). 
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Types of problems 
Apparently state-business relations in Jordan suffer from a lack of effi-
ciency. 67 % of our interviewees were dissatisfied with the time required  
to complete certain administrative procedures. 37 % said that the number 
of steps within each procedure was unreasonably high, and 11 % said that 
very high costs were associated with the procedures.  
However, state-business relations also suffer from a lack of fairness and 
predictability in decisions taken by the authorities. 33 % of the business-
people interviewed mentioned cases of biased decisions favouring some 
companies and hampering others. Likewise, 26 % criticised that it was al-
most impossible to anticipate the decisions of the administration. 
These results are supported by other reports (e.g. Boye et al. 2006, 9–10) 
as well as by the statements of the experts and civil servants who were in-
terviewed. Civil servants, for example admitted that the official rules for 
their tasks were very unclear, that procedures in their department took too 
much time and were too complicated for investors, and that many officials 
made decisions on the basis of personal preference (see Annexes B and C). 
 
Figure 6:  Problems faced by businesspeople in interactions with the 
state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Data from Table A4 in Annex A 
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Causes of problems 
For the most part, the businesspeople interviewed explained their difficul-
ties in interactions with the state by naming four factors: (i) regulatory de-
ficiencies, (ii) insufficient training of civil servants, (iii) deficits in the or-
ganisation of work in the public sector, and (iv) discretionary decisions on 
the basis of wasta (see Figure 7). These factors were confirmed in general 
by Boye et al. (2006, 6–10) as well as by the results of our standardised 
survey among 180 civil servants. The latter added however a further ex-
planation: According to them, businesspeople are not well informed about 
the procedures and rules of the public administration (see Figure 8). 
Regulatory deficiencies: 17 % of the civil servants said that the procedures 
in the public administration required simplification. Likewise, 40 % of the 
businesspeople complained of overregulation or inadequate regulation as 
major reasons for the problems prevailing in Jordan in state business rela-
tions. Many said, for example, that investors must go through too many 
procedures in different public institutions before they can start a new busi-
ness. A report by the Anti-corruption Directorate in the General Intelli-
gence Department found that bureaucratic regulations drive businesses 
away because of the “obscurity in some regulations which handicap trans-
parency“ (Kassay 1998, 57). 
 
Figure 7:  Explanations of businesspeople for their problems in  
interactions with the state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Data in Table A4 in Annex A 
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Figure 8:  Suggestions of public sector employees on how to improve 
state-business relations 
 
Source:  Data in Table B6 in Annex B 
 
9 % of the businesspeople, however, said that there was too little regula-
tion in Jordan. Some wanted more rigorous rules in licensing to limit the 
degree of competition in their respective markets, while others believed 
that better standards were needed to protect consumers, the environment, 
and high-quality producers (see also Table B2 in Annex B).  
Training of public sector employees: The low level of qualification and 
motivation among public sector employees was mentioned by 40 % of the 
businesspeople as a main reason for their problems in interactions with the 
state. At the same time, 27 % of the civil servants admitted themselves that 
they were in need of better training and that the recruitment procedures of 
the public administration had to be improved. 
Organisation of work within the public administration: 19 % of the civil 
servants had additional proposals regarding more efficient public admini-
stration in Jordan: They complained of the concentration of decision-
making power at higher levels of the hierarchy (9 %), insufficient comput-
erisation (5 %), duplication of responsibilities among different public insti-
tutions (2 %) and over-staffing in the public sector (3 %). Likewise, 8 % of 
the businesspeople interviewed explained their problems with the bureau-
cracy at least partly by over-staffing in the public sector, and 9 % respec-
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tively by the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a few 
and the lack of communication within the public administration. 
Discretionary decisions on the basis of personnel preferences: A fourth 
group of explanations referred to favouritism in state-business relations. 
39 % of the interviewed businesspeople complained about decisions taken 
by public sector employees on the basis of personal preferences rather than 
rules (see Figure 7). This view is supported by four studies conducted by 
the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS 2002a; CSS 2002b; CSS 2002c; CSS 
2002d) among clients of selected public sector institutions. For instance, 
more than 30% of the persons interviewed in one study said that nepotism 
is very widespread within the customs administration (CSS 2002d, 24). 
Our standardised survey of civil servants provided additional evidence for 
these complaints. 13 % of the respondents admitted that something had to 
be done to make sure that customers of their department are treated more 
equally. 17 % claimed that public sector employees in Jordan should fol-
low the rules better, and 21 % believed that more and better incentives are 
needed for civil servants to do their work properly (see Figure 8) 
The problem is that many of the rules governing state-business relations in 
Jordan lack clarity and full implementation. In the customs area, for ex-
ample, “tariff assessment practices are frequently arbitrary and may even 
differ from written regulation” (Kanaan and Kardoosh 2005, 8). As a con-
sequence, the rule of law is undermined: Civil servants have discretionary 
power to provide preferential treatment to friends and tribesmen.  
Customer information: In addition to explanations given by businesspeo-
ple, the civil servants surveyed mentioned a lack of information among 
their customers as another reason for problems in state-business relations 
in Jordan. 13 % said that the rules in effect for procedures in the public 
sector should be explained to businesspeople better. 
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5 Wasta in Jordan 
Favouritism is very widespread in Jordan, where it is usually referred to by 
the Arabic word ‘wasta’ for ‘connection’ or ‘relation’: In everyday lan-
guage, ‘doing things by wasta’ means asking for and/or benefiting from 
preferential treatment instead of going through official channels. The per-
son who helps a relative or a friend to get preferential treatment is also 
called ‘a wasta’. 
The use of wasta may or may not involve corruption. It does not constitute 
a problem, for example, when only two parties are involved: the person 
who provides preferential treatment and the person who benefits from it. 
However, as soon as such treatment is granted at the expense of a third 
party (the employer, the state, the public, the nation, or a competitor), 
wasta becomes corruption.  
This ambiguity is illustrated by the way in which many Jordanians per-
ceive the phenomenon. They distinguish between good and bad wasta, al-
though the majority of the population wants its use to be curtailed. 
In the following we analyse the role of wasta in Jordan (Section 5.1) and 
how Jordanians themselves perceive it (Section 5.2). 
5.1 The role of wasta 
According to international rankings, the level of corruption in Jordan is not 
very high. Our research, however, provides substantial evidence that the 
use of wasta is a very common way of interaction in large parts of Jorda-
nian society. Even though it is said to have somewhat diminished in recent 
years, it still plays an important role.  
Level of corruption in international comparison 
Jordan is certainly not among the most corrupt countries in the world. 
Even with respect to favouritism it is only average on an international 
scale. Nevertheless, the role of wasta in Jordan is not to be ignored. 
It is difficult to quantify corruption. Until two decades ago, almost no unit 
of measurement existed neither for corruption nor for any other aspect of 
governance. Today, more than 40 indicators exist scoring and ranking dif-
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ferent countries by the quality of their governance. Some of these, such as 
the World Bank’s governance indicator for the control of corruption, the 
Global Opacity Index of Price Waterhouse Coopers, the Corruption Per-
ception Index of Transparency International (TI) and the Corporate Gov-
ernance Index of the Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., focus mainly 
on corruption (Kaufmann 2005c; Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi 2006). 
However, there is no generally agreed gauge for the quantity or quality of 
corruption in a country. As a consequence, all of the indicators mentioned 
above are based on the level of corruption as perceived by selected people 
in their respective countries. They can thus approximate objectivity only 
by comparing the views of as many people in as many different countries 
as possible. In addition, the indicators do not quantify the intensity of cor-
ruption but can only compare; they do not identify corruption in absolute 
terms, but merely denote whether corruption is more or less widespread 
than in other countries.  
All existing indicators of corruption rank Jordan in the middle in compari-
son to other Arab and non-Arab countries (see Figure 9): 
— The TI Corruption Perceptions Index gave Jordan a score of 5.7 on a 
10-point-scale and ranked it 37th among 158 countries worldwide. 
This was an increase from 4.5 in 2002 and 5.3 in 2004. The world 
mean is 4.3, and the mean for all Arab countries is 3.7. Oman, Bah-
rain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates score better. Other Arab 
countries, among them Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan and Libya, 
rank below Jordan (TI 2006).  
— The World Bank’s indicator for the control of corruption ranks Jordan 
70th of 201 countries worldwide. Jordan’s score of 0.33 is slightly 
above the world average (0.00) and above the average of all Arab 
countries (–0.14) (World Bank 2005f). 
— Jordan’s score according to the Corporate Governance Index (38.1) is 
below both the world average (48.5) and the average of the Arab 
countries (44.6) (Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. 2005). 
— According to the WEF’s Growth Competitiveness Index, the business 
costs of corruption in Jordan are only slightly below average. Jor-
dan’s score is 5, while the global mean is 4.4 and the mean of the 
Arab countries is 4.5 (Lopez-Claros / Schwab / Porter 2005). 
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Figure 9: The level of corruption in Jordan in international comparison 
according to different indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mean
mean
 Markus Loewe et al. 
58 German Development Institute 
Figure 9 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (2005); Lopez-
Claros / Schwab / Porter (2005, 574); TI (2006); World Bank (2005f) 
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These indices, however, say little about the intensity of favouritism in a 
country, because they do not distinguish between different forms of cor-
ruption. Usually, their main focus is on bribery, because most people have 
only bribery in mind when hearing or reading the word ‘corruption’.  
The Global Opacity Index of Price Waterhouse Coopers (2001) and the Glo-
bal Corruption Barometer of TI (2005) are composite indicators with at 
least one component concentrating on favouritism, but their values for 
Jordan have not yet been calculated. The only index with a focus on fa-
vouritism that lists Jordan is the WEF’s Growth Competitiveness Indica-
tor. One of its component indicators measures the level of ‘favouritism in 
decisions of government officials’ (see Figure 10). 
According to this indicator, favouritism is much less widespread in Jordan 
than in many other countries in the world. With a score of 3.7, Jordan 
ranks sinificantly above the world mean (3.2) on position No. 31 among 
117 countries worldwide.  
 
Figure 10: Jordan’s ranking for ‘favouritism in decisions of government 
officials’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Lopez-Claros / Schwab / Porter (2005, 557) 
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This finding should be treated with caution, however, because of the 
methodology used by the WEF:  
– The sample of resource persons interviewed in each country for the 
purpose of the Index is very small. In Jordan, it comprised only 
88 entrepreneurs (Lopez-Claros / Schwab / Porter 2005, 218). 
– The samples are not representative. First, they are limited to business-
people and exclude consumers, government officials, journalists, aca-
demics and NGO activists. Second, only persons from medium to 
large-size companies are taken into consideration. In Jordan, 57 % of 
the interviewed usinesspeople had more than 100 employees and the 
rest had between 21 and 100 employees. None came from an enterprise 
with less than 21 employees, even though these make up more than 
90 % of all Jordanian firms and provide jobs for more than 50 % of 
workers in the private sector (MoIT 2006). Moreover, even though 
Jordan has only a few companies with more than 500 employees, a 
quarter of the persons interviewed represented this category. Third, en-
trepreneurs with more than 500 employees are major players in a small 
country like Jordan and therefore not neutral. All of them are likely to 
have very good wasta to the government or even the Royal Family. 
Without wasta, they would not be as successful as they are. As a con-
sequence, they are unlikely to complain about business conditions in 
their country or to perceive any unfairness in state-business relations. 
– The Growth Competitiveness Index is biased with respect to Jordan. It 
was conducted by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooper-
ation, whose main task is to co-ordinate foreign aid for Jordan and 
which thus has an interest in sanitising Jordan’s international image. 
– Finally, the ranking should not be used for international comparison. 
According to WEF’s indicator for favouritism, Belgium and Estonia 
rank on approximately the same level as Jordan, although intuition says 
that these two countries should fare much better. The United States and 
Canada even score somewhat worse than Jordan, and Italy ranks far 
below, at position No. 72. These results can only be explained by the 
fact that businesspeople tend to compare their situation with the busi-
ness-climate in countries that are similar in one or another way to their 
own country, i.e. countries in the same world region or in the same per-
capita income group. People in Jordan, for example, tend to compare 
themselves with Egyptians or Syrians rather than Estonians, while Bel-
gians and Italians compare their country with Denmark, Spain and 
Austria rather than Jordan or Algeria. A global ranking therefore tends 
to overestimate the significance of favouritism in countries like Italy 
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that perform badly in comparison to their neighbours but not necessar-
ily in international comparison. At the same time, it underestimates fa-
vouritism in countries like Jordan, which is a good performer in re-
gional comparison but a bad performer in international comparison.  
Prevalence of the use of wasta 
Our research provides evidence for the fact that favouritism is still very 
widespread in Jordan: Wasta is used frequently in many different kinds of 
social interactions.  
 
Table 4: The role of wasta in Jordan according to an opinion poll con-
ducted by the Arab Archives Institute in 2000 
(a) … deal with it directly 35 % 
(b) … look for wasta before beginning 46 % 
If you need to get a job done at 
a government office, company 
or organisation, you… 
(c) … look for wasta after beginning 19 % 
(a) Procedures are complicated 50 % 
(b) Deficiencies with your case 4 % 
(c) Impossible to complete the task with-
out wasta 41 % 
If you answered (b) or (c) to the 
previous question, what is the 
reason for this? 
(d) Social standing 5 % 
(a) … will increase 42 % 
(b) … will decrease 13 % 
With reference to your present 
situation, do you think that your 
need for wasta… 
(c) … will remain as it is 45 % 
Yes 57 % Are you subjected to social 
pressure to use wasta? No 43 % 
Relatives 27 % 
Friends 17 % 
Whom do you use wasta for? 
Anyone who asks 56 % 
Yes 87 % Do you think wasta should be 
eliminated? No 13 % 
Note: The poll was conducted among 360 journalists, artists, physicians and 
lawyers and is thus not representative. 
Source:  Kilani / Sakijha (2002, 126 f.) 
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Figure 11: The role of wasta in the recruitment of civil servants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Data from Table B4 in Annex B 
 
Wasta is very helpful in interactions with the state. 86 % of the business-
people interviewed confirmed this, and 56 % admitted using wasta. Simi-
larly, 64 % of the public sector employees confessed that their clients can 
speed up procedures in their department if they know one of the employ-
ees. Further evidence is provided by an opinion poll conducted by the 
Arab Archives Institute in 2000: 60 % of the respondents admitted using 
wasta occasionally when dealing with government offices (see Table 4).  
Wasta also plays a very important role in the recruitment of civil servants. 
77 % of the respondents to our standardised public sector survey stated 
that it is important or even very important to have wasta to get a job in the 
public administration (see Figure 11). 
Finally, wasta is said to be similarly valuable for gaining admission to a 
university, for getting good marks on university examinations, for gaining 
access to financial support from the government, and for avoiding penal-
ties or fines. Some interview partners even went so far as to say that “eve- 
How important is it to have wasta in order to get employed in your department?
not important at all
6%
very important
51%
important
25%
not very important
16%
n/a
2%
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rything in Jordan requires wasta” (Khalaf, 8 March 2006) and that “wasta 
is all over and everybody uses it” (Sakijha, 28 February 2006). 
The use of wasta by different social groups 
No social group in Jordan is exempt from using wasta. Women use it just 
like men, poor people as well as rich people, and even many foreigners do 
so. 
However, poor people tend to benefit less from the use of wasta, because 
their wasta is less powerful than that of rich people: Poor people cannot 
pay for the small presents needed to maintain social relations and net-
works. In addition, they do not know ‘the right people’, i.e. the key deci-
sion-makers who have the power to improve their situation. On the other 
hand, if the poor knew such people, they would probably not be poor. 
Many studies, such as the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor (Narayan et al. 
2000), argue that a lack of social connections is both a cause and a conse-
quence of material poverty: 
“‘You have to cultivate networks and contacts with people with power 
and influence to secure a livelihood and future.’ – Pakistan 1993” (Na-
rayan et al. 1999, 39) 
The Jordan Human Development Report 2004 cites townsmen of Madaba 
who describe wasta as a “magic wand”, which provides job opportunities, 
loans, cash assistance from the National Aid Fund and access to better and 
cheaper health services (UNDP Jordan 2004, 63). 
Similarly, women in Jordan often have greater difficulty than men in gain-
ing access to persons who can help them. 
5.2 The popular perception of using wasta 
The perception of wasta by Jordanians is ambiguous. Many interviewees 
stated that the use of wasta creates unfairness and hampers economic de-
velopment and should therefore be reduced. Still, many people said that 
the use of wasta has positive aspects. Ambiguity prevails as well with re-
spect to whether the use of wasta is a form of corruption or not and how it 
is related to bribery. 
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The main argument against the use of wasta was that it creates unfairness, 
since people with better wasta have fewer problems in gaining access to 
resources, information and services than people without wasta. The owner 
of a small shop in Zarqa said, “I think it [wasta] is not good because there 
is no fairness in it. If I have wasta, it is good, but what can a person with-
out wasta do?” Other interviewees indicated that “there are no equal op-
portunities for all citizens” (Al Rantawi, 21 February 2006), or that “the 
majority of Jordanians has only limited wasta and is thus disadvantaged.” 
(Al-Masri, 18 February 2006). 
In addition, many believe wasta to be detrimental to Jordan’s economic 
development. One expert claimed: “You cannot build a sustainable, mod-
ern economy on wasta, since it makes interactions unpredictable” (Al-
Husseini, 21 February 2006). Another expert called wasta “the cancer of 
our society” (Al-Masri, 18 February 2006). 
At the same time, however, many Jordanians also stressed the positive as-
pects of wasta. Several interviewees claimed that poor people in particular 
would not get their rights in the public sector without using wasta. In the 
same way, the Jordan Human Development Report 2004 cites a poor vil-
lager who cried, “Without wasta, we cannot live!” (UNDP Jordan 2004, 
63). In the absence of appropriate social protection by the state (Loewe et 
al. 2001), the use of wasta is seen as a surrogate which helps to mitigate 
income shocks and to alleviate unemployment and poverty: 
“Wasta is a support mechanism that has allowed many families to sur-
vive [and] has filled a vacuum that the state didn’t fill.” (Sawalha, 23 
February 2006) 
Moreover, the use of wasta is considered by many as “a source of social 
cohesion” (Al Khouri, 15 February 2006) and is therefore believed to have 
a stabilising effect on Jordanian society. Wasta is also often associated 
with cherished social norms such as solidarity and loyalty and with social 
institutions like the family or the tribe. 
Dissension was also apparent, however, as to whether or not wasta is a 
form of corruption. Many interviewees claimed that “wasta is a type of 
corruption” (Khader, 7 March 2006) and “something illegal and unjust” 
(public sector employee, 30 March 2006).  
Others declared that “Wasta is tradition, not corruption” (Kanaan, 
16 February 2006), and that it “is in the culture” (public sector employee, 
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26 March 2006), or that “Wasta is not corruption, because it is not linked 
to money” (Al-Husseini, 21 February 2006).  
A third group of people took a middle position between these extremes: 
they stated that the use of wasta is sometimes corruption, but not always. 
In their opinion it has nothing to do with corruption when a person gets 
something that he or she deserves or when wasta is merely used to speed 
up procedures. However, it constitutes corruption when it is used to cir-
cumvent a procedure or to gain a personal advantage. One expert illus-
trated the difference by the example of a government tender that is handed 
to a relative of a government official. If the relative submitted an offer that 
was worse than the offers of others, the act of awarding him the contract is 
a form of wasta that constitutes corruption. If the offers were all the same, 
however, the selection of a relative due to wasta would be unproblematic. 
Finally, Jordanians also disagree on the distinction between wasta and 
bribery and on the prevalence of the two phenomena. Some interviewees 
affirmed that bribery and wasta often come together in one and the same 
interaction, for example, when someone offers money or a little present for 
a favour even though he already has good wasta with the responsible deci-
sion-maker. In addition, bribes can help to create and improve wasta. 
Some businesspeople told us that they offer gifts or discounts to key per-
sons in public administration to build up wasta for later occasions (see Ta-
ble A5 in Annex A).  
At the same time, the majority of our interviewees stated that Jordanians 
use wasta rather frequently, but bribery only rarely.  
This view is obviously in error, as our standardised survey among 
180 public sector employees reveals: 64 % of the respondents admitted 
that bribes were accepted in their department at least from time to time. 
This was particularly the case in departments that are responsible for com-
pany licensing and for public tenders (see Table B5 in Annex B).  
This is in line with a survey conducted by the Arab Archives Institute in 
2005: 63 % of respondents to this survey considered bribery to be common 
or even very common in Jordan. 51 % believed that it is on the rise, while 
only 33 % assumed that bribery is on the decline. 50 % admitted that they 
themselves had paid a bribe at least once in the past (see Table 5). 
 
 Markus Loewe et al. 
66 German Development Institute 
Table 5: The role of bribery in Jordan according to an opinion poll 
conducted by the Arab Archives Institute in 2005 
Yes: 50,4 % Have you ever paid a bribe in the 
past? No: 46,8 % 
From the bribed person himself 11,0% 
From someone else 41,3% 
How did you know that a bribe 
had to be paid? 
I did not know if it was necessary: 8,3% 
Yes 28,4% Are you convinced that you 
would have succeeded in that 
matter without the bribe? 
No 23,9% 
Much: 29,4% 
Medium: 33,9% 
What do you think how common 
is bribery in Jordan? 
Little: 31,2% 
Yes: 93,6% Would you consider bribery as a 
form of corruption? No: 3,7% 
It is increasing: 59,6% How do you think bribery is de-
veloping this year? It is diminishing: 33,0% 
Yes: 95,4% Do you believe that the fight 
against bribery is necessary? No: 1,8% 
Yes: 33,0% Is the government serious in fight-
ing bribery? No: 62,4% 
The government: 16,5% 
Civil society: 11,9% 
Who do you think could initiate 
the fight against bribery? 
Both: 68,8% 
Individual matters: 39,4% Where do you think bribery is 
most widespread? Commercial matters: 50,5% 
Note:  The poll is not representative of Jordanian society. It was conducted 
among 327 persons working in the public or private sector. How-
ever, most of the respondents were between 21 and 30 years old, 
unmarried, living in Amman and having a university degree. 
Source:  Kilani (2006, 12–17) 
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While the use of wasta is sometimes legitimised and justified by arguing 
that it can serve a good purpose or that it is part of Jordanian culture, brib-
ery is more often considered an unacceptable act. 68 % of the employees 
of public institutions interviewed in our survey argued that even the accep-
tance of very small tips was not acceptable, although justifications were 
offered for accepting such gifts, such as low salaries and the fact that cus-
tomers who offer payments may be very rich (see Table B5 in Annex B).  
Nevertheless, the majority of the Jordanians want both bribery and the use 
of wasta to be eliminated. 95 % of those who participated in the survey of 
the Arab Archives Institute on bribery believe that the fight against bribery 
is necessary (see Table 5). Likewise, 87 % of the participants in our survey 
on wasta wanted it to be eliminated (see Table 4). 
6 The impact of wasta on the business climate in Jordan 
We now turn to the main question of our study. We will show that favour-
itism affects the business climate in Jordan and will explain the mecha-
nisms by which this comes about. We provide empirical evidence for the 
assumptions expressed in Chapter 2: the widespread use of wasta makes 
state-business relations inefficient and unfair, thereby increasing the costs 
and risks of investments and creating barriers for market entrants. How-
ever, it also affects the level of investment in Jordan in a more direct way 
(see Figure 12). 
Our data show first that frequent use of wasta affects the fairness of state-
business relations on both the administrative and the political level. Busi-
ness people who have more wasta than others have better access to ser-
vices provided by the administration, the judiciary and the government and 
also have privileged access to political decision-making. They can thus set 
up barriers to competition which new market entrants find it difficult to 
overcome.  
Second, we substantiate the assumption that the prevalence of wasta 
makes state-business relations inefficient, thereby increasing the costs and 
risks of doing business in Jordan. Wasta plays an important role in the re-
cruitment and promotion of public sector employees. It thus fosters over- 
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Figure 12: Effects of wasta on the business climate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Results of the present survey 
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staffing and the employment of unqualified staff in the public sector. This 
is a major reason for the complexity and long duration of administrative 
procedures. In addition, wasta also leads to inappropriate legislation and 
regulation. Most members of parliament (MPs) are elected because they 
are a good wasta for their constituencies rather than because of their ideas 
or capabilities. Likewise, ministers are appointed because of wasta. Both 
MPs and ministers lack the motivation and qualification needed to work 
out effective and clear laws and decrees. 
Third, our findings suggest that the omnipresence of wasta not only affects 
the efficiency and equality of state-business relations but also has a direct 
impact on the level of investment and on private sector development in 
Jordan. The important role of wasta in the economic, social and political 
system of Jordan constitutes a strong incentive for businesspeople to seek 
rents instead of improving their competitiveness. They tend to invest their 
time and money in social relations rather than in productive capital or new 
business ideas, since their success depends much more on the quality of 
their wasta than on the quality of their products or services. Widespread 
favouritism thus reduces investments in Jordan and confines the competi-
tiveness of the Jordanian economy to levels far below those which would 
be possible without it (Boye at al. 2006, 8; Dieterich 1999, 124). 
Each of these three lines of argumentation is explained in detail in one of 
the following three sections. 
6.1 How the use of wasta makes state-business relations 
unfair 
Wasta enables well-connected people to speed up administrative proce-
dures and to gain exclusive access to public sector services, business op-
portunities, government contracts, tax exemptions, jurisdiction and credit. 
However, wasta is also used by businesspeople to influence legislation and 
government regulation to their advantage. 
6.1.1 The impact of wasta on access to government services 
We start out by presenting empirical evidence for the possibility of busi-
nesspeople with wasta to go through administrative procedures in Jordan 
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faster than others. Then, we show that well-connected businesspeople also 
benefit from preferential access to business opportunities, favourable regu-
lation and efficient contract enforcement. 
Preferential treatment by the administration 
Business people can speed up administrative procedures in Jordan with the 
help of wasta, and they make ample use of this possibility. Interviewees 
told us that the long, complicated and expensive procedures of the public 
administration were their primary motivation for using wasta. Likewise, 
many public sector employees confirmed that wasta is helpful for speeding 
up procedures in their respective administrative departments or even for 
getting around rules and regulations. 
Often, businesspeople ask for the help of a wasta i.e. a go-between, to put 
them in contact with the relevant decision-makers in public administration. 
As we were repeatedly told:  
“If you know someone, he will speed things up for you. Every business 
needs someone to do that for them.”  
64 % of the civil servants covered by our survey stated that procedures can 
be completed more quickly by people who have wasta (see Table B3 in 
Annex B). An employee of the Ministry of Public Sector Development 
(MoPSD) stressed:  
“Some people’s documents are handled faster because they have rela-
tives in the ministry.” 
Many higher-ranking civil servants agreed with this statement while deny-
ing at the same time that wasta plays a role in their own department. Ex-
amples of procedures which can be completed more quickly by people 
with wasta include the licensing and registration of companies, the issuing 
of work permits for foreign workers, and customs clearance.  
Many businesspeople argued that they use wasta to speed up procedures 
mainly because it is only rational for an individual to exploit this advan-
tage. As the manager of a manufacturing company stressed:  
“We have a system, but if you are able to step ahead, of course you do 
it, and there are lots of people who can do it.“ 
The high cost of not using wasta, i.e. the long duration of procedures and 
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complicated laws, as well as difficulties in dealing with unmotivated and 
moody public sector employees, provide an additional incentive for em-
ploying wasta. One company representative said:  
“Wasta is used to speed up processes, but it should be normal that a 
process is quick.”  
Another one told us:  
“Sometimes you need people to push your case because even if you are 
right, public sector employees will find something.” 
In contrast, some public sector employees blamed self-interested and unin-
formed businesspeople for the common use of wasta. Some stated that 
every customer tries to get his application approved more quickly than the 
rules allow. The head of a registration department told us “People always 
ask us to make it quicker. Everyone wants his papers to be proceeded 
more quickly.” One head of a customer relations department said that 
some customers even try to break the rules by using their wasta 
Other public sector employees pointed out that businesspeople are often 
poorly informed about rules and procedures:  
“The reason why clients try to use wasta is that the normal people don’t 
know the rules. They want somebody to do it quickly, they are afraid 
[...]. They think we are complicated,[...]. In the past that was true, eve-
rything took very long, but people think it is like before.” 
Some public sector managers, finally, suggested that their customers stick 
to wasta for cultural reasons: ´ 
“In an Arabic society you have to find wasta. It is something tribal. 
Even if a person is okay and his documents are okay, he brings a wasta 
with him when he comes here.” 
Another question is why civil servants are ready to provide preferential 
treatment to some of their customers. Several interviewees in public ad-
ministration confirmed that they had no incentive to avoid granting prefer-
ential treatment to their relatives and friends and even to the friends of 
friends. One manager in public administration said that “speeding up pro-
cedures is not punished, but getting around rules or breaking them will be 
punished.” Others, however, stressed that there are no controls and no 
penalties at all against unequal treatment of applicants. 
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At the same time, civil servants must fear being victimised by society if 
they refuse to favour family members and neighbours. Many interviewees 
stressed that they felt very much under social pressure to use their office 
for helping their families and fellow tribe members. For instance, a mu-
nicipality employee said, “if I have a cousin who asks me to help him, I do. 
If not, they think I am a bad person.” 
Finally, serving as a wasta adds positively to one’s reputation. An inter-
viewee who works at the Municipality of Greater Amman emphasised that 
“When I am wasta for someone, many people listen to me because I am re-
spected.” 
The preferential treatment of people who have wasta constitutes a problem 
because it makes administrative procedures unfair. Companies with little 
wasta “loose a significant comparative and competitive advantage. They 
suffer from time delays compared to others”, as the manager of a manu-
facturing company told us. In addition, the ability of people with wasta to 
speed up administrative procedures makes state-business interactions un-
predictable, since the duration and result of the procedures depends on fac-
tors other than the official rules.  
Of course, personal connections are not the only factor determining how 
quickly public administrators deal with requests from private companies. 
Company size matters in particular. Many times we heard that big compa-
nies benefit from preferential treatment, even when they do not know any-
body in the public administration. One could thus say that company size is 
a substitute for personal relations. A financial market specialist confirmed:  
“The economic section at the Royal Court interferes a lot. They help big 
firms to by-pass the laws so that they do not have to go through lengthy 
procedures.”  
Likewise, foreign investors seem to have wasta simply by being foreign. 
They benefit from preferential treatment in many procedures such as regis-
tration and licensing by the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), which has 
been founded especially for the purpose of attracting direct foreign in-
vestment to Jordan. The head of a promotion agency for small and me-
dium enterprises (SME) complained: 
“Foreign investors are given preferential treatment. When an investor 
from the Gulf comes to Jordan the red carpet is rolled out for him, 
while Jordanian entrepreneurs suffer from the bureaucracy.” 
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Preferential access to information, licenses and permits, government con-
tracts, tax concessions and jurisdiction 
In many cases, wasta is useful not only for getting a permit or being 
awarded a concession faster and easier than usual, but can even be indis-
pensable for getting such permits or concessions at all. Many Jordanians 
have exclusive business opportunities because of their wasta. They have, 
for example, preferential access to (i) information, (ii) licenses, (iii) gov-
ernment contracts, (iv) tax exemptions and (v) jurisdiction for getting their 
rights enforced. The same manager of an SME support programme already 
cited above complained during our interview with him: 
“Everything in Jordan requires wasta. With wasta you can speed up 
procedures. This is normal and happens everywhere in the world. Yet, 
having wasta can also imply that you get something that someone else 
would not get at all. This is the difference to other countries.” 
Access to information: Wasta is used by many people to acquire from the 
government confidential information on business opportunities. A high-
ranking representative of a foreign donor agency explained: 
“All ministers in Jordan are also businessmen, even the King. This is 
because investment is linked with inside information.”  
A business specialist from another donor institution said: 
“The main problem is not the time it takes to get your things done […]. 
The main problem is the lack of information about how the procedures 
really are. There is no transparency in procedures and decisions.” 
Wasta can thus be useful in saving businesspeople time and money, be-
cause it ensures that they are always up to date regarding changes in ad-
ministrative rules and procedures. A company representative said: 
“You need personal connections so that someone tells you about the 
changes. It will slow things down at your company if you don’t know 
about the changes.” 
Likewise, well-connected investors are often informed about municipal 
decisions long time before these decisions are published. As a result, they 
know sooner than others where new roads, schools or malls are to be built, 
with the result that they can buy the surrounding land before the municipal 
decisions become known and the price of land jumps. 
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Access to licenses: Operating and manufacturing licenses are often pref-
erably granted to applicants with good wasta. The head of a social science 
research institute explained that 
“when there is a new business […] the people with the best wasta get 
the first licence. People who are close to the government and the secu-
rity forces always have the first draw.” 
Even in a governmental investment promotion agency we were told: 
“In this society, the families are very strong. If you know someone from 
a family, you call him and ask him for help. This is a problem, some-
times bad projects get an approval and good ones don’t.” 
Access to government contracts: Wasta also affects the chances of winning 
a government contract. An expert for foreign direct investment in Jordan 
maintained that “tenders are often ‘window dressing’. Decisions are made 
before [the publication of the tender] following informal criteria.” Several 
businesspeople confirmed that “wasta plays a major role in getting proj-
ects”, and some told us that they were “not participating any more, be-
cause corruption and ´buying from one’s cousin` is increasing and there is 
no security that tenders will be fair.” 
Some people told us that improvements have taken place in recent years 
and that there was now much more transparency in the process and results 
of governmental processing of tenders than in the past.  
In the commissions awarded by the Royal Court, however, wasta still 
plays a very important role. The manager of a company, which often did 
work for the Royal Court, said: 
“The Hashemite Court is not obliged to call for tenders. It can directly 
assign to a company that is recognised as a preferred supplier. To be-
come a preferred supplier, you mainly have to wait. There is no formal 
rule for this procedure.” 
Access to tax exemptions: Wasta can even help in receiving tax deduc-
tions. An economist at the University of Jordan stated that some compa-
nies are exempt from paying taxes because of their wasta. Likewise, sev-
eral entrepreneurs admitted that wasta helps in the tax department. One of 
them said that “the tax department has become more efficient, and the em-
ployees are much more friendly now. But a lot still depends on whether a 
person is known to them.“  
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Access to jurisdiction: People with good wasta even have a better chance 
of getting their rights enforced. According to our findings, this affects the 
decision-making of at least some of the judges in Jordan. A researcher 
stated that “the law is not equally applied; for example, [you will get your 
rights] only if you know someone at the security services.” A human rights 
lawyer told us that “because of the importance of the nets of personal rela-
tions in our society, it is sometimes difficult for a judge to remain inde-
pendent.” This is supported by the statement of a woman entrepreneur who 
felt that the courts had treated her unfairly because she did not make use of 
her wasta. Thereupon she turned to wasta:  
“Then I called another judge, a friend of mine who went with me to the 
next appointment. All of a sudden the judge was very polite to me. The 
courts are full of wasta, everything is twisted.”  
Accordingly, the head of a research institute strongly recommended: 
“The judiciary has to be reformed as to its efficiency and liability, and 
predictability. This is really a main area of problems arising for inves-
tors in Jordan. What the country needs most urgently is a thorough re-
view of how the judiciary works.” 
The preferential treatment of well-connected people makes state-business 
interactions not only unfair but also unpredictable. A consultant explained:  
“It is not easy for me since I do not have that many contacts. Influential 
people can get what they want easily. You see, there is no transparency, 
no fairness, no competition and no rules.” 
Likewise, the representative of a pharmaceutical company complained 
about the unpredictability of decisions taken by the public administration: 
“We don’t know what they want and we cannot plan.” Since entrepreneurs 
must hedge their risks in transactions with the state, unpredictable deci-
sion-making causes additional costs. One entrepreneur summed up:  
“You can have good quality, good PR [public relations], but if you don’t 
know a key person you are out of business.”Sabra (2004) tells about 
a young engineer who has given up on a career in Jordan and has decided 
to emigrate because of the omnipresence of wasta: 
“According to the constitution, the free market economy reigns here. 
[…] But in reality, that is not the case. Without connections, you will 
not be successful.” (Sabra 2004, 323) 
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6.1.2 The impact of wasta on political decision-making 
Wasta with the right people even allows entrepreneurs to affect politics in 
Jordan, i.e. decisions taken by the Jordanian parliament and government to 
their own advantage. Our data suggest that a small number of business-
people have such a good wasta with ministers, top bureaucrats, and mem-
bers of parliament that they can manipulate laws and government decrees. 
This finding is supported by Keller and Nabli (2002, 18), Boye et al. 
(2006, 9) and the Young Entrepreneurs Association (YEA 2006, 39). We 
may even assume that the present economic and social status of Jordan’s 
business elite is based on this influence (Wils 2003, 205 and 217).  
Some businesspeople in Jordan have a very strong say in political deci-
sions because they occupy high positions in the government themselves, 
because they have built family relationships with government members by 
marriages, or because other members of their families are high-level state 
officials. The head of a political think tank explained that “it is normal in 
Jordan today that high state officials are head of a big company as well,” 
and a journalist told us that “in many families there is one branch that goes 
into big business and another branch that goes into politics.” 
Most enterprises in Jordan do not have much of a voice in politics. They 
lack the necessary wasta and the business associations fail to represent the 
interests of their members (Boye et al. 2006, 9). Every company in Jordan 
must be member of a business association, but 68 % of our interview part-
ners from the private sector stressed that these associations were not help-
ful for them at all (see Table A7 in Annex A). The representative of a 
pharmaceutical company complained: “I don’t get anything from them, 
and I am not committed to them, they don’t help us.“ Big companies, on 
the other hand, do not miss such assistance, as the manager of a large tour-
ism company explained: “We go directly to the minister or to the Royal 
Court to solve our problems. There is no pressure group here.” 
The reason for this deficit is that the small, established elite of business-
people also controls business associations and chambers of commerce in 
Jordan with excellent relations with the political elite (Knowles 2005, 
129). A Jordanian economist confirmed that the “business associations are 
dominated by rich people and therefore not representative.” When a new 
General Sales Tax Law was under consultation in parliament, the Amman 
Chamber of Commerce (ACC) was unable to act cohesively for its mem-
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bers. Instead, several members of the ACC board lobbied for their per-
sonal interests outside associational channels (Moore 2004, 165). An en-
trepreneur from the telecommunications sector also maintained that “the 
associations have no influence. Members just do their own lobbying.”  
As a result, state-business relations on the policy-making level are also 
very unfair. Many regulations are designed for the benefit of the largest, 
best-established and most influential businesspeople and thereby severely 
distort competition. For example, various interviewees told us about a 
situation in which some businesspeople had persuaded the Minister of Ag-
riculture to allow the import of lambs from Syria. Permission was given at 
the very moment these entrepreneurs had lorries full of lambs parked next 
to the border so that they were able to import huge numbers of lambs duty-
free within a few days. When other traders also started to buy lambs in 
Syria and to carry them to the Jordanian border, the Ministry withdrew its 
previous permission just before these competitors were about to import 
their lambs to Jordan.  
Likewise, a reputable journalist reported about “one case where the prime 
minister owned an insurance company and the government changed a law 
so that premiums were doubled. Obviously the prime minister benefited 
from it”“ Wils states that during the privatisation of state enterprises influ-
ential businesspeople managed to gain control over lucrative parts of the 
market, for instance in the telecommunications sector (Wils 2003, 186). 
The reformed tax law is another example. It passed parliament only after 
several tax exemptions for certain goods were granted (ibid, 182). 
Jordanian MPs themselves provided additional evidence after a prelimi-
nary version of this study was presented in a workshop at the Center for 
Strategic Studies and distributed to politicians and journalists. One daily 
asked MPs about their opinions on the topic, and one answered: 
“It is true that some investors maintain excellent relations with the gov-
ernment in order to exert influence on political decisions. It is even true 
that a law was changed for the benefit of just one investor.” (Abdel Ra-
him Malhas in Al-Hayat, 11 May 2006) 
And another MP stated: 
“Investors have no access to functionaries except with money.“ (Khaled 
Al Shawabkeh in Al-Hayat, 11 May 2006) 
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6.2 How the use of wasta makes state-business relations 
inefficient 
The prevalence of wasta, however, not only results in unfairness and a 
lack of predictability in state-business interactions, thus increasing risks 
and barriers for investors, but it also reduces efficiency, thereby increasing 
the costs of investment. 
In this section, we will show that wasta is a key factor in the recruitment 
and promotion of public sector employees in Jordan, thus affecting their 
quality and number and, concomitantly, the quality of public services. Af-
ter that, we argue that wasta also has a negative influence on the legisla-
tive process by playing an important role for both the election of MPs and 
the appointment of ministers. 
6.2.1 The impact of wasta on the quality of public services 
Wasta in the recruitment and career promotion of public sector employees 
Many civil servants in Jordan are employed mainly because of their wasta. 
77 % of the low- to medium-ranking public sector employees covered in 
our survey stated that wasta was ‘important’ or even ‘very important’ for 
getting employment in the public sector (see Table B4 in Annex B). Many 
high-ranking public sector employees confirmed this in our interviews 
with them. Although efforts have been made to establish new recruitment 
procedures, wasta still plays a major role. The manager of a service de-
partment complained:  
“They are now trying to advertise in the newspapers but that is not ef-
fective; most people are employed by wasta.“ 
Jobs in the public sector are widely recognised in Jordan as a reliable and 
comfortable source of income, although they are not very well paid. 
As a result, there is much pressure from influential people to provide em-
ployment to their constituencies. We were told, for example, that MPs, 
ministers and chief directors frequently send lists of job applicants to the 
human resources departments of the public administration containing the 
names of supporters and family members for whom they wish employment 
in one or the other public sector department. A manager at the Municipal-
ity of Greater Amman explained us: 
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“It is because of the MPs who have to supply their supporters with jobs. 
This is the main thing with wasta, they ask us to employ their people. 
The people are poor, and the mayor discusses these issues with the 
MPs. The mayor is not free; he is under pressure.” 
However, ordinary citizens also exert pressure. One high-ranking official 
stated: 
“There is also this mentality of the people that because they pay taxes to 
the Municipality, the Municipality should also employ their sons and 
daughters.” 
The staffs of human resource departments in the public sector have diffi-
culty in withstanding this double pressure. Many told us that they often 
feel obliged to employ the proposed candidates. One of them said: 
“If a minister or engineer tells you to employ someone, you cannot say 
no.“ 
Moreover, wasta affects not only the recruitment of public sector employ-
ees, but also their career advancement. One employee of the Municipality 
of Greater Amman stressed: 
“There is wasta in promotions. Some people are not qualified at all and 
they get promoted, while others who are here for 10 years and do a 
good job are not promoted […]. This is a big problem. They don’t look 
who is qualified but who has the wasta.” 
Employment of unqualified staff and overstaffing 
The importance of wasta in recruiting and promoting public sector em-
ployees leads to (i) the employment of people who are inadequately quali-
fied and (ii) overstaffing in public sector institutions. In the process it af-
fects the quality of public services and, finally, the efficiency of state-
business relations in general. 
Low qualification of employees: One consequence of the important role 
that wasta plays in the recruitment and promotion of public sector em-
ployees is that some people acquire positions for which they are neither 
qualified nor motivated. The director of a ministerial department described 
this problem as follows:  
“You don’t necessarily find the right people in the right place.” 
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The problem is aggravated by the fact that it is almost impossible to dis-
miss public sector employees even when they lack motivation and are un-
qualified for their jobs. In addition, decision-makers refrain from dismiss-
ing people who have been recruited because of their wasta, fearing repri-
sals from the influential person who initially pushed for the employment 
of these persons. A manager in the Ministry of Public Sector Development 
(MoPSD) explained:  
“In the case of normal employees, we talk about regulations and laws 
that prohibit to dismiss them, even if they just sit around and do noth-
ing. With respect to higher-ranking officials we talk about culture. For 
example, if you try to merge two authorities you will not be able to lay 
one of the heads off, because his father is a member of parliament.” 
As a result, many public sector institutions suffer from the low qualifica-
tion and motivation of at least some of their employees. This in turn cre-
ates serious problems for entrepreneurs. As mentioned in Chapter 4, half 
of the businesspeople that we interviewed mentioned the lack of qualifica-
tion and motivation among public sector employees in Jordan as one of the 
main reasons for their problems in interactions with the state bureaucracy 
(Table A4 in Annex A). One company owner explained this factor in more 
detail: 
“In 30 % of the cases the problem is that the rules are not up to date. In 
70 % of the cases it is that public sector employees are not educated 
and that they take decisions on their own without really having the nec-
essary know-how […]. For example, we were inspected seven times be-
fore we got an approval for our […] factory. And we had to train the 
inspectors because they did not know the latest technology. They com-
pared us to some old factory. And they wrote a report in which they 
criticised that our products are stored in a tank on the roof of the build-
ing. They said it is too dangerous. We had to teach them that this tank is 
a high-tech tank with a lot of safety features. That is what we have to 
educate them on, that’s part of the ignorance we face.” 
Another entrepreneur stated that 
“The people in the public administration are not very helpful. They are 
lazy and lack the necessary commitment and interest for their jobs. Still, 
there are good and bad people everywhere, and you should not blame 
the simple employees.” 
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Of course, the recruitment of civil servants on the basis of their wasta is 
not the only factor that explains the low qualification of many public sec-
tor employees. Several interviewees stressed that adverse selection and a 
lack of training also play a role. Adverse selection takes place because 
wages in the public sector are very low compared with salaries in the pri-
vate sector.16 Consequently, many well-educated and trained people prefer 
to work in the private sector rather than in public administration. In addi-
tion, although many low- to medium-ranking employees in the bureauc-
racy believe that they have received adequate training17, the majority of the 
businesspeople, experts and higher-ranking civil servants whom we inter-
viewed stressed that there is a dearth of opportunities for training. 
Overstaffing: The second effect of wasta in the recruitment of civil ser-
vants is that many public sector departments are overstaffed. Our research 
generated ample empirical evidence to show that a misbalance exists be-
tween the amount of work to be done in many administrative units and the 
number of their employees. Most heads of public sector departments con-
firmed that they had enough employees:  
“We have a lot of employees, more than we need. But sometimes we 
have to take them.” 
Many pointed to overcrowded offices:  
“We have a lot of crowded offices, some people don’t even have a desk 
and some don’t even come to work, they are paid just for nothing.” 
Likewise, the Jordan Vision 2020 confirms that the public sector, which 
employs a third of Jordan’s workforce, suffers from disguised unemploy-
ment and underemployment of the individual employees (YEA 2006, 41). 
Goussous and Dababneh (2004) conclude that the “enormous growth in 
government has indirectly suppressed the level of entrepreneurial activity 
in Jordan“ (Goussous / Dababneh 2004, iii). 
                                                          
16  In our survey, 50 % of public sector employees stated that they earn less than 200 JD 
per month. Another 36.7 % earn between 200 and 400 JD, while only 13.3 % are paid 
more than 400 JD per month (see Table B1 in Annex B). 
17  In our survey, 59 % of all public sector employees believe that they receive adequate 
training, 37 % stated that this is not the case, and 3 % did not answer this question (see 
Table B4 in Annex B). 
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Overstaffing leads to inefficiency in state-business relations because it 
prolongs procedures and makes them more complicated than necessary. 
This effect is due to the idea that every head of an administrative depart-
ment wants to give all of his staff something to do. As a consequence, 
sometimes additional administrative steps are introduced, and duplication 
of responsibilities becomes more likely. One public sector manager ex-
pressed this clearly by stating:  
“We have about 20–30 too many [employees]. We try not to let this af-
fect the quality of our work. We give them little tasks to keep them busy, 
but they are not necessary.” 
Unfortunately, such efforts do not seem to offset the negative impact of 
overstaffing on the quality of public service: 67 % of the businesspeople in 
our survey still complained about the slowness of procedures, and another 
39 % named “too much regulation and dispersed decision-making” as a 
main cause of their problems with the authorities (see Table A4 in An-
nex A). They thus regarded the high number of administrative procedures 
and the duplication of responsibilities as major problems.  
This overstaffing in the public sector is often justified by advancing the 
need for security, political stability and social welfare as arguments. For 
example, one medium-ranking employee in the Municipality of Greater 
Amman argued as follows:  
“You see, this is a political thing. You have a problem if you do not em-
ploy these people. It is a matter of security.” 
In addition, overstaffing in the public sector is viewed as a way of tackling 
the problems of widespread unemployment and poverty: 
“The municipality also helps people to find work. Many of the employ-
ees have work because of ‘social’ reasons, because they are poor. This 
is related to the mayor. He is approached by people who bring evidence 
for their situation.” 
6.2.2 The impact of wasta on the legislative framework 
Deficiencies in the legal framework constitute another difficulty for busi-
nesspeople in Jordan. Here two of the main factors are directly related to 
the importance of wasta in Jordan: (i) Not only are many civil servants 
employed on the basis of their wasta, but many ministers are also ap-
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pointed because of their connections to the Royal Family instead of their 
competence. (ii) In addition, wasta also plays a key role in the election of 
MPs. Jordanian voters tend to support the candidate who is most likely to 
be a good wasta, i.e. to help them getting preferential treatment once he is 
in parliament. Again, people are elected because of their connections 
rather than their ability to design good laws.  
Appointment of ministers on the grounds of wasta 
Many ministers belong to big, influential families. They are appointed be-
cause the support of their families for the King is important for the stabil-
ity of the Jordanian political regime. As a result, not all ministers are well 
prepared to hold public office. Some have little understanding of economic 
matters and no experience in policy formulation and regulation. Some 
even lack the commitment to draft decrees for the benefit of the people; 
rather, their primary aim is to work for their own interests and for the 
benefit of their families.  
In addition, the ministers change frequently because the regime has to bal-
ance out the concerns of different influential families. As a result, minis-
ters usually stay in office for only a few months. They do not have much 
time to change the legal framework, as a representative of the Amman 
Chamber of Industry (ACI) underlined:  
“A minister that initiates a reform will be out of office half a year later.”  
The regulations are changed frequently, and it is difficult for the govern-
ment to achieve consistency in economic policies. 
Wasta as a dominant motive for the election of Members of Parliament 
Many interviewees confirmed that wasta also constitutes a central motive 
for the election of Jordanian MPs. The primary aim of their voters is to 
have a good wasta in parliament providing jobs, services and other favours 
once they are elected. In fact, the main concern of many MPS is to satisfy 
their constituencies materially rather than to design reforms for the benefit 
of the whole nation. 
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Most MPs in Jordan apparently represent a tribe or a region rather than a 
party, an ideology, a political stream or a specific goal.18 The head of a re-
search team stated: 
“Parliamentarians in Jordan are elected by their clientele not for their 
political ideas and convictions but because they promise goods, ser-
vices and an infrastructure to their voters, that is, the members of their 
family and tribe.” 
Likewise, one MP himself admitted: 
“Most MPs came to Parliament without a programme.” 
Many interviewees also confirmed that the majority of parliamentarians in 
Jordan pursue narrow personal interests, along with the interests of their 
families and tribes. They show little interest in the well-being of the popu-
lation as a whole. The director of a think-tank said: 
“In parliament, the deputies are elected according to the tribe they be-
long to. They are called ‘service deputies’, because they make promises 
to their local communities, such as jobs, water supply, new streets, al-
though this is the job of the municipalities. The deputies in the current 
parliament are not the right people to change the rules.” 
And a government official asserted: 
“The economic laws have to be passed by parliament. That is a real 
problem as long as we don’t have a good party system. Now, the MPs 
have no idea what they are talking about and they do not know at all 
what economic reform is.” 
A weak legislative framework negatively affects state-business interac-
tions. 17 % of the businesspeople we interviewed complained about inap-
propriate regulation (see Table A4 in Annex A). They stressed in particu-
lar that many laws in Jordan are not sufficiently clear and therefore leave 
too much room for discretion in decisions made by public sector officials 
(Boye et al. 2006, 10). Discretion always increases inequality in the treat-
ment of persons and the predictability of decisions made by the state.  
                                                          
18  The only notable exceptions to this are the candidates of the Islamic Action Front, who 
won 17 seats in the current House of Deputies (Hourani / Abu-Rumman / Kamel 2004).  
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6.3 How the use of wasta directly affects investment 
In addition to impairing the business climate in Jordan, the prevalence of 
wasta distorts economic incentives and thereby generates undesirable pat-
terns of behaviour. Many Jordanian businesspeople are seeking rents 
which can be obtained through wasta rather than to take the risk of devel-
oping a good product, trying to be innovative, or investing in competitive-
ness. In other words, widespread rent-seeking entails a misallocation of re-
sources and thereby constrains private sector development. 
Since wasta is the tool that enables entrepreneurs to obtain rents by gain-
ing access to decision-makers, it is only natural for them to invest much of 
their time and money in building up wasta instead of spending the same 
time and money for more productive purposes. 46 % of the businesspeople 
we spoke to said that they devoted substantial resources to the improve-
ment of their wasta. We identified three main strategies for reaching this 
goal: 
(i) Employment of ‘wasta-agents’: Many businesspeople employ people 
who have wasta or are specialised in building up wasta to go through ad-
ministrative procedures easily and without major risks: 
“All of the big enterprises employ people just because of their good 
wasta, because they need someone to make things happen.”  
(ii) Establishing relations: In particular, the owners of medium-sized and 
small companies which cannot afford to pay for a ‘wasta-agent’ try to 
build up contacts with influential or well-connected figures who can be a 
good wasta for them once they need help. Many entrepreneurs told us that 
they were intentionally trying to make friends with whomever they meet in 
order to improve their wasta. One entrepreneur said: 
“I spend half of my working day on the phone making contacts.”  
(iii) Giving gifts and discounts: Both smaller and larger companies also give 
little gifts to public sector employees and other influential people in order to 
improve their wasta. The manager of a manufacturing company said: 
“Sometimes […] I have to use my family name, or I have to smoke a 
cigarette with the civil servants. Or I give them small gifts like a per-
fume or a tie. Only on a personal level. I don’t have a problem with giv-
ing the employees small gifts […] Or maybe you send some flowers if 
they have a festivity to show your appreciation for their service.” 
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Likewise, the owner of a small shop mentioned that he tries to build up 
wasta by giving public sector employees a discount on his products. 
These examples show that it is not easy to make a clear-cut distinction in 
Jordan between favouritism and bribery. 64 % of the public sector em-
ployees covered by our standardised survey admitted that the employees in 
their administrative unit accepted bribes at least every now and then. The 
coordinator of a development project explained:  
“It is your decision if you want to use wasta or pay bribes. You use 
wasta or pay bribes if the things you need to have done are worth it.” 
To invest in more and better wasta is rational in a setting where economic 
opportunities are limited and wasta can help to benefit from one of the few 
opportunities available (Dieterich 1999, 123 f.).  
This very fact, however, is detrimental to economic development. It means 
that businesspeople with good wasta can earn rents even if their compa-
nies are not competitive. They have little incentive to take risks or to de-
velop innovative products or services. As a consequence, many Jordanians 
invest in wasta rather than in competitiveness. 
Some observers have identified this phenomenon as a lack of entrepreneu-
rial spirit. The Young Entrepreneurs Association (YEA), for example, 
writes that “culture and social norms [in Jordan] do not support entrepre-
neurship, because the notion of starting a business was never really en-
trenched in the Jordanian culture and way of life” (Goussouss / Dababneh 
2004).  
However, it is highly unlikely that the unsatisfactory level of entrepreneu-
rial activities and investment in Jordan is due to culture, spirit or the like. 
Rather, it is due to a system in which entrepreneurs have no incentive to 
devote their resources to productive projects and services or to improve 
their competitiveness because they can get ahead much more easily by 
building up wasta.  
7 Measures against the use of wasta in Jordan 
It now remains to answer the second main question of this study: What can 
be done to cut down on the use of wasta and thereby improve the business 
climate in Jordan?  
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We argue that the following steps are essential for reaching this goal: 
— Inform people better about alternatives to the use of wasta, 
— Make administrative procedures more transparent, 
— Strengthen the accountability of civil servants and politicians, 
— Create incentives for refraining from the use of wasta, 
— Adhere to the principles of democracy 
— Form a coalition for change to combat the use of wasta in Jordan. 
Section 7.1 below discusses the reasons why wasta is so widespread in 
Jordan despite its detrimental impact on the business climate. Section 7.2 
informs about steps, which have already been taken in recent years in Jor-
dan for the purpose of combating wasta. Finally, Section 7.3 gives rec-
ommendations for the government of Jordan, the private sector, non-
governmental organisations, the media, and donors on how to contribute 
more effectively to the fight to reduce the use of wasta in Jordan. 
7.1 Reasons for the persistence of wasta  
The use of wasta in Jordan prevails despite the aversion of many Jordani-
ans to it. Although many interviewees stressed that the overall importance 
of wasta had decreased somewhat during the last five years, nobody de-
nied that it still plays a very important role. The question therefore remains 
why its use is so persistent.  
Chapter 2 above assumed that favouritism can be seen as an informal insti-
tution which persists because of one or more of the following factors: (i) a 
lack of awareness, (ii) perverse incentives, (iii) the impact of socio-cultural 
norms, and (iv) an opposition to change.  
We found empirical evidence for all four factors with the partial exception 
of the first one: Our research results confirm that many Jordanians are un-
aware of the fact that wasta is no longer needed in many interactions with 
the state. However, we could not substantiate our initial hypothesis that 
widespread use of wasta is also due to a lack of awareness of its negative 
impact. On the contrary, a large majority of Jordanians, as described in 
Chapter 5, wants the use of wasta to be eliminated. 
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7.1.1 Lack of awareness  
Most Jordanians are aware of the negative consequences of wasta. How-
ever, many are clearly unaware that they have alternative options for 
reaching a goal.  
Our research substantiates that this lack of information is another reason 
for the continued use of wasta by many people in Jordan. Many business-
people admitted that their first thought when going through an administra-
tive procedure is whom to contact in order to receive preferential treat-
ment. They regard wasta as a universal solution for all of their problems. 
Although some administrative procedures in Jordan have been shortened 
and simplified in a way that there is no longer any objective need to use 
wasta, many applicants still try to do it. Several civil servants complained 
that their customers do not bother to get information about new regulations 
or to follow new, streamlined procedures. The owner of a bakery told us: 
“You need wasta, because the law is complicated.” 
The manager of a district municipality however disagreed: 
“The reason why clients try to use wasta is that the normal people don’t 
know about the rules. They want somebody to do it quickly, they are 
afraid, that’s why they need wasta. They think we are complicated, 
that’s why they try to use wasta. In the past this was true, everything 
took very long, but people still think it is like before.” 
Similarly, another high-ranking public official stated: 
“There is no need for wasta as long as everything goes by the law and is 
easy. But older people don’t know that. Sometimes people think they 
have to go to the Prime Minister for everything. But they could go eas-
ier if they just went on their own.” 
As a consequence, the use of wasta would probably be less widespread if 
businesspeople were better informed and knew that some administrative 
procedures have become easier, quicker, and cheaper and can be mastered 
even without wasta.  
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7.1.2 Perverse incentives  
Jordanians apparently continue to use wasta even though they are con-
vinced that its use constitutes a major obstacle for the development of their 
country. One expert called this “the dilemma between the individual and 
collective level” (Al-Husseini, 21 February 2006). Another one stated: 
“All people suffer from wasta, but they still use it. They think about 
short-term gains: that wasta can help them solve their problems today.” 
Our research confirms that individuals have little incentive to stop using 
wasta but many incentives to continue using it. As one interviewee pointed 
out, “no one who is rational would stop using his wasta. If you can get 
something more quickly you will not queue for it, right?” (Al-Husseini, 21 
February 2006).  
Inefficiency in the public sector is a main incentive for the use of wasta: 
“Wasta is encouraged because there is a lack of efficiency and because 
bureaucratic procedures are tedious” (Al-Masri, 18 February 2006). The 
longer administrative procedures take, and the more expensive and bur-
densome they are, the more reason applicants have to use their wasta in 
order to get preferential treatment. 
People who refrain from using wasta must accept disadvantages in com-
parison with others. In a context of poverty and unemployment, these dis-
advantages can be devastating for the individual. Widespread poverty and 
high unemployment must therefore be considered a part of the incentive 
structure to use wasta in Jordan. An entrepreneur from Amman said: “You 
have the choice to use wasta or to live on the peanuts that are left over by 
the others.” 
Public sector employees believe that speeding up administrative proce-
dures is the main motive for businesspeople to use wasta in their interac-
tions with the state. 64 % of the participants in our standardised survey 
stated that businesspeople use wasta in order to get something which they 
could also get without wasta, but not as quickly (see Figure 13). 
At the same time, however, 27 % admitted that businesspeople sometimes 
have no choice: they would not get what they want without wasta. This 
statement can be interpreted in two ways: either the applicants cannot en-
force their rights in certain areas without wasta, or wasta can enable them 
to get something to which they are formally not entitled. 
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26 % of the public sector employees whom we surveyed stated that busi-
nesspeople use wasta simply because everyone else does so as well. 
In addition, we found that people fear penalties if they deny to provide 
preferential treatment to their relatives and friends. If someone refuses to 
play the game, he/she can be branded as a person who does not act in ac-
cordance with the prevailing socio-cultural values and norms. 
 
Figure 13:  Reasons for the use of wasta by businesspeople  
according to Jordanian public sector employees  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Data taken from Table B3 in Annex B 
7.1.3 Socio-cultural values and norms 
The use of wasta is not a socio-cultural norm as such, but many Jordanians 
believe that this is so or that it is a consequence of their norms.  
Some authors write that the level of favouritism is determined, among 
other things, by culture (e.g. von Alemann 2006). Likewise, many Jorda-
nians also explain the use of wasta in cultural terms. They associate it with 
cherished values and norms such as solidarity, allegiance and mutual re-
sponsibility. Therefore they regard it as a part of their heritage: “Wasta is 
in our heads, it is in our culture” (Dannoun, 30 March 2006). “Wasta is 
part of the culture and it is also political” (Sakijha, 28 February 2006).  
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If this were true, it would mean, for example, that Jordanians would have 
to abandon their culture in order to eliminate the use of wasta in their 
country. This is clearly not the case. On the contrary: favouritism has been 
found under various names at some point in history in every culture.  
Nevertheless, the argument is relevant. The simple fact that it has been 
brought forward over and over again has given it momentum and made 
everyone believe in it. As a consequence, many Jordanians do not give up 
using wasta because they deem it part of their culture. Likewise, they do 
not blame others for benefiting from wasta. 
Even worse, many people explicitly use this argument to excuse and jus-
tify their own behaviour: If wasta is part of the Jordanian culture, using it 
cannot be wrong. On the contrary, it is neither realistic nor desirable to 
take steps to fight it. 
Finally, the argument is used to exert pressure on relatives and friends. 
Non-compliance with this norm is branded as socially and culturally in-
adequate behaviour, which can entail social sanctions and disadvantages. 
As an entrepreneur from Amman confirmed:  
“It is not a favour, it is a duty to do something for your tribe. If you do 
not grant wasta, you are considered weird and without honour.”  
Another person explained: 
“People who do not grant wasta will face problems. People will con-
sider you as a bad person.”  
Helping relatives or friends to get a job, a production licence, preferential 
treatment at hospital, admission to a good university or a foreign exchange 
scholarship are all examples of the social obligation to prove one’s loyalty 
and social responsibility and to strengthen family ties (Cunningham / 
Sarayrah 1993, 2).  
Moreover, people who do not provide wasta cannot expect to get help 
from others should they themselves ever be in need. This shadow of the 
future contributes to the pressure that each individual faces and that 
prompts him to serve as a wasta. 
Another important aspect is the negative influence of tribalism. An expert 
for corruption in Jordan told us “Wasta is more prevalent because of the 
tribal mentality and inheritance“ (Sakijha, 28 February 2006). Tribalism is 
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a pre-Islamic tradition, which is especially strong in societies that have a 
nomadic background, as in Jordan. In pre-Islamic times, the tribe was the 
highest unit of social and political organisation, and tribal leaders consti-
tuted the most important social, political and judicial authority in many 
Arab territories (Loewe 2004, 212). 
The tribal tradition still exists, although other cultural layers accompany it. 
Social norms are based on various sources (pre-Islamic, Islamic, modern), 
but society still values primary allegiances. Genealogical institutions sur-
round the individual like concentric circles, with the inner circle being the 
family, followed by his kinship, then the clan, and finally the tribe. The 
individual owes loyalty to these institutions and must accept various social 
obligations towards them. On the other hand, he can expect support and 
solidarity from them in times of need (bin Muhammad 1999; Dieterich 
1999, 117 f.; Jungen 2002; Loewe 2004, 212). 
The problem with tribalism in this sense is that it strengthens solidarity 
among relatives but not with others. Many interviewees affirmed: 
“Jordanians tend to think that you help your family first, then your 
clan, then your tribe, and then the region.” (Mansur, 20 March 2006) 
A sociologist explained: 
“Jordan basically is a tribal society. The tribe is the basis of the society. 
When we talk about the tribe, we mean a group. The group is very im-
portant. Loyalty is addressed to the group, not to the state, because the 
group provides the basic security. Everybody has to give the group pri-
ority.” (Nasir, 28 February 2006) 
7.1.4 Opposition to change in an authoritarian context  
The fourth and probably most important reason for the widespread use of 
wasta in Jordan is the country’s authoritarian political system. According 
to our findings, this contributes in two different ways to the problem: First, 
the regime has no interest in fighting the use of wasta because its own 
power depends on mechanisms such as personalism, informalism and cli-
entelism, which go along with wasta. Second, the regime controls the me-
dia and all non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and thereby inhibits 
them from organising and implementing effective strategies against the 
widespread use of wasta. 
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Wasta and regime stability: Jordan has an authoritarian regime with a neo-
patrimonial pattern of rule, i.e. it is characterised by personalism, infor-
malism, clientelist structures and a strong centralisation of decision-
making in the hands of the King (Bill / Springborg 1994, 150 f.; Dieterich 
1999, 101–105; Eisenstadt 1973, Pawelka 1985, 24 f.).  
In order to stabilise the political system, the Jordanian King uses clientelis-
tic mechanisms, which go along with the use of wasta. The King uses the 
patrimonial nature of Jordanian society by co-opting tribal leaders and the 
chiefs of clans and interest groups (Dieterich 1999, 117 f. and 121). He 
guides all major political decisions through a network of personal relations 
and distributes benefits and privileges to create legitimacy and support for 
his rule. In doing so, he presents himself as a caring, paternalistic head of 
state: a patrimon to whom citizens owe loyalty, support and respect in re-
turn for material benefits. Thus, as an NGO representative put it;  
“Regime loyalty builds on benefits that can be obtained from the  
regime.“ 
Clientelism can be found on all levels of the state apparatus including 
higher levels of the administration, the government and the parliament. 
Many people within the political system are both patrons of those below 
them and clients of those above. For example, many parliamentarians, 
while clients of ministers and other important political figures, also use 
their positions and influence to promote recruitment of members of their 
own clans to public offices and to secure benefits, such as infrastructure 
and services, for their kinship or for friends. Thus, in many situations, po-
litical figures in Jordan serve as wasta. As one journalist put it:  
“The political system itself is based on patronage and accused of using 
wasta. It is a patriarchal system. So wasta is used by both, the ordinary 
people and the political system.” 
Given that many political figures both use and provide wasta, it is prob-
able that they will oppose the fight against the use of wasta since this 
would cost them a loss of influence and power. For example, many mem-
bers of parliament (MPs) primarily understand themselves as sources of 
wasta for their relatives and friends. It is therefore unlikely that initiatives 
to reduce wasta will find enthusiastic approval in the parliament. Experts 
point out that any reduction in the role of wasta would weaken the tribes 
because the tribal leaders themselves often figure as wasta-MPs. Weaken-
The impact of favouritism on the business climate: a study on wasta in Jordan 
German Development Institute  95
ing the tribal structure would thus change the political balance and thereby 
lead to instability:  
“…and behind wasta is the political balance of Jordan with its tribal 
links. This is why you cannot change wasta. These backward tribal peo-
ple will reject to do it.” 
In addition, many Jordanians fear that combating the use of wasta would 
also change the balance between Jordanians of Palestinian and Transjor-
danian origin in the public sector and thereby lead to instability. At the 
moment, the fact that wasta plays a major role in the recruitment of civil 
servants and politicians guarantees the dominance of Transjordanians in 
the public sector. If the influence of wasta in employment and appoint-
ment to strategic positions within the state were to be reduced in favour of 
merit-based employment and appointment, more Palestinians could enter 
the public sector. Fear of the possible ensuing political disturbances makes 
political forces resist the reduction of wasta. An expert explained in detail:  
“The problem of wasta comprises a nationality issue: roughly speaking, 
Jordanians from the East Bank dominate the public sector, while West 
Bankers dominate the private sector. Recently, more and more East 
Bankers are also engaging in economic activity. But West Bankers still 
have few chances getting access to the public sector because most jobs 
are distributed on the basis of wasta. As a consequence, it is difficult to 
fight wasta: those that occupy powerful positions in the state have no 
interest to abolish their own privileges and to work against their own 
interest. Especially, the East Bankers fear greater influence of the West 
Bankers in state institutions.” 
In spite of all these difficulties, King Abdullah II has assumed the risk of 
reforms. According to many experts, he honestly wants to fight the use of 
wasta in his country. A political scientist postulated: 
“The King is really committed to reforms. He is the driving force behind 
the current reform initiatives. However, he has no solution or formula 
for where he would like to arrive at the end.” 
Comments on the political will of other actors such as the government and 
the parliament were more diverse. Many experts believe that politicians in 
the government and parliament impede reform (Al Rantawi, 21 February 
2006; Sakijha, 28 February 2006). Others, however, stressed that all politi-
cal forces now recognise that the use of wasta is detrimental to the devel-
opment of Jordan (Abu Halaweh, 12 March 2006). 
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Wasta and the control of NGOs and the media: The executive branch of 
Jordan’s political system has extensive powers and ample means to control 
society. The media, NGOs and the judiciary are not independent and can-
not effectively claim more accountability and transparency in the public 
sphere. This, however, is a prerequisite for any reduction in the use of 
wasta.  
Jordan’s political decision-makers regularly widen and narrow the bounda-
ries of legal participation and expression in alternating steps of liberalisa-
tion and de-liberalisation. Brumberg (2003) argues that such a strategy 
serves to appease opponents and can be considered as part of the strategy 
for ensuring the regime’s survival in the form of ‘liberalised autocracies’. 
In addition, measures of liberalisation are often counterbalanced by restric-
tions that render precisely these measures ineffective in practice. A jour-
nalist gave the following example: 
“Democratisation appears to go one step forward and then two steps 
back. Some new laws look good, but other laws make restrictions 
tighter. For instance, the new party law is liberal, but the law governing 
public gatherings has become tighter, because permissions have to be 
sought before organising a gathering of even three people.” 
As a consequence, the monarch retains extensive control over all areas of 
social life in addition to his power over the public administration, the mili-
tary, the police and the secret services. The government is hardly held ac-
countable by the parliament or by the public. One expert stressed: 
“The central problem is that there is no accountability in Jordan. Poli-
cies can be bad without any consequences for the government.“ 
A separation of powers, with concomitant institutional checks and bal-
ances, is absent. The executive has the legal means to control the popula-
tion and to restrict the activities of organised civil society. Parliament 
plays only a minor political decision-making role. One expert referred to it 
as a “rubber stamp parliament“. 
Political parties, trade unions and NGOs exist, but they are weak and lack 
broad support. They are also closely monitored and therefore cannot effec-
tively demand accountability and transparency in government procedures:  
“Jordan has 34 political parties, but in fact all of them are ineffective. 
They do not have any influence in the country. The government is the 
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main power and we do not have a real public sphere.” (Hourani, 
20 February 2006) 
Most NGOs are closely linked to the political establishment, or are even 
run by a member of the Royal Family. The establishment of truly inde-
pendent NGOs is impeded by various legal measures. For example, the 
Associations Law demands close control of the budget of NGOs 
(Wiktorowicz 2002, 116 f.), and every single activity needs government 
approval. An academic from Amman said: 
“Until now, the government is controlling all NGOs. If I had opened my 
own NGO, I would have to renew my registration every year or so. Al-
so, if I just want to have a table in my NGO, I need a permission from 
the government. I would have to get a license for every board meeting 
and I have to invite one government official.” 
The media can operate quite freely in comparison to many other Middle 
Eastern countries. However, the development of truly independent news-
papers which critically monitor government performance is almost impos-
sible. The government controls most of the country’s media. Private com-
panies are sometimes discriminated against and therefore face difficulties 
in operating. All journalists are obliged to become members of the Jordan 
Press Association, and the press imposes self-censorship on issues involv-
ing the Royal Family and corruption (Devi 2005; Kilani 2002). 
7.2 Past measures 
Several measures have been implemented in recent years to curtail the use 
of wasta in Jordan, which can be assigned to several of the different ap-
proaches presented in Chapter 2 for a comprehensive fight against wasta:  
— Initiatives have been started to heighten public awareness of the nega-
tive effects of favouritism, although they have thus far reached only a 
small part of the population.  
— Various steps have been taken to create incentives for businesspeople 
not to ask for preferential treatment and for public sector employees 
not to provide preferential treatment to relatives and friends.  
— Some very slight progress has been made in organising a ‘coalition 
for change’ and in reforming the political system. 
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At the same time, little has been done to detach wasta in the minds of Jor-
danians from their social norms and values and to promote transparency 
and accountability in the administrative and political system of Jordan.  
We will therefore confine ourselves to describing reform measures related 
to (i) raising public awareness, (ii) changing the incentives, (iii) implemen-
ting political reforms, and (iv) organising a coalition for change. 
7.2.1 Heightening public awareness 
The King and some NGOs have taken the initiative in trying to heighten 
Jordanians’ awareness of the negative impacts of wasta. The King has put 
the fight against wasta on his political agenda, one NGO has run a media 
campaign on behalf of the government, and several research institutes are 
conducting and disseminating research on the role of wasta in the social, 
economic and political system of Jordan.  
Unfortunately, the effect of these efforts has remained comparatively 
small. In addition, since the terrorist attacks in November 2005 on three 
hotels in Amman, security issues at the top of the agenda, thereby dimin-
ishing the public’s interest in the issue of corruption. 
“A poll carried out by […] the Jordan Centre for Social Research 
(JCSR), underscored the effect that the hotel bombings had had on 
popular sentiment. Of the 1,000 people polled, almost 30 % said that 
‘terrorism’ was the main problem facing Jordan, and a further 12 % 
said that ‘instability in neighbouring countries’ was the primary issue. 
In a poll carried out by JCSR one year earlier, ‘corruption’ was identi-
fied as the major issue facing the country.” (EIU 2006, 18) 
The third deficit of the initiatives is that they have focused on sensitising 
people to the effects of wasta, even though most Jordanians already re-
gards the use of wasta as a form of malpractice. Future campaigns should 
better provide more information on alternatives to the use of wasta.  
Wasta on the political agenda 
Shortly after his accession to throne in 1999, King Abdullah II made “the 
fight against corruption, social injustice, bribery, nepotism and adminis-
trative laxity“ a priority issue (Hattar 2000). Since then, he has emphasised 
several times that he strongly backs the fight against all kinds of corrupt 
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practice, including wasta. In a letter from June 2005 he wrote to the then 
Prime Minister Adnan Badran: 
“We look upon the phenomenon of ‘wasta’ (patronage) and favouritism, 
a public complaint, as another form [of corruption]. While we are proud 
of our values of solidarity, social responsibility and human understand-
ing of others' problems, which are rooted in our Arab and Islamic heri-
tage, favouritism and patronage infringe on the rights of others, have 
squandered public funds, and deprived some citizens of their rightful 
opportunities. Thus, patronage that deprives others of their rights is in-
congruent with Jordanian values and should be regarded as a gross 
violation of justice and equality that is punishable by law.” (King Ab-
dullah II 2005) 
On another occasion, the King addressed senators, deputies and govern-
ment officials with the following words:  
“I really wish that every deputy, member of the Upper House or minis-
ter, instead of endeavouring to get jobs for others, would rather – along 
with the rest of us – try to change our sons’ and daughters’ perceptions 
of work and jobs. They should understand that ‘wasta’ is not an honest 
deed.” (King Abdullah II, cited in Royal Hashemite Court 2005) 
As a consequence, many experts perceive the King as the driving force in 
creating awareness about the negative impacts of wasta. 
Some critics, however, say that the King’s statements raise expectations 
among the population which will never be fulfilled. They maintain that 
such declarations are primarily made to please donors and do not reflect a 
real political will to take measures against the widespread use of wasta. 
Media campaigns 
So far, at least one media campaign has been launched against the use of 
wasta. It was intended to make the Jordanians aware of the negative con-
sequences of wasta. Launched in early 2006, it was initiated and run by an 
NGO called Al-Mizan (the scales) and supported, among others, by the 
Ministry of Political Development and Parliamentary Affairs and the 
European Union (EU). The campaign was aimed at educating people about 
their rights and about the fact that the use of wasta violates to the principle 
of equal treatment. Under its slogan “[N]o to favouritism, nepotism“, it 
called for “the right person for the right position“ (Al-Mizan 2006). Dur-
ing the four weeks of the campaign, various kinds of promotion material, 
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such as posters, TV and radio spots were employed. In addition, several 
newspapers picked up the topic and published articles on the campaign 
and its content (Abu Halaweh, 12 March 2006). 
Research on wasta 
So far, two studies dealing explicitly with the role that wasta plays in Jordan 
have been published (Kilani and Sakijha 2000; Kilani and Sakijha 2002). 
Both have been edited by the Arab Archives Institute, which has also organ-
ised conferences on different aspects of corruption in Jordan. The studies 
provide excellent information on the prevalence and persistence of wasta in 
Jordan, as well as on Jordanians’ perception of it. The conclusions were 
broadly covered in the media and thus helped to increase general awareness 
about the negative consequences of using wasta (Sawalha 2002). 
7.2.2 Changing the incentives 
Several political forces in Jordan have developed ideas on how to increase 
the cost of using wasta or how to reduce its benefits. New sets of rules 
prohibiting the use of wasta have been drafted, and plans exist to form 
government entities which can effectively fight corruption. Some adminis-
trative procedures have, in fact, been streamlined, and human resource 
policies have been reformed to some degree. However, many of the more 
comprehensive suggestions have not yet been realised. In addition, they 
focus on creating new regulations, whereas the main problem is not a lack 
of regulations but the fact that existing regulations are ignored. 
Regulations prohibiting the use of wasta 
Several Jordanian laws already set limits to the use of wasta. Apart from 
some very general principles in the constitution, this includes paragraphs 
in the Civil Service Law, the Anti-Corruption Bill, and the draft Code of 
Conduct and Ethics in the Civil Service. Critics argue, however, that exist-
ing regulations leave loopholes and that they are not emphatic enough 
about the legal consequences of corruption. One lawyer said, for example, 
“What we need is a full-scale description of wasta, along with standards 
and criteria that are known publicly and channels that are open for com-
plaints.“ It remains open whether the Anti-Corruption Bill and the drafted 
Code of Conduct and Ethics can bridge the gap. 
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The Constitution: Several articles of the Jordanian Constitution clearly 
prohibit corruption and the use of wasta in interactions with the state. For 
instance, Article 6 stipulates that every person is to be treated equally be-
fore the law and that the government is to ensure equal opportunities for 
all citizens. Article 22 says that recruitment in the public sector should be 
based on merit and qualifications (see Box 3). However, it is very difficult 
to enforce these rather vague guidelines (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003). 
The Civil Service Law: According to the Jordanian Civil Service Law, the 
abuse of a position in the public sector is to be punished. However, the 
prerequisite for this is proof of a bad motive for the offence, and this is 
very difficult to prove in the case of wasta (OECD 2006c). A prominent 
lawyer considered the law to be “too unclear and elastic”. 
 
Box 3:  Provisions in the Jordanian Constitution with regard to wasta 
Article 6 (i) and (ii) declare that “Jordanians shall be equal before the law. 
There shall be no discrimination between them as regards their rights and du-
ties on grounds of race, language and religion. The government shall ensure 
work and education within the limits of its possibilities, and it shall ensure a 
state of tranquillity and equal opportunities to all Jordanians.“ 
Article 22 (ii) says that “Appointment to any government office or to any estab-
lishment attached to the government, or to any municipal office, whether such 
appointments is permanent or temporary, shall be made on the basis of merit 
and qualifications.“ 
Article 44 stipulates that “No minister may purchase or lease any government 
property even if the sale or lease thereof has been offered in public auction. 
He/she shall not, while holding his/her ministerial office, become a member of 
the board of directors of any company or take part in any commercial or finan-
cial transaction or receive a salary from any company.“ 
Article 55 stipulates that “Ministers shall be tried by a High Tribunal for of-
fences which might be attributed to them in the course of the performance of 
their duties.“  
Article 75 (i) says that “No person shall become a Senator or Deputy […] who is 
related to the King within degree of consanguinity to be prescribed by special law.“ 
Source:  Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2005a) 
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The anti-corruption bill: An anti-corruption bill was drafted at the direc-
tive of King Abdullah II in the summer of 2005 (Barakat 2005). It covers 
different forms of corruption, including wasta, and provides for the estab-
lishment of a new anti-corruption commission, which shall be authorised 
to investigate cases of corruption in the government and in every public 
and private institution and to refer such cases to trial before a court of law. 
According to the bill, a group of officials from the executive, the legisla-
tive and the judicial branches will nominate the members of the commis-
sion, who shall enjoy diplomatic immunity and may not be dismissed for 
any reason, except if they “betray” their position (Marwan Muasher, cited 
in Barakat 2005). 
 
Box 4:  The draft Code of Conduct and Ethics: Provisions  
regarding wasta 
Article 6:  Dealing with others 
(a)  Civil servants are obligated to: 
1. respect the rights and interests of others with no exception; deal 
with the public in a respectful, polite, neutral, impartial, and ob-
jective way, without any discrimination. 
(b)  Regarding the interaction with their superiors, civil servants are obli-
gated to: 
2. interact respectfully with their superiors and not try to obtain 
any preferential treatment by behaving in a flattering or cheating 
way or by making use of connections or favouritism. 
(c)  Civil servants are obligated to: 
3. oppose any influences from a third party which would lead to 
preferential treatment of the subordinate. 
Article 10: Worthiness, aptitude, competition and fairness 
(c)   Civil servants are obligated to: 
1. never take up or enter any form of preferential treatment for 
anyone through connections or favouritism, be it directly or in-
directly. 
Source: MoPSD (2006a), translation by the ministry 
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Adoption of this bill has been delayed several times, even though it was 
given urgency status. A group of parliamentarians has argued that the draft 
is unconstitutional, because it brings together the three branches of gov-
ernment into one commission, and because it “trespasses on the judicial 
branch’s authority” (Falah Qudah, as cited in Al Abed 2005a). However, 
some experts assert that the main problem is that the bill lacks backing in 
parliament because many MPs benefit from wasta and themselves provide 
preferential treatment to their constituents on this basis.  
The draft bill was still under discussion in August 2006. 
The Code of Conduct and Ethics in the Civil Service: The Ministry for 
Public Sector Development has drafted a code of conduct for civil servants 
that prohibits all kinds of preferential treatment by public sector employ-
ees (see Box 4). This draft is still under discussion, but will, if things go as 
planned, become part of all employment contracts with civil servants. 
Government agencies in charge of the fight against corruption 
Jordan lacks an organisation which effectively prosecutes the use of wasta. 
Several entities have been explicitly founded for this purpose or have been 
given the task of fighting corruption (in addition to other tasks). The two 
most important ones are the Audit Bureau and the Anti-Corruption Unit at 
the General Intelligence Department. However, they purportedly lack the 
political and administrative independence and support needed to carry out 
their tasks in this regard. 
The Audit Bureau: The Audit Bureau’s mandate includes fighting all kinds 
of corruption in the public sector and reinforcing legality, transparency 
and equality. It was founded in 1952, and its main task is to audit govern-
ment revenues and expenses. When doing so, however, it often also un-
covers irregularities in the decisions of public sector employees, including 
preferential treatment of customers on the basis of wasta. In these in-
stances, the Audit Bureau can either start an investigation itself or refer the 
case to the Anti-Corruption Unit at the General Intelligence Department, 
which has more extensive means of investigating. 
Unfortunately, the Audit Bureau is hampered by several institutional 
weaknesses: First, it is legally and functionally subordinate to the Prime 
Minister. As a result, it is subject to pressure from the executive, even 
though its president enjoys immunity. Second, its annual budget is deter-
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mined by the Ministry of Finance, which means that one of the main insti-
tutions the Audit Bureau is expected to control can exert pressure on the 
Bureau by cutting down on its budget. Third, as already described, many 
laws and decrees in Jordan are superfluous, outdated, and unclear. The 
Audit Bureau therefore faces considerable difficulty in monitoring compli-
ance with these laws and decrees. The regulation on government procure-
ment, for example, is not clearly formulated, and this poses an additional 
hindrance to the prosecution of any official who has favoured a bidder be-
cause of wasta (Abadi, Al-Baik and Al-Masri, 10 April 2006). Fourth, 
critics also argue that the Audit Bureau restricts itself too much to supervi-
sion of the ex-ante budgetary process, i.e. to planning which takes place 
before money is effectively spent, thereby leaving much scope for unlaw-
ful practices during or after the disbursement of public funds (Kas-
say 1998, 59). 
The Anti-Corruption Unit at the General Intelligence Department: This 
unit was founded in 1996 at the earliest. Its main task is to investigate 
questionable activities and refer them, if necessary, to the Public Prosecu-
tor (Carnegie Endowment / Fride 2005). The unit deals with cases of tax 
evasion, abuse of power, embezzlement, money-laundering, violations of 
intellectual property rights, along with the smuggling and trafficking of 
drugs and arms (Hattar 2000). 
Critics argue that this Anti-Corruption Unit is ineffective in its work be-
cause it is part of the General Intelligence Department, which generally 
avoids any kind of publicity and which is itself accused of internal corrup-
tion and influence peddling (Khouri 2005; Kassay 1998; Bertelsmann Stif-
tung 2003). 
Streamlining and standardisation of procedures 
Incentives for the use of wasta have been slightly reduced by streamlining 
and standardising procedures, i.e. by lowering the benefits of using wasta, 
in both state-business interactions and in administrative human resource 
management. In addition, an extensive public sector reform programme 
has been set in motion. To create an efficient public sector, however, these 
efforts must be intensified, and further reforms are needed. Measures are 
also needed to reinforce transparency in the public sector as a precondition 
for controlling compliance with existing regulations. 
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Sharif Ali Zu’bi, Jordan’s current Minister of Industry and Trade, is con-
vinced that “Jordan is transforming from an economy dominated by an 
ever-present government and burdensome bureaucracy to a market econ-
omy in which the private sector leads and the government facilitates [and] 
a merit-based economy in which hard work pays off” (Zu’bi 2006). How-
ever, while much has been achieved with regard to streamlining and stan-
dardisation procedures, “too often, good ideas have failed to take root be-
cause they have not been followed through, or because the initiators and 
supporters of reform have moved on too quickly from key positions” 
(Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2004, 6). 
Several reform measures have improved state-business interactions in the 
past years:  
— The process of starting a company has been simplified, for example 
through the establishment of the one-stop-shops in the Jordan In-
vestment Board (JIB) and the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) 
(see Box 1, Page 47), as well as through the creation of the Aqaba 
Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) (see Box 2, Page 48).  
— Tangible improvements have been achieved in standardising customs 
procedures. 
— The Ministry of Public Sector Development (MoPSD) has set up sev-
eral programmes to streamline administrative procedures. For ex-
ample, a so-called Challenge Fund has been put in place to finance 
innovative improvements in service delivery.  
— The Jordan Agency for Enterprise Development (JAED) was set up in 
2003 to become an umbrella organisation for Jordan’s different in-
vestment promotion agencies: the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), the 
Industrial Estates Corporation (JIEC), and the Free Zone Corporation 
(Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2006a). However, JAED is still not op-
erative. Its director left the institution in November 2005, and no suc-
cessor has been appointed. In addition, the institution has no employees 
except for a few secretaries and a driver: “JAED is where it was in 
1999: in the design stage, a study in the making“ (Mansur 2006). 
Procedures for public sector recruitment and promotion have also been 
slightly improved, and more reform measures are planned. For instance, 
several public sector institutions have introduced a merit-based selection 
process that objectively compares how well candidate profiles match the 
job description (for details see Box 5). 
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Box 5:  Steps taken to standardise the recruitment and promotion of 
public sector employees 
The Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) and the Municipality 
of Greater Amman (MGA) have both improved their recruitment procedures. 
They now advertise vacancies with job descriptions in the newspapers and 
short-list applicants according to their qualifications. Short-listed candidates 
undergo English language and ability tests, as well as structured interviews. 
However, an official in the MGA also admitted that many employees get jobs 
for ‘social reasons’ and because they are poor. The Mayor of Amman is still of-
ten pressured by parliamentarians who seek jobs for their supporters. Such 
statements confirm broader evidence that merit-based recruitment systems have 
not been introduced in a systematic way. 
Some improvements have also been made regarding salaries and limitations on 
the time of employment in the public sector. Highly qualified staff can be hired 
on the basis of contracts. Such contracts make it possible to limit the period of 
employment on the one hand while paying salaries substantially above the civil 
service pay scale on the other. 
In addition, the Ministry of Public Sector Development (MoPSD) has devel-
oped principles for improving human resource policies in the public sector. 
These ideas include appropriate and equitable salaries, regular performance 
evaluations, merit-based promotion procedures, better training, and effective 
procedures governing retirement, redundancy and dismissal. The MoPSD and 
the Civil Service Bureau are currently also working on a new civil service by-
law which “Aims at ensuring that the public sector has the right number of 
people with the right number of skills in the right jobs“ (MoPSD 2006b, 6).  
Finally, some ministries have introduced performance evaluation systems to set 
incentives by adjusting salaries according to employee performance. However, 
according to an official from the MoPSD, these systems do not work satisfacto-
rily because supervisors in the ministries usually give good grades for all their 
employees regardless of performance. 
Source: MoPSD (2006b), YEA (2006) 
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7.2.3 Implementing political reforms 
Progress in political reforms has been slow. Although the government of 
Jordan began in the 1990s to initiate reform projects such as the Jordan 
First Initiative and the National Agenda, these have been only partially 
implemented to date.  
In the National Agenda, the government describes its plans to undertake 
broad political reforms. For instance, the chapter on political development 
and inclusion mentions a revision of Jordan’s electoral, party, associations 
and press laws (for details see Box 6).  
Though, it is very unclear whether any of these ideas will ever be imple-
mented. Only some two hundred copies of the National Agenda have been 
distributed to the public. Although the agenda is supposed to be available 
for downloading on the internet, the link to both the Arabic and the Eng-
lish versions of the full document have been inactive so far. 
For its part, the Jordan First Initiative has been little more than a PR cam-
paign. Some critics say that it was started mainly to strengthen the identi-
fication of the Jordanians with their country and with the King.  
7.2.4 Organising a coalition for change 
The task of forming groups along lines of common interest remains diffi-
cult in Jordan because of legal restrictions on the freedoms of assembly 
and speech. As a result, no strong movement or pressure group has 
emerged calling for more action against the widespread use of wasta. Only 
a few business associations and NGOs are active in the field, and it is up to 
them to become the nuclei of a broader coalition for change. 
The majority of business associations in Jordan are too weak for this task 
and too dependent on the will of the government and the interests of a 
small number of well-connected big entrepreneurs who themselves benefit 
from the use of wasta in Jordan. In particular, the Chambers of Commerce 
and the Chambers of Industry are considered ineffective in representing 
the interests of a larger fraction of their members. Even worse, they seem 
to be part of the system, since their leaders themselves are said to make 
ample use of wasta (Barhan, 22 February 2006). 
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Box 6:  The National Agenda 
In February 2005, King Abdullah II instructed a committee to develop the Na-
tional Agenda, a holistic programme for economic, political and social reforms 
to be implemented by the government of Jordan. It builds on earlier initiatives 
such as the National Charter and the Jordan First Initiative, but for the first time 
clearly points out that economic development can only take place if political re-
forms are undertaken simultaneously.  
Several measures envisaged by the National Agenda would help to curtail the 
use of wasta. Its chapter on Investment Development proposes streamlining 
administrative procedures in the areas of registration, taxation and customs. 
This would reduce incentives for using wasta. The reforms proposed in the 
chapter on Political Development and Inclusion aim at comprehensive revision 
of the laws governing the media, political parties and NGOs. This would 
strengthen the legal security of non-state actors and contribute to their ability to 
fight wasta. The National Agenda’s chapter on Justice and Legislation recom-
mends giving the judicial system more independence and reviewing all laws 
concerning judicial procedures. Such reforms would also facilitate the en-
forcement of penalties for the use of wasta.  
Nevertheless, many Jordanians who argue that the royal committee lacked rep-
resentatives from the middle class and the political opposition criticise the Na-
tional Agenda. Also, the agenda has not been well communicated to the Jorda-
nian public, although this would be necessary to ensure broad support for its 
implementation. Others say that its recommendations are too abstract. 
Most observers doubt that the agenda will ever be implemented. Even the rep-
resentative of the Government Performance Directorate at the Prime Ministry, 
which oversees the process of implementation, admitted that “implementation 
is a serious problem. Of course, there is always opposition“ (Al-Hmoud, 26 
February 2006). It therefore remains to be seen whether the regime has enough 
political will to realise its ambitious plans. 
Source: Al-Ahmad / Shanshal (2006); Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
(2006a); MoPIC (2006a); Taher (2006) 
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However, some business associations clearly speak out against any form 
of favouritism. The Young Entrepreneurs Association (YEA), for exam-
ple, has published several reports (YEA 2000; YEA 2004; YEA 2006) 
pointing out the detrimental effects of the widespread use of wasta for Jor-
dan’s economic development. In these reports, the YEA criticises both the 
behaviour of the state and its employees and the rent-seeking mentality of 
many entrepreneurs; the reports call for a change in attitudes and policies. 
The YEA is still isolated in its efforts, but it is well managed and could in 
the future become an important part of a broader coalition for change. 
A few NGOs are also engaged in the fight against corruption. Some of 
these focus on human rights issues (e.g. Al-Mizan), others on freedom of 
press (e.g. the Arab Archives Institute). Unfortunately, these NGOs have 
not yet formed alliances with each other. When they organise workshops, 
for example, they invite representatives of the government, the private 
sector and the press but not of other NGOs engaged in the fight against the 
use of wasta. 
7.3 Recommendations 
The state and the private sector have key responsibility for the fight 
against widespread use of wasta. The state needs to establish transparency 
and accountability on all levels of the administrative and political system. 
This probably cannot be achieved reached without major governance re-
forms. On their parts, businesspeople who suffer from the effects of wasta 
should form a coalition against favouritism. They should heighten public 
awareness, lobby for political change, and mutually agree to refrain from 
the use of wasta in all situations. 
NGOs, the media, and foreign donors can support the efforts of these two 
groups of stakeholders. NGOs and the media can provide information, 
mediate conflicts, and serve as advocates for the weak and poor. Donors 
should urge their partners in development co-operation to work for gov-
ernance reforms, to provide technical assistance when needed, and to give 
a good example in their own activities. 
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7.3.1 The state 
The parliament and government of Jordan should make the fight against 
favouritism a priority. They should put more effort than in the past into 
(i) heightening public awareness of the negative effects of wasta and 
(ii) eliminating the incentives for businesspeople to ask for preferential 
treatment and civil servants to grant it. Even more important, however, 
politicians should (iii) make the administrative and political system more 
transparent and accountable and (iv) implement broader governance re-
forms. 
Heightening public awareness 
The government should communicate the negative consequences of wasta 
to society and show people alternative ways of getting their business done. 
In addition, it should take measures to strengthen the solidarity of citizens 
with the nation as a whole. 
People should understand that government funds belong to the entire 
population and are therefore not to be exploited by individuals. The gov-
ernment of Jordan should thus initiate additional public awareness pro-
grammes to sensitise all citizens to the negative consequences and unlaw-
fulness of using wasta. Likewise, investors should be better informed 
about improvements in administrative procedures and human resource 
policies so that they know there is no longer any need to employ wasta. 
22 % of the businesspeople interviewed and 13 % of the public sector em-
ployees covered by our standardised survey indicated that the rules gov-
erning procedures in the public sector should be better explained to busi-
nesspeople (see Table A6 in Annex A and Table B7 in Annex B). 
In addition, measures should be implemented to strengthen Jordanians’ 
identification with public interests. 43 % of the businesspeople inter-
viewed stated that a mentality change was crucial for curtailing the use of 
wasta in Jordan (see Table A6 in Annex A). First, the government should 
strengthen the public’s loyalty to the state as an institution (i.e. not neces-
sarily to the respective government in office or other specific persons). 
This goal can best be achieved by getting people involved in public life 
and making them participate much more than in the past in political deci-
sion-making. Second, activities at the community level should be initiated 
to bring together the members of different tribes, thus fostering trust and 
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sympathy across societal gaps. Many Jordanians today feel solidarity only 
with those of their family, their clan, and their tribe, but not with other 
citizens. Third, the state should make citizens aware of both their rights 
and their duties. In this sense, the Jordan First Initiative proposed that 
school curricula “implanting values of democracy, justice, equality, and 
citizenship, as well as the rights and duties of citizens and national unity” 
(Foreign Ministry of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2004). 
Eliminating incentives to ask for and grant preferential treatment 
The government must create incentives for businesspeople to refrain from 
using wasta and for government employees to refrain from providing pref-
erential treatment to friends and relatives.  
Negative incentives can deter people from using wasta. Therefore, the 
government should do more than in the past to punish people for granting 
or exploiting any kind of preferential treatment in the public sector. The 
use of wasta is still not explicitly described as a criminal act by any law. 
As one lawyer argued, “We need a full-scale description of wasta, along 
with standards and criteria that are known publicly and channels that are 
open for complaints.“  
In addition, the government should take measures to strengthen compli-
ance with existing laws, decrees and guidelines. Currently, fines imposed 
on civil servants for favouring relatives or friends are low and should be 
increased. In general, procedures and decisions by public administrators 
should be better monitored. The civil servants interviewed in this study 
themselves pointed out that their departments should be better supervised. 
To reach this goal, an efficient government entity has to be built up to 
fight all kinds of corruption. The existing Anti-Corruption Unit at the 
General Intelligence Department lacks transparency and effectiveness and 
therefore is not trusted by the Jordanian population. Moreover, the inde-
pendence of the judiciary must be strengthened. 
At the same time, positive incentives should reward Jordanians for refrain-
ing from the use of wasta. The most important starting point for this is fur-
ther streamlining and standardising all administrative procedures in Jordan 
so that no one needs wasta to go through them quickly and easily. At the 
same time, a prize might be awarded every month or year for the most 
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transparent and service-oriented government department or for the friend-
liest employee within each department. 
An even more effective approach, however, would be to make wasta com-
pletely useless. When citizens realise that administrative procedures have 
become easy, cheap and quick, they will no longer have any reason for try-
ing to use wasta. Efforts in this area could start with the implementation of 
the Policy Statement for Public Sector Reform 2004-2009 (Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan 2004) and the Public Sector Reform Programme 
(MoPSD 2006b).  
Additional steps would be to: 
— Introduce clearer rules for public officials while also ensuring that the 
rules allow for flexible decision-making in case of situations encoun-
tered for the first time and therefore not covered by the rules.  
— Decentralise decision-making in the public sector to prevent high-
ranking officials from making all the decisions. For instance, deci-
sion-making power about starting an investment project should be 
transferred from the ministries to the one-stop-shops. 
— Implement sound human resource policies in the public sector: re-
cruitment and promotion of employees should be improved, transpar-
ent, merit-based recruitment systems should be given priority in all 
public sector entities, and sound performance evaluation systems 
should be put in place. Moreover, as public sector employees 
stressed, positive incentives should be put in place and better training 
should be provided for them; salaries should be increased, and em-
ployees should be better trained on the job.19 Finally, external and in-
ternal supervision should be improved, and new employee contracts 
should be limited in number. 
Strengthening transparency and accountability 
Measures must also be implemented to foster transparency and account-
ability in the whole of Jordan’s political and administrative system.  
                                                          
19  In our survey among public sector employees 24 % named better payment and 18 % 
better training as means for increasing their motivation and their qualifications for serv-
ing the business area. 16 % of the employees said that special incentives, such as bonu-
ses or vacation packages, would increase their motivation on the job (see Table B7 in 
Annex B). 
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In public administration, the division of responsibilities should be much 
more clear-cut and transparent. Every citizen should be able to find out 
who is responsible for a decision or an administrative procedure and to 
check whether this is in line with official guidelines. Transparent, merit-
based recruitment and promotion systems should be put in place, and all 
public sector employees should receive better training. All public sector 
employees must feel accountable for all of their decisions.  
Modern information and communication technologies can effectively con-
tribute to this goal. For example, in the case of tenders, the criteria for 
awarding contracts can be published on the Internet so that businesspeople 
can compare why a certain company was awarded a contract and whether 
this decision was in accordance with the initial call for bids. Moreover, 
e-procurement and e-tendering have helped in many countries to bring 
down government spending dramatically. In Jordan, the use of computers 
has already helped to accelerate administrative procedures and to make re-
sults more predictable. 
In addition, every public sector entity should develop mechanisms allow-
ing customers and public officials to blow the whistle on users of wasta 
without having to fear negative consequences. 
At the same time, however, Jordan’s political system must also become 
more transparent and accountable: (i) The parliament should be empow-
ered to hold the Prime Minister and the whole government accountable for 
its actions. In particular, the Audit Bureau’s reports should be addressed to 
the parliament and should be discussed in its committees and its General 
Assembly. (ii) A Freedom of Information Law is needed which will allow 
citizens to demand disclosure of all government activities. This would in-
crease transparency and allow the public to monitor all ministers and other 
politicians. (iii) The government should implement its plan to establish an 
independent ombudsman who would serve as a first address for the com-
plaints of citizens and can therefore help to develop a code of conduct for 
politicians and government employees. The ombudsman should directly 
report to the parliament. (iv) The system of public financial management 
and tracking should be improved; all budget plans and monitoring reports 
should be available to the public. 
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Adhering to democratic principles 
The Jordanian government should implement its plans for political reform 
and democratisation as specified in the National Agenda. As already 
shown, the use of wasta in Jordan is directly related to that country’s po-
litical system. Measures aimed at reducing the use of wasta on the admin-
istrative level will therefore lack success in the long run unless they are 
accompanied by broader political reforms. The role of democratic elec-
tions should be strengthened, and the influence of informal networks and 
clientelistic relations must be reduced. In particular, the party law should 
be liberalised, and the election law20 should be reformed to allow for a 
more representative parliament and for stronger parliamentary control of 
the government. In addition, freedom of press and the freedom of speech 
must be enhanced. 
7.3.2 The private sector 
As the other main stakeholder in state-business relations next to the state, 
the private sector also has to play an important role in the fight against 
wasta. Business people and business associations should contribute to a 
heightened awareness and form a coalition for change. 
Heightening public awareness 
Business associations and professional unions should assume responsibil-
ity for heightening awareness among their members about the negative 
impacts of wasta on state-business relations and on the business climate at 
large.  
Also, they should inform businesspeople about improvements in relevant 
administrative procedures in Jordan and campaign in this manner for inter-
actions with the state according to the rules and not by using wasta. 
                                                          
20  Introducing proportional representation would be beneficial for at least two reasons: 
first, fewer members of parliament would be elected because of wasta and, second, the 
free development of political parties in Jordan would be enhanced. 
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Organising a coalition for change:  
Business associations and professional unions should try to organise a coa-
lition for change among their members and should call for legal and ad-
ministrative reforms that avert the use of wasta in all interactions between 
businesspeople and the state. 
Business associations could, for example, consider forming ‘islands of in-
tegrity’ among their members, i.e. alliances of private firms, which abide 
by a code of conduct that bans both wasta and bribes in all kinds of inter-
actions with the state. If the established business associations turn out to 
be too large to organise such an alliance, smaller groups of companies 
could establish new associations that are more flexible and thus better able 
to form ‘islands of integrity’ in well-defined areas. For example, an ‘island 
of integrity’ could be formed in which only a small number of large com-
panies compete in the tendering process, e.g. for the construction of public 
roads. Even if only a few companies submit to such a code of ethics, 
which prohibits, inter alia, the use of wasta, they might be able to monitor 
whether every one else is abiding by this code. 
7.3.3 NGOs and the media 
Even though NGOs and the media are not direct stakeholders in state-
business relations, they can play an important role in reducing the impact 
of wasta in this field. They should act in the public interest and assume 
three tasks: promoting reform and greater awareness, mediating in conflict 
situations, and speaking out for those who find it difficult to voice their 
concerns. Currently, however, the scope for NGOs and the media to follow 
these recommendations is limited, since law restricts the work of NGOs 
and freedom of the press is not fully guaranteed (The Star 2006). 
Heightening awareness 
Educating people on their rights and duties does not only empower them 
but also enables them to inform state bodies about their needs and wishes. 
NGOs and the media can thus pressure the government and the private 
sector to intensify their efforts in the fight against the use of wasta. They 
can raise public awareness for this issue (i) by publishing research studies 
on its importance, (ii) by informing the public about the negative impacts 
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of wasta, including the fact that wasta violates their rights, (iii) by report-
ing about flagrant cases of wasta and the related abuse of power, and 
(iv) by organising conferences, seminars and lectures on these subjects. 
Mediating in conflict 
NGOs and the media can also try to bring parties with conflicting interests 
together in order to reach compromises. For this purpose, NGOs can or-
ganise round-table discussions and workshops, and the media can serve as 
a public forum for discussion. 
Defending the weakest 
NGOs and the media should always have an eye out for those who have 
greatest difficulty in making their voices heard. They should, for example, 
try to increase public awareness for those who have little wasta or none at 
all. In addition, they should monitor legislative and bureaucratic proce-
dures and analyse all reforms with regard to their impact on the poor. 
NGOs like Al-Mizan should continue to offer legal counselling to the 
weak and poor who have no other means of finding out about their rights. 
7.3.4 Donors 
The scope of possible action for donors in fighting against the use of wasta 
in Jordan is very limited, but they can provide support to the efforts of 
Jordanian institutions. Most of the necessary measures against the use of 
wasta can be financed and implemented by the Jordanian government or 
by other domestic actors. For their part, donors should therefore concen-
trate on three tasks: First of all, they must give a good example of trans-
parency and the control of corruption in their own work. Second, they 
should make use of bilateral policy dialogue to urge the Jordanian gov-
ernment to become more active in the fight against the use of wasta and 
other forms of corruption and to remind it repeatedly of the necessity for 
fundamental political reforms. Third, donors may think about providing 
technical assistance, e.g. for improving the effectiveness of Jordanian 
NGOs. 
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Setting a good example 
The most important thing for donors to do is to set a good example for 
their Jordanian partners in all of their activities. For example, they should 
avoid recruiting staff for development co-operation projects on the basis of 
wasta and should also monitor how financial assistance is spent. 
Pushing for governance reforms and anti-corruption initiatives 
Donors should also make use of the opportunities available to them in bi-
lateral and multilateral policy dialogue with the Jordanian government to 
call for political reforms within the Kingdom. The OECD-MENA Initia-
tive on Government and Investment for Development of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is one example of 
a multilateral forum for policy dialogue. It is based on the idea that policy 
makers from Arab and OECD-countries should exchange ideas on govern-
ance and investment policies (OECD 2006b).21 The Forum for the Future 
of the Group of Eight (G8) is a similar initiative launched by the G8 in 
2004.22 In the context of such good governance initiatives, donors should 
push all relevant Jordanian actors to intensify their efforts to do everything 
they can against the widespread use of wasta. 
Providing technical assistance 
The question whether donors should provide assistance to a partner coun-
try in a specific sector or field depends very generally on two criteria.  
First, donors should make sure that the respective partner country is actu-
ally in need of support, i.e. (i) that it suffers significantly from a problem 
                                                          
21 The Initiative on Governance and Investment for Development is a regional effort that 
tries to strengthen Arab countries’ capacity to design and implement reforms and to fa-
cilitate policy dialogue on governance and investment policies. It consists of the Good 
Governance for Development in the Arab Countries Initiative, which is also supported 
by the UNDP Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, and the Investment Pro-
gramme (OECD 2006b). 
22  The Forum for the Future is an annual forum that permits the G8 countries, countries of 
the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) and other supporters to engage in 
a debate on political, economic and social reform on a regular basis (US Department of 
State 2006). 
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and (ii) that no domestic actor is able to solve the problem without foreign 
assistance. 
Second, donors should carefully inspect the partner country’s interest in 
donor support, i.e. they should verify (i) whether the population really 
wants the problem to be solved and (ii) to what degree the government is 
ready to contribute as much as it can to the solution of the problem. 
The fight against the use of wasta in Jordan meets the first of these two 
criteria to some extent. The foregoing chapters have shown that wasta is a 
serious problem with a significantly negative influence on state-business 
relations in Jordan – and probably on private sector development and eco-
nomic growth as well. Nevertheless, the Jordanian government should be 
able to implement most of the measures that are considered as useful for 
combating the use of wasta. 
As a consequence, donors should carefully reflect whether they should 
support Jordan in this area. If they decide to do so, they should direct their 
contributions to areas that constitute bottlenecks for Jordanians in reducing 
the use of wasta.  
It is difficult to say whether the second of the two criteria – the commit-
ment of the Jordanians and their government to the fight against wasta – is 
currently being met. On the one hand, the King is committed to fighting all 
forms of corruption, and the government drafted an Anti-Corruption Bill 
in the summer of 2005. In addition, a royal committee developed a com-
prehensive programme, the National Agenda (see Box 6), for economic 
and political reform for the coming years. Moreover, tangible progress has 
been made during the last couple of years in public sector reform (see Sec-
tion 7.2). On the other hand, adoption of the Anti-Corruption Bill has been 
stalled for months. Likewise, the National Agenda is promising, but there 
are doubts whether it will ever be implemented, and its contents do not 
seem to have been communicated well to the Jordanian public. Further-
more, most reforms implemented so far have been limited to the adminis-
trative level, and little has changed on the broader political stage; as shown 
in Section 7.1, the political system continues to contribute to the persis-
tence of wasta. 
In any case, donors should limit themselves to providing technical rather 
than financial assistance. Even though Jordan is a middle-income country, 
it is already one of the countries with the highest per capita inflow of de-
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velopment assistance worldwide. As a consequence, its government cer-
tainly has the means to finance all measures against the use of wasta listed 
above (and these are not prohibitively expensive anyway).  
Technical assistance, on the other hand, might be helpful in some well-
defined areas. Jordan has acquired much technical know-how on develop-
ment issues in the last couple of years. Donors, especially the United 
States and the World Bank, have provided ample support in the area of 
public sector reform. In addition, e.g. the EU and Canada have funded 
several small projects to strengthen human rights and civil society organi-
sations, including help for NGOs and journalists and the improvement of 
the legal system (USAID 2003). Nevertheless, donors can still provide 
valuable expertise in selected fields. For example, donors should dissemi-
nate information on what can be done against wasta, i.e. they should trans-
fer know-how to Jordan, especially concerning what other countries have 
done and what experience they have had with strategies for combating 
fighting favouritism and other forms of corruption. In addition, donors 
should consider increasing their support for Jordanian NGOs or business 
associations in their activities against wasta. Finally, they might also think 
about providing technical assistance for administrative and political re-
forms such as, e.g. the development of regulatory systems and customs 
and revenue systems or for enhancing the capacities of MPs.  
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Annex A: Results of semi-structured interviews with 58 
business people 
During its field research phase, the team from the German Development 
Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) conducted 63 
interviews with representatives of Jordanian and foreign enterprises. Five 
of these interviews failed to bring any substantial results. The findings 
from the remaining 58 interviews are presented here. 
The Interviews 
45 of the interviews (78 %) took place in Amman or Zarqa, nine were con-
ducted in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) and four in the In-
dustrial Estate of Sahaab (see Table A1).  
Five of the companies involved were active in the information and com-
munication technology (ICT) sector, four in the pharmaceutical industry, 
21 in other manufacturing sectors (textiles, stationery products, cosmetics, 
machines, computer screens, plastics, furniture, etc.), 13 in trade, nine in 
consultancy or marketing activities and six in tourism. On average, the 
firms had been founded 12 years earlier and had 45 employees (see Ta-
ble A1). 54 companies were owned by Jordanians and four by foreigners. 
Six of those interviewed were less than 30 years old, 32 between 30 and 
45, 15 between 45 and 60, and only one was older than 60. The age of four 
interview partners is unknown. 
Most interview partners were identified with the assistance of different 
business associations, micro-finance institutions and business-develop-
ment agencies. These were asked to provide the DIE team with a mixed 
sample list of their members / clients according to size, branch, and own-
ership for the purpose of interviews by the DIE team. Some interview 
partners, however, were also selected randomly from the telephone book 
to avoid systematic mistakes in the composition of the sample. 
This sample is, of course, not representative for all enterprises in Jordan. 
Its results should therefore be treated with caution. Nevertheless, the sam-
ple is more representative than the sample on which the Global Competi-
tiveness Report is based (see Table A2). 
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Table A2:  Size of the covered companies 
all Jordan DIE sample WEF 
sample 
Com-
pany  
size 
(number 
of em-
ployees) 
share 
of all 
compa-
nies  
share of 
all em-
ployees 
average 
number 
of em-
ployees 
share 
of all 
compa-
nies  
share 
of all 
employ-
ees 
average 
number 
of em-
ployees 
share 
of all 
compa-
nies  
0-5 75 % 33 % 2,4 24 % 2 % 3,1 0 % 
6-20 15 % 19 % 7,1 26 % 6 % 10,3 0 % 
21-100 8 % 39 % 47 % 56,5 45 % 
100+ 2 % 
48 % 26,4 
11 % 45 % 180,2 55 % 
Source: Lopez-Claros / Schwab / Porter (2005), Table 1; MoIT (2006) 
 
Main problems of doing business in Jordan 
One of the interview questions referred to major problems faced by the en-
terprises currently or in the past in opening or running their businesses. 
The majority of respondents said that investment conditions in Jordan have 
improved during the last years and that their business was doing well. 
Many referred to the King as the driving force behind the ongoing reforms 
or pointed to Dubai as an example of a good business climate. 
Nevertheless, most interview partners also pointed to a number of areas in 
which they were currently facing problems or in which they had had prob-
lems in the past. The single most frequently mentioned area was registra-
tion and licensing: 33 % of all interview partners mentioned problems in 
this field. 26 % talked about problems regarding the high level of competi-
tion in their market, the qualification of workers, and access to finance. 
22 % faced difficulties with access to and the price of inputs for their pro-
duction. 16 % suffered from low demand for their products, and 12 % each 
from insufficient active support by the government and problems in taxa-
tion. 9 % complained about customs procedures and 7 % about the lack of 
stability in the Middle East. 3 % mentioned the areas of tendering, labour 
regulation and the protection of intellectual property rights. Only 2 % had 
problems with the infrastructure, and 16 % named various other problems 
(see Table A3). 
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Table A3: Main fields of problems of the covered companies in general 
 registra-
tion /
licensing
high 
competi-
tion 
finding 
qualified 
workers
access to 
finance
access 
to and 
price of 
inputs
 
 
insuffi-
cient 
demand
19 15 15 15 13 9 All interview partners 
(33%) (26%) (26%) (26%) (22%) (16%) 
12 11 12 14 9 9 Amman and Zarqa 
(27%) (24%) (27%) (31%) (20%) (20%) 
5 1 2 1 1 0 Aqaba Special Economic  
Zone (ASEZ) (56%) (11%) (22%) (11%) (11%) (0%) 
2 3 1 0 3 0 Industrial Estate Sahaab 
(50%) (75%) (25%) (0%) (75%) (0%) 
2 1 2 3 1 0 ICT industry 
(40%) (20%) (40%) (60%) (20%) (0%) 
3 2 0 1 1 1 Pharmaceutical industry 
(75%) (50%) (0%) (25%) (25%) (25%) 
4 6 7 4 9 4 Other manufacturing  
(19%) (29%) (33%) (19%) (43%) (19%) 
3 2 4 1 0 4 Consultancy and  
marketing (33%) (22%) (44%) (11%) (0%) (44%) 
4 1 1 1 0 0 Tourism 
(67%) (17%) (17%) (17%) (0%) (0%) 
3 3 1 5 2 0 Trade 
(23%) (23%) (8%) (38%) (15%) (0%) 
14 9 9 9 6 6 Interview partner younger 
than 45 (37%) (24%) (24%) (24%) (16%) (16%) 
5 6 6 6 7 3 Interview partner older  
than 45 (25%) (30%) (30%) (30%) (35%) (15%) 
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lack of  
active  
support 
by gov-
ernment 
taxation customs security 
and 
stability
tender-
ing 
labour 
regula-
tion 
(work 
permits)
protec-
tion of 
intellec-
tual 
property 
rights 
infra-
structure 
supply 
other 
7 7 5 4 3 3 3 2 9 
(12%) (12%) (9%) (7%) (5%) (5%) (5%) (3%) (16%) 
7 7 3 3 3 2 2 0 6 
(13%) (16%) (7%) (7%) (7%) (4%) (4%) (0%) (13%) 
0 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 2 
(0%) (0%) (22%) (11%) (0%) (11%) (0%) (22%) (22%) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (25%) (0%) (25%) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0%) (0%) (20%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (25%) (25%) (0%) (50%) 
2 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 
(10%) (10%) (5%) (10%) (5%) (5%) (0%) (0%) (5%) 
2 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 
(22%) (11%) (0%) (0%) (22%) (0%) (11%) (0%) (11%) 
1 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 2 
(0%) (0%) (17%) (33%) (0%) (17%) (0%) (33%) (33%) 
2 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 
(15%) (31%) (15%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (8%) (0%) (23%) 
7 6 2 3 3 2 3 1 6 
(16%) (16%) (5%) (8%) (8%) (5%) (8%) (3%) (16%) 
0 1 3 1 0 1 0 1 3 
(0%) (5%) (15%) (5%) (0%) (5%) (0%) (5%) (15%) 
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Table A4: Fields of problems in state-business relations 
  at least one 
of the  
following 
fields 
registration 
and  
licensing 
 
customs taxation 
46 29 10 10 All interview  
partners (79%) (50%) (17%) (17%) 
36 22 7 10 Amman and Zarqa 
(80%) (49%) (16%) (22%) 
7 5 2 0 Aqaba Special Economic 
Zone (78%) (56%) (22%) (0%) 
3 2 1 0 Industrial Estate  
Sahaab (75%) (50%) (25%) (0%) 
5 2 2 2 ICT industry 
(100%) (40%) (40%) (40%) 
4 3 0 0 Pharmaceutical  
industry (100%) (75%) (0%) (0%) 
18 10 4 2 Other  
manufacturing  (86%) (48%) (19%) (10%) 
6 4 0 2 Consultancy and  
marketing (67%) (44%) (0%) (22%) 
4 4 1 0 Tourism 
(67%) (67%) (17%) (0%) 
9 6 3 4 Trade 
(69%) (46%) (23%) (31%) 
33 20 5 8 Interview partner younger 
than 45 (87%) (53%) (13%) (21%) 
13 9 5 2 Interview partner older 
than 45 (65%) (45%) (25%) (10%) 
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tendering promotion 
by  
government
labour  
regulation 
(work  
permits) 
infrastructure 
supply 
protection of 
intellectual 
property 
rights 
others 
8 7 7 6 3 1 
(14%) (12%) (12%) (10%) (5%) (2%) 
8 7 5 4 2 1 
(18%) (16%) (11%) (9%) (4%) (2%) 
0 0 2 2 0 0 
(0%) (0%) (22%) (22%) (0%) (0%) 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (25%) (0%) 
1 0 0 2 0 0 
(20%) (0%) (0%) (40%) (0%) (0%) 
1 0 2 0 1 0 
(25%) (0%) (50%) (0%) (25%) (0%) 
3 3 4 1 0 1 
(14%) (14%) (19%) (5%) (0%) (5%) 
3 2 0 1 1 0 
(33%) (22%) (0%) (11%) (11%) (0%) 
0 0 1 2 0 0 
(0%) (0%) (17%) (33%) (0%) (0%) 
0 2 0 0 1 0 
(0%) (15%) (0%) (0%) (8%) (0%) 
7 6 5 4 3 1 
(18%) (16%) (13%) (11%) (8%) (3%) 
1 1 2 2 0 0 
(5%) (5%) (10%) (10%) (0%) (0%) 
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Quality of state-business relations 
Since problems in state-business relations ranked so high, the interview 
partners were asked whether they had also problems in other fields of in-
teraction with the public administration. When the results of this question 
are added to the first one, the result is a total of 46 out of 58 interlocutors 
(i.e. 79 %) who mentioned problems in at least one field of state-business 
relations (see Table A4): Again, the most frequently mentioned field was 
registration and licensing (50 % of all interviewees), followed by customs 
procedures and taxation (17 % each), tendering (14 %), insufficient sup-
port of business promotion by the government (12 %), deficits in labour 
regulation (12 %), infrastructure supply (10 %) and protection of intellec-
tual property rights (5 %). 
Those who mentioned problems in their interactions with the public ad-
ministration were furthermore asked about the nature of these problems. 
According to their answers, the long duration of procedures is the single 
most important source of problems in state-business relations. It was men-
tioned by 67 % of those who had any problems at all (see Table A5). Other 
types of problems are the high number of procedures in interactions with 
the public administration (37 %), unequal treatment by the state (33 %), 
the unpredictability of decision-making by public administrators (26 %), 
and the high cost of procedures (11 %). 
The role of wasta 
In a further step, the interlocutors were asked what they believed to be the 
major reasons for their problems in interactions with the public administra-
tion. Their answers indicated that insufficient training and motivation of 
the employees in the public sector are among the main causes of problems 
for investors in Jordan. This was mentioned by 50 % of those who men-
tioned problems with the public administration. 39 % said that there was 
too much regulation, and another 39 % criticised the fact that too much 
decision-making was based on personal relations (wasta). 17 % believed 
that regulation was inappropriate, and 9 % criticised the concentration of 
decision-making power in the hands of a few, along with the lack of nec-
essary regulation. 11 % mentioned frequent changes in rules, and 7 % that 
there was much over-employment in the public sector, that the rules left 
too much room for discretion, and that there was not enough communica-
tion between the administration and business people (see Table A5). 
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It thus became clear during the interviews that it is sometimes not enough 
in Jordan to have a good idea for business and to sell a good product. 
Rather, it is often necessary to know someone who can help applicants 
complete bureaucratic procedures, get permission, or obtain a loan. 50 of 
the 58 businesspeople interviewed (86 %) stated that it is helpful to have 
wasta, i.e. to have good relations, which can be used with influential per-
sons for personal advantage. Only three (5 %) said that this is not the case, 
five (9 %) did not state an opinion on this matter (see Table A6). 
Most interlocutors rejected the idea that it is possible to bypass laws or 
rules with the assistance of wasta. Some of them regarded violations of the 
rules as corruption and not as wasta.  
Nevertheless, wasta is essential for doing business in Jordan. According to 
most other interviewees, wasta not only speeds up procedures but it also 
determines access to business opportunities. Those who have wasta get 
public tenders, can travel with the King to potential investors or clients 
abroad, get licenses in highly regulated sectors, and obtain permission to 
produce in protected areas. Some interview partners even stated that the 
high relevance of wasta in Jordan was an important reason why many tal-
ented young entrepreneurs leave the country or entirely give up their firm. 
As a consequence, 56 % (28 out of 50) admitted to using wasta themselves 
for their interactions with the public administration. Only 24 % (12 out of 
50) said that they do not use wasta, and 20 % of those who were asked this 
question gave no clear answer. 
Those who relied on the use of wasta were also asked whether they are 
trying to obtain more or better wasta. 13 of 28 (46 %) acknowledged that 
this is the case, while 12 (43 %) said that they did not. Three gave no clear 
answer (see Table A6). 
Obtaining wasta can be very expensive. Some business people are born 
with wasta. They derive their wasta simply from the family they are born 
into and from their good family name, which can open many doors to them 
that remain closed for the majority of other Jordanian entrepreneurs. Oth-
ers however have to invest if they want to obtain wasta. They must spend 
time with other people, make small gifts or even employ people who have 
wasta themselves. 
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Table A5: Main kinds and causes of problems in state-business relations 
main kind(s) of problem(s)  
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31 17 15 12 5 All interview  
partners (67%) (37%) (33%) (26%) (11%) 
23 14 13 11 5 Amman and Zarqa 
(64%) (39%) (36%) (31%) (14%) 
6 3 2 1 0 Aqaba Special Eco-
nomic Zone (86%) (43%) (29%) (14%) (0%) 
2 0 0 0 0 Industrial Estate  
Sahaab (67%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
4 1 2 3 0 ICT industry 
(80%) (20%) (40%) (60%) (0%) 
4 1 1 0 1 Pharmaceutical in-
dustry (100%) (25%) (25%) (0%) (25%) 
11 5 3 4 3 Other  
manufacturing  (61%) (28%) (17%) (22%) (17%) 
4 5 5 1 1 Consultancy and  
marketing (67%) (83%) (83%) (17%) (17%) 
4 1 2 1 0 Tourism 
 (100%) (25%) (50%) (25%) (0%) 
4 4 2 3 0 Trade 
(44%) (44%) (22%) (33%) (0%) 
22 11 11 8 4 Interview partner 
younger than 45 (67%) (33%) (33%) (24%) (12%) 
9 6 4 4 1 Interview partner 
older than 45 (69%) (46%) (31%) (31%) (8%) 
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23 18 18 8 5 4 4 3 3 4 
(50%) (39%) (39%) (17%) (11%) (9%) (9%) (7%) (7%) (9%) 
18 13 16 5 4 2 4 3 2 2 
(50%) (36%) (44%) (14%) (11%) (6%) (11%) (8%) (6%) (6%) 
3 5 2 3 1 2 0 0 0 2 
(43%) (71%) (29%) (43%) (14%) (29%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (29%)
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
(67%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (0%) 
2 2 3 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
(40%) (40%) (60%) (20%) (0%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (0%) (20%)
4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
(100%) (25%) (25%) (25%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (25%) (0%) 
8 4 4 2 3 1 2 1 0 1 
(44%) (22%) (22%) (11%) (17%) (6%) (11%) (6%) (0%) (6%) 
3 4 5 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
(50%) (67%) (83%) (17%) (17%) (0%) (0%) (17%) (0%) (0%) 
3 3 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 
(75%) (75%) (25%) (50%) (0%) (25%) (25%) (0%) (0%) (25%)
3 4 4 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 
(33%) (44%) (44%) (11%) (11%) (11%) (0%) (0%) (22%) (11%)
17 13 13 7 4 1 2 3 3 3 
(52%) (39%) (39%) (21%) (12%) (3%) (6%) (9%) (9%) (9%) 
6 5 5 1 1 3 2 0 0 1 
(46%) (38%) (38%) (8%) (8%) (23%) (15%) (0%) (0%) (8%) 
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Table A6:  The use of wasta by the interviewed business people 
Is it helpful for  
business people  
to have wasta? 
if so: 
Are you using wasta  
yourself? 
 
yes no 
 
 
n/a yes no 
 
 
n/a 
50 3 5 28 12 10 All interview  
partners (86%) (5%) (9%) (56%) (24%) (20%) 
39 1 5 22 8 9 Amman and Zarqa 
(87%) (2%) (11%) (56%) (21%) (23%) 
9 0 0 5 3 1 Aqaba Special  
Economic Zone (100%) (0%) (0%) (56%) (33%) (11%) 
2 2 0 1 1 0 Industrial Estate  
Sahaab (50%) (50%) (0%) (50%) (50%) (0%) 
3 0 2 2 1 0 ICT industry 
(60%) (0%) (40%) (67%) (33%) (0%) 
3 1 0 3 0 0 Pharmaceutical  
industry (75%) (25%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) 
18 2 1 9 6 3 Other  
manufacturing  (76%) (10%) (15%) (50%) (33%) (17%) 
7 0 2 2 0 5 Consultancy and  
marketing (100%) (0%) (0%) (29%) (0%) (71%) 
6 0 0 2 2 2 Tourism 
(100%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (33%) (33%) 
13 0 0 10 3 0 Trade 
(100%) (0%) (0%) (77%) (23%) (0%) 
35 1 2 24 5 6 Interview partner  
younger than 45 (92%) (3%) (5%) (69%) (14%) (17%) 
15 2 3 4 7 4 Interview partner  
older than 45 (75%) (10%) (15%) (27%) (47%) (27%) 
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if yes again: 
Are you trying to  
obtain (better) wasta? 
if yes once more: 
How do you try to  
obtain (better) wasta? 
yes no n/a offer  
gifts 
give  
discount 
to clients 
networking employ 
agent 
13 12 3 2 2 6 6 
(46%) (43%) (11%) (15%) (15%) (46%) (46%) 
10 9 3 1 1 6 5 
(42%) (41%) (14%) (10%) (10%) (60%) (50%) 
2 3 0 1 1 0 0 
(40%) (60%) (0%) (50%) (50%) (0%) (0%) 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
(50%) (50%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) 
3 0 0 1 0 2 2 
(100%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (0%) (67%) (67%) 
3 4 2 0 1 0 2 
(33%) (44%) 22%) (0%) (33%) (0%) (67%) 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
(50%) (50%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%) 
5 4 1 1 1 3 1 
(50%) (40%) (10%) (20%) (20%) (60%) (20%) 
11 10 3 1 1 6 6 
(46%) (42%) (13%) (9%) (9%) (55%) (55%) 
2 2 0 1 1 0 0 
(50%) (50%) (0%) (50%) (50%) (0%) (0%) 
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The 13 business people who admitted trying to obtain (better) wasta were 
asked how they went about it. Six said that they employ agents who have 
good wasta and can get administrative procedures done faster and easier 
than they themselves. Another six relied on networking, two on gifts to 
decision-makers, and two on giving discounts on their own products in ex-
change for a privileged treatment in administrative procedures (see Table 
A6. Please keep in mind that some interlocutors mentioned more than one 
strategy). 
Fighting the use of wasta 
The business people were then asked what they thought about fighting the 
use of wasta in Jordan. 23 said that the use of wasta should be reduced, 
while only four were completely against it. Two believed that it was im-
possible to fight the use of wasta (see Table A7). 
Many interlocutors mentioned during the interviews that improvements 
have taken place over the past five years, that the conditions for doing 
business in Jordan were improving and that the importance of wasta was 
decreasing. Some said that the National Agenda was a good step forward 
but others had doubts whether it would ever be implemented. More un-
equivocally, the e-government initiative of the Jordanian government was 
seen by many as a helpful tool for limiting the use of wasta and other 
forms of corruption. In addition, many mentioned that the new generation 
which was now growing up was much less prone to using wasta because 
of better education and because many people from this generation had 
studied abroad and come back with different social values. 
Nevertheless, many interviewees also complained that reforms already 
implemented are insufficient and that changes have been carried out too 
slowly and remain too limited in scope and scale. They mentioned at least 
four reasons for this:  
— Too little effort is made to involve the population in the reform pro-
cess, and reform projects are not sufficiently explained to them. Jor-
danians have never before been encouraged to discuss political deci-
sions or to take a stand on political ideas. In fact, membership in a po-
litical party has for decades been regarded as almost criminal.  
— The loyalty of Jordanians belongs to their families and tribes rather 
than to the government.  
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— Wasta is viewed by many Jordanians as part of their traditions and 
culture, that is, as a natural feature of a tribal society. Some inter-
viewees stressed that they learned to use wasta as children. 
— There is considerable opposition to reforms. Many Jordanian citizens 
and companies benefit significantly from wasta and are not keen on 
giving up these advantages. Many also have a good deal of political 
influence and thus have the means to prevent reforms.  
As a consequence, the interviewees were also asked what they believed to 
be a good strategy for fighting the use of wasta. Ten said that a change of 
mentality was crucial for any improvement in this sense, eight stated that a 
better regulatory framework was needed, five said that the main problem 
was the lack of transparency in the political and administrative process, 
four called for a democratisation of their country, three believed that the 
use of wasta should be more severely sanctioned, and two said that public 
sector employees should have greater powers (see Table A7). 
In addition, six believed that it is up to the King to do something about the 
use of wasta. Four believed that the educational system could contribute 
best to the fight against it, and three saw it as a responsibility of the gov-
ernment. Two believed that NGOs or business associations could make a 
valuable contribution, and one said that the media could fight the use of 
wasta (see Table A7). 
The role of business associations 
At the end of the interviews, the business people were asked whether they 
believed that membership in a business association could help them. Al-
most all are members of a business association in which membership is 
compulsory (see Table A8).  
Only 25 % of those who confirmed to be member of a business association 
said that they benefited from it, while 68 % did not feel themselves well 
represented. They said that they did not benefit from their membership and 
complained of high membership fees and high fees for training courses. 
Many maintained that the leaders of the business associations were inter-
ested only in personal gains and did not care about the members. Large 
companies were alleged to deal directly with the government with the ef-
fect that they did not need the business associations at all. 8 % of the inter-
viewees did not answer the question (see Table A8).  
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Table A7: Opinion of the interviewed business people on fighting against 
 Do you think that the use  
of wasta should be reduced? 
How can the use of 
 
yes no im-
possible 
better 
regulation
sanction-
ing 
more 
trans-
parency 
23 4 2 8 3 5 All interview  
partners (79%) (14%) (7%) (35%) (13%) (22%) 
20 3 2 7 2 5 Amman and Zarqa 
(80%) (12%) (8%) (35%) (10%) (25%) 
2 1 0 1 0 0 Aqaba Special  
Economic Zone (67%) (33%) (0%) (50%) (0%) (0%) 
1 0 0 0 1 0 Industrial Estate  
Sahaab (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%) 
3 0 0 1 0 1 ICT industry 
(100%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (0%) (33%) 
3 0 0 0 1 1 Pharmaceutical  
industry (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (33%) 
5 2 1 2 1 1 Other  
manufacturing  (63%) (25%) (13%) (40%) (20%) (20%) 
4 0 1 3 0 2 Consultancy and  
marketing (80%) (0%) (20%) (75%) (0%) (50%) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 Tourism 
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
7 2 0 2 1 0 Trade 
(78%) (22%) (0%) (29%) (14%) (0%) 
18 4 2 6 3 4 Interview partner  
younger than 45 (75%) (17%) (8%) (33%) (17%) (22%) 
5 0 0 2 0 1 Interview partner  
older than 45 (100%) (0%) (0%) (40%) (0%) (20%) 
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the use of wasta 
If yes: 
wasta be reduced? Who can do anything to reduce the use of wasta? 
demo-
cratisation 
mentality 
change 
empower
civil 
servants
King govern-
ment 
educa-
tional 
system 
civil  
society 
media 
4 10 2 6 3 4 2 1 
(17%) (43%) (9%) (26%) (13%) (17%) (9%) (4%) 
4 7 2 6 2 4 2 1 
(20%) (35%) (10%) (30%) (10%) (20%) (10%) (5%) 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
(0%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (33%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
2 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
(67%) (33%) (67%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (0%) 
1 3 0 2 1 1 1 0 
(20%) (60%) (0%) (40%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (0%) 
1 3 0 1 0 2 0 1 
(25%) (75%) (0%) (25%) (0%) (50%) (0%) (25%) 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
0 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 
(0%) (29%) (0%) (29%) (14%) (14%) (0%) (0%) 
4 8 2 5 2 4 2 1 
(22%) (44%) (11%) (28%) (11%) (22%) (11%) (6%) 
0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
(0%) (40%) (0%) (20%) (20%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
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Table A8: Opinion of the interviewed business people on business  
associations in Jordan 
Are you member  
of a business association? 
If yes: 
Does it help you? 
 
yes no n/a yes no n/a 
40 1 17 10 27 3 All interview  
partners (69%) (2%) (29%) (25%) (68%) (8%) 
32 0 13 7 22 3 Amman and  
Zarqa (71%) (0%) (29%) (22%) (69%) (9%) 
5 1 3 1 4 0 Aqaba Economic 
Zone (56%) (11%) (33%) (20%) (80%) (0%) 
3 0 1 2 1 0 Industrial Estate  
Sahaab (75%) (0%) (25%) (67%) (33%) (0%) 
4 0 1 0 3 1 ICT industry 
(80%) (0%) (20%) (0%) (75%) (25%) 
2 0 2 1 1 0 Pharmaceutical  
industry (50%) (0%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (0%) 
17 0 4 6 10 1 Other  
manufacturing (81%) (0%) (19%) (35%) (59%) (6%) 
6 0 3 2 3 1 Consultancy and 
marketing (67%) (0%) (33%) (33%) (50%) (17%) 
3 1 2 0 3 0 Tourism 
(50%) (17%) (33%) (0%) (100%) (0%) 
8 0 5 1 7 0 Trade 
(62%) (0%) (38%) (13%) (88%) (0%) 
25 0 13 4 19 2 Interview partner 
younger than 45 (66%) (0%) (34%) (16%) (76%) (8%) 
15 1 4 6 8 1 Interview partner  
older than 45 (75%) (5%) (20%) (40%) (53%) (7%) 
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Annex B: Results of the standardised survey among low- 
to medium-ranking public sector employees 
In connection with this study a survey was conducted among 180 government 
employees. It covered public sector institutions that are especially relevant for 
the registration of companies and other typical state-business interactions:  
— The Jordan Investment Board (JIB: 7 employees),  
— The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT: 19 employees),  
— The Municipality of Greater Amman (MGA: 10 employees in the 
Tendering Department, 16 in the Companies Licensing Department, 
17 in the Customer Relations Department, 33 in the Jubeiha District 
Office, and 29 in the Marka District Office) and 
— The Aqaba Special Economic Zone Administration (ASEZA: 21 em-
ployees in the One-Stop-Shop for investors and 28 in the Tax De-
partment). 
The employees were asked to fill out a written questionnaire, which con-
tained 14 questions (see Box B1 at the end of this annex). All of the em-
ployees were willing to co-operate, some appeared almost enthusiastic 
about the fact that they were asked about their opinions. 
Almost a third of the 180 government employees had been working in the 
same administrative unit for more than 10 years, 15 % for more than five but 
less than 10 years, 42 % for more than one year but less than five years, and 
11% for less than one year. 50 % of the total sample reported a salary of 
more than 100 but less than 200 JD per month, while 37 % had a salary of 
200–400 JD and only 13 % received more than 400 JD per month (Table B1). 
Existence and quality of rules for the work of the employees 
The large majority of the employees (89 %) reported that written rules 
governed the performance of their tasks, and 83 % were convinced that 
these rules are clear or even very clear. The share of those without written 
rules was highest within the MoIT and lowest in the ASEZA One-Stop-
Shop (0%). 42 % of all employees believed that the rules given to them 
covered all of their tasks, though only 14 % of the employees in the JIB 
and only 24 % of the employees in the ASEZA One-Stop-Shop for inves-
tors were of this opinion (Table B2). 
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The role of wasta in state-business relations 
64 % of the 180 government employees surveyed were convinced that cus-
tomers can speed up procedures in public administration by means of 
wasta, i.e. by personally knowing someone in the relevant government of-
fice. This share was highest among the employees of the Tendering and 
Licensing Department of the Municipality of Greater Amman (90 and 
88 % respectively), the ASEZA One-Stop-Shop (76 %), and the MoIT 
(74 %). The government employees surveyed thought that speeding up 
public administration procedures was the dominant motivation of their 
customers for having recourse to wasta (64 % of all employees), followed 
by the conviction that everybody else also tries to use wasta (26 %) and 
that customers cannot get what they what they want without wasta (26 %). 
20 % of the employees also said that the rules were too complicated for the 
customers (see Table B3). 
The role of wasta in the recruitment and career advancement of public 
sector employees 
Wasta also seems to play a very important role in the recruitment of em-
ployees for the public sector. 77 % of the respondents stated that wasta is 
important or even very important for finding employment in their depart-
ments. Among the employees of the Municipality of Greater Amman, the 
share was up to 100 %, while it was comparatively low for those of the JIB 
(43 %) and the ASEZA Tax Department (65 %, see Table B4). 
37 % of the employees also stated that they needed more training. This 
share was highest for the employees of the JIB (43 %) and ASEZA (One-
Stop-Shop: 48 %, Tax Department: 71 %). 
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Table B2:  Existence of transparent rules for government procedures 
 Do you have  
written rules for the job 
you do? 
Do you 
rules are clear 
 yes no n/a very 
clear
 
clear 
Total 89% 7% 4% 37% 46% 
JIB 86% 14% 0% 29% 57% 
MOIT 68% 21% 11% 21% 53% 
MGA: Tendering Dep’t 90% 10% 0% 30% 50% 
MGA: Licensing Dep’t 88% 12% 0% 41% 41% 
MGA: Customer Relations 94% 6% 0% 63% 25% 
MGA: Jubeiha Office 94% 0% 6% 36% 55% 
MGA: Marka Office 86% 3% 10% 55% 38% 
ASEZA: One-Stop-Shop 100% 0% 0% 33% 52% 
ASEZA: Tax Dep’t 89% 7% 4% 21% 46% 
Income 101-200 JD 89% 7% 4% 37% 49% 
Income 201-400 JD 89% 5% 6% 38% 42% 
Income above 400 JD 88% 13% 0% 38% 46% 
Less than 1 year in job 89% 5% 5% 47% 37% 
1-5 years in job 96% 3% 1% 34% 49% 
6-10 years in job 85% 7% 7% 44% 37% 
More than 10 years in job 81% 12% 7% 34% 50% 
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believe that these  
for the employees 
 
Do rules cover all the procedures that the  
customers of your administration come for? 
 
some-
times 
clear 
unclear n/a all most part  
of 
not  
at all 
n/a 
12% 2% 1% 43% 39% 8% 1% 9% 
0% 0% 14% 14% 71% 14% 0% 0% 
11% 5% 0% 26% 32% 21% 0% 21% 
10% 10% 0% 40% 40% 10% 10% 0% 
6% 6% 0% 47% 35% 6% 6% 6% 
13% 0% 0% 56% 38% 0% 0% 6% 
9% 0% 0% 58% 27% 3% 0% 12% 
7% 0% 0% 69% 17% 3% 0% 10% 
14% 0% 0% 24% 62% 10% 0% 5% 
29% 0% 4% 21% 57% 11% 0% 11% 
11% 2% 0% 50% 36% 4% 2% 8% 
17% 2% 2% 36% 42% 9% 0% 12% 
4% 0% 4% 33% 42% 17% 0% 8% 
16% 0% 0% 47% 37% 5% 0% 11% 
14% 1% 1% 39% 41% 9% 0% 11% 
15% 4% 0% 37% 41% 4% 4% 15% 
7% 2% 2% 48% 36% 9% 2% 5% 
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Table B3:  The use of wasta by customers of different public services  
 Customers can speed up  
procedures by knowing one of  
the employees 
 true 
 
 
not true 
 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
Total 64% 36% 1% 
JIB 57% 43% 0% 
MoIT 74% 26% 0% 
MGA: Tendering Dep’t 90% 10% 0% 
MGA: Licensing Dep’t 88% 12% 0% 
MGA: Customer Relations 69% 31% 0% 
MGA: Jubeiha Office 58% 42% 0% 
MGA: Marka Office 34% 66% 0% 
ASEZA: One-Stop-Shop 76% 19% 5% 
ASEZA: Tax Dep’t 61% 39% 0% 
Income 101-200 JD 58% 41% 1% 
Income 201-400 JD 70% 30% 0% 
Income above 400 JD 71% 29% 0% 
Less than 1 year in job 58% 42% 0% 
1-5 years in job 70% 29% 1% 
6-10 years in job 63% 37% 0% 
More than 10 years in job 59% 41% 0% 
*  Respondents were allowed to tick multiple answers to this question. 
**  Out of 30 civil servants mentioning other reasons, 8 stated that those who try 
use wasta are doing so to get a permission for something that is not allowed  
by law, 6 noted that the use of wasta was a custom and 2 assumed that those 
who try to use wasta have a weak character. 
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Customers turn to wasta, because … * 
 
 
… the rules 
are too  
complicated 
… they can't 
get what they 
want without 
wasta 
… they want 
to speed up 
procedures 
… anybody 
else uses 
wasta as well
… of  
other  
reasons ** 
n/a 
20% 27% 64% 26% 17% 2% 
14% 29% 43% 29% 43% 0% 
5% 11% 63% 11% 11% 5% 
20% 40% 80% 70% 20% 0% 
6% 47% 65% 18% 0% 0% 
19% 19% 88% 19% 25% 0% 
17% 38% 52% 17% 14% 3% 
38% 10% 62% 24% 5% 5% 
21% 14% 64% 25% 21% 0% 
17% 30% 66% 27% 12% 2% 
27% 23% 59% 32% 15% 0% 
13% 21% 71% 4% 21% 4% 
21% 21% 42% 32% 21% 0% 
18% 24% 68% 24% 11% 3% 
19% 37% 74% 37% 19% 0% 
22% 26% 60% 21% 16% 2% 
20% 27% 64% 26% 17% 2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Markus Loewe et al. 
148 German Development Institute 
Table B4: Getting employment in the public sector 
 How important is it to have  
wasta to get employed in your 
department? 
Are you offered 
enough training 
for your job? 
 very a bit not 
very 
not
at all
n/a yes no n/a 
Total 52% 25% 16% 6% 2% 59% 37% 3% 
JIB 14% 29% 43% 14% 0% 57% 43% 0% 
MoIT 37% 37% 21% 5% 0% 53% 37% 11% 
MGA: Tendering Dep’t 90% 10% 0% 0% 0% 60% 30% 10% 
MGA: Licensing Dep’t 76% 12% 6% 0% 6% 59% 41% 0% 
MGA: Customer Relations 56% 38% 0% 6% 0% 94% 6% 0% 
MGA: Jubeiha Office 70% 15% 12% 3% 0% 67% 33% 0% 
MGA: Marka Office 48% 21% 14% 17% 0% 76% 17% 7% 
ASEZA: One-Stop-Shop 33% 38% 19% 0% 10% 48% 48% 5% 
ASEZA: Tax Dep’t 36% 29% 32% 4% 0% 29% 71% 0% 
Income 101-200 JD 54% 20% 11% 11% 3% 70% 24% 6% 
Income 201-400 JD 56% 29% 15% 0% 0% 45% 55% 0% 
Income above 400 JD 29% 33% 38% 0% 0% 58% 38% 4% 
Less than 1 year in job 32% 16% 37% 11% 5% 74% 21% 5% 
1-5 years in job 53% 32% 8% 5% 3% 61% 34% 5% 
6-10 years in job 56% 26% 19% 0% 0% 37% 63% 0% 
More than 10 years in job 55% 19% 19% 7% 0% 64% 34% 2% 
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The role of bribes 
Only 1 % of public sector employees believe that their colleagues often 
accept bribes. This share turned out to be highest for the Tendering De-
partment of the Municipality of Greater Amman (10 %, see Table B5). 
However, 64 % of the employees think that bribes are accepted at least 
from time to time. Again, the respective share for the Tendering Depart-
ment of the Municipality of Greater Amman (75 %) was far above aver-
age. It was even higher for the MoIT (86 %) and the Company Licensing 
Department of the Municipality of Greater Amman (76 %), while it turned 
out to be lower for the JIB (64 %) and the ASEZA (One-Stop-Shop 39 %, 
Tax Department: 57 %).  
68 % of the government employees surveyed stated that accepting even 
small tips was not acceptable, but 23 % believe that it is acceptable be-
cause salaries are low in the public sector. Once more, the respective share 
is highest among the employees of the Municipality of Greater Amman 
(up to 44 %). Interestingly, it is only slightly above average for employees 
with a below-average salary (28 %). 7 % of the employees also responded 
that small tips are acceptable because their clients are rich (up to 19 % in 
the Municipality of Greater Amman, 10 % in the ASEZA One-Stop-Shop). 
Ideas for improving public service 
In addition, the government employees were asked to write down their 
own ideas on how service for customers in their department could be im-
proved (See Box B1). Almost all the interviewees made at least one rec-
ommendation (see Table B6). Many of these recommendations are related 
to better working and living conditions for government employees to make 
them more satisfied and, thus, more committed to their work: 33 % of the 
government employees in the survey made one or more proposals concern-
ing (i) higher salaries, (ii) more equality of treatment by their directors, 
(iii) improvements in their workplace or equipment, (iv) shorter working 
hours, or (v) higher job security.  
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Table B5:  Spread and acceptability of bribery 
Do the employees in your 
accept payments from 
 
yes,   
frequently
yes,  
sometimes
yes,  
rarely 
yes,  
but I  
cannot 
say how 
often 
 
Total 1% 14% 22% 27% 
JIB 10% 10% 30% 20% 
MoIT 0% 35% 18% 24% 
MGA: Tendering Dep’t 0% 13% 31% 31% 
MGA: Licensing Dep’t 0% 21% 26% 37% 
MGA: Customer Relations 3% 18% 15% 24% 
MGA: Jubeiha Office 0% 0% 14% 43% 
MGA: Marka Office 0% 14% 17% 41% 
ASEZA: One-Stop-Shop 0% 4% 25% 11% 
ASEZA: Tax Dep’t 0% 10% 29% 19% 
Income 101-200 JD 0% 13% 23% 24% 
Income 201-400 JD 3% 17% 21% 32% 
Income above 400 JD 0% 13% 21% 21% 
Less than 1 year in job 0% 5% 37% 32% 
1-5 years in job 0% 17% 20% 18% 
6-10 years in job 7% 15% 19% 30% 
More than 10 years in job 0% 14% 22% 34% 
*  Respondents had the option to tick more than one answer. 
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department 
customers? 
If employees are accepting such  
payments: Is it acceptable? * 
no,  
never 
n/a yes,  
because 
salaries are 
low. 
yes,  
because 
those who  
offer pay-
ments  
are rich. 
it is 
hard 
 to accept
payments 
no,  
it is not 
acceptable
n/a 
34% 2% 23% 7% 11% 68% 3% 
30% 0% 30% 10% 20% 50% 0% 
24% 0% 35% 6% 6% 53% 0% 
25% 0% 44% 19% 19% 50% 6% 
16% 0% 21% 5% 5% 68% 5% 
36% 3% 30% 9% 12% 64% 3% 
43% 0% 14% 0% 0% 71% 14% 
24% 3% 7% 3% 7% 86% 0% 
61% 0% 14% 0% 14% 82% 0% 
38% 10% 24% 10% 10% 62% 5% 
36% 3% 28% 9% 16% 60% 3% 
26% 2% 24% 5% 6% 73% 2% 
50% 0% 4% 4% 4% 83% 4% 
26% 0% 32% 11% 11% 68% 0% 
41% 4% 26% 7% 16% 62% 1% 
33% 0% 15% 4% 15% 70% 7% 
28% 2% 21% 7% 2% 74% 3% 
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Table B6: Proposals of government employees for improving the  
 
(1) better working  
conditions for  
civil servants 
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Total 33% 24% 11% 9% 3% 3% 
Absolute number (total) 59 44 20 16 6 6 
JIB 43% 14% 29% 0% 0% 0% 
MoIT 16% 5% 5% 11% 0% 0% 
MGA: Tendering Dep’t 40% 10% 20% 0% 20% 0% 
MGA: Licensing Dep’t 53% 47% 29% 0% 12% 18% 
MGA: Customer Relations 6% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
MGA: Jubeiha Office 30% 27% 3% 21% 6% 0% 
MGA: Marka Office 28% 24% 3% 3% 0% 3% 
ASEZA: One-Stop-Shop 48% 38% 10% 10% 0% 0% 
ASEZA: Tax Dep’t 39% 29% 21% 14% 0% 7% 
Income 101-200 JD 24% 21% 7% 9% 6% 4% 
Income 201-400 JD 41% 27% 15% 9% 2% 2% 
Income above 400 JD 42% 29% 17% 8% 0% 4% 
Less than 1 year in job 26% 21% 5% 0% 11% 11% 
1-5 years in job 25% 32% 7% 13% 5% 3% 
6-10 years in job 11% 4% 7% 7% 0% 0% 
More than 10 years in job 26% 14% 16% 9% 2% 2% 
Note:  The figures for the positions in some categories add to more than the 
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customer service 
(2) better training and 
recruitment  
of civil servants 
(3) more positive and 
negative incentives for 
civil servants 
(4) more efficient  
organisation of work  
in the public sector 
T
ot
al
 
be
tte
r t
ra
in
in
g 
to
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r e
m
p-
lo
ye
es
 o
n 
ho
w
 to
 d
o 
th
ei
r j
ob
 
be
tte
r r
ec
ru
itm
en
t a
cc
or
di
ng
 
to
 c
ap
ab
ili
tie
s 
T
ot
al
 
be
tte
r i
nc
en
tiv
es
 fo
r e
m
pl
oy
-
ee
s (
bo
nu
se
s, 
va
ca
nc
ie
s e
tc
.) 
m
or
e 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n 
fr
om
 in
de
-
pe
nd
en
t a
ut
ho
rit
y 
m
or
e 
pe
na
lti
es
 
T
ot
al
 
m
or
e 
au
th
or
iti
es
 fo
r e
m
pl
oy
-
ee
s i
n 
de
ci
si
on
s 
m
or
e 
co
m
pu
te
rs
 / 
us
e 
th
em
 
m
or
e 
ef
fic
ie
nt
ly
 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
cl
ea
r o
rg
an
iz
in
g 
sy
st
em
 
de
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f e
m
-
pl
oy
ee
s (
ov
er
-s
ta
ff
in
g)
 
27% 18% 8% 6% 21% 16% 6% 2% 19% 9% 5% 2% 2% 
48 33 15 11 38 28 10 4 34 16 9 3 3 
29% 29% 0% 0% 43% 43% 14% 14% 29% 14% 0% 14% 0% 
16% 16% 0% 0% 21% 16% 5% 5% 11% 0% 5% 0% 0% 
10% 0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 
18% 12% 6% 0% 41% 41% 0% 0% 12% 0% 12% 0% 0% 
25% 25% 0% 6% 13% 0% 13% 0% 19% 19% 0% 0% 0% 
33% 27% 9% 9% 9% 6% 3% 0% 18% 6% 9% 0% 3% 
21% 7% 7% 14% 31% 24% 3% 3% 7% 3% 3% 0% 0% 
29% 14% 10% 5% 29% 19% 14% 5% 36% 14% 0% 10% 0% 
43% 29% 21% 7% 11% 7% 4% 0% 29% 18% 7% 0% 7% 
20% 10% 7% 6% 18% 13% 3% 2% 18% 6% 7% 0% 0% 
29% 23% 8% 8% 26% 20% 8% 3% 12% 14% 3% 2% 5% 
46% 38% 17% 4% 21% 13% 8% 0% 25% 8% 4% 8% 0% 
21% 16% 5% 0% 21% 16% 11% 0% 11% 11% 11% 5% 0% 
26% 17% 9% 8% 18% 13% 5% 1% 18% 4% 8% 3% 0% 
22% 15% 15% 4% 4% 4% 0% 0% 19% 15% 0% 0% 4% 
24% 19% 3% 9% 22% 19% 5% 2% 10% 7% 3% 2% 2% 
totals, because some interviewees have made several proposals. 
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Table B6 (continued) 
(7) better  
behaviour  
of employees 
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Total 17% 13% 22% 13% 9% 3% 6% 
Absolute number (total) 30 23 39 24 17 5 12 
JIB 14% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
MoIT 5% 5% 16% 5% 5% 11% 5% 
MGA: Tendering Dep’t 30% 10% 50% 30% 20% 0% 10% 
MGA: Licensing Dep’t 6% 12% 12% 6% 6% 0% 0% 
MGA: Customer Relations 38% 31% 50% 38% 19% 0% 6% 
MGA: Jubeiha Office 12% 9% 9% 6% 3% 0% 3% 
MGA: Marka Office 17% 10% 14% 10% 7% 0% 3% 
ASEZA: One-Stop-Shop 19% 0% 43% 19% 29% 5% 10% 
ASEZA: Tax Dep’t 18% 25% 18% 14% 4% 7% 19% 
Income 101-200 JD 18% 14% 21% 16% 7% 1% 4% 
Income 201-400 JD 12% 9% 20% 11% 12% 3% 11% 
Income above 400 JD 25% 17% 29% 13% 13% 8% 4% 
Less than 1 year in job 11% 11% 0% 16% 5% 0% 0% 
1-5 years in job 18% 14% 0% 18% 12% 1% 1% 
6-10 years in job 19% 4% 0% 7% 0% 4% 8% 
More than 10 years in job 10% 5% 0% 5% 3% 5% 9% 
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At the same time, 27 % of the interviewees made proposals as to one or 
more of the following: (i) more or better training for government employ-
ees (18 %), more and better information for government employees on 
how to handle procedures (8 %), and better recruitment of new employees 
according to their real capabilities (6 %).46 
21 % of the employees recommended greater incentives for serving clients 
better: 16 % proposed bonus payments, extra vacation time, or other re-
wards for employees who do a good job. 6 % stated that more external su-
pervision from an independent government authority would be useful. 2 % 
believed that more penalties should be imposed on employees who neglect 
their job (Table B6). 
13 % recommended that customers be better informed about the tasks, 
procedures and work of the government departments. 
17 % of the interview partners suggested simplifying administrative pro-
cedures in the public sector, and 19 % made other proposals related to the 
organisation and work of their department, such as giving government 
employees more authority in making decisions (9 %), using computers 
more often and more efficiently (5 %), streamlining organisational struc-
tures in their departments (2 %), reducing the number of employees in 
their department because of over-staffing (2 %), reducing the number of 
employees responsible for one and the same task, and putting relevant 
government offices together in one place (e.g. in the case of the one-stop-
shop of the JIB). 
Finally, 22 % of the government employees mentioned their own conduct: 
13 % declared that customers should be treated equally, that is, independ-
ently of their social status. 9 % wrote that civil servants should adhere to 
the rules better. And 3 % felt that co-operation between employees had to 
be improved (Table B6). 
 
 
                                                          
46  The three figures add up to more than 27 % because some employees had more than one 
of the three ideas. 
Markus Loewe et al. 
156 German Development Institute 
 
 
Annex C: Results of the semi-structured interviews with 
18 medium- to high- ranking public sector 
employees 
Parallel to the standardised survey among low- to medium-ranking civil 
servants described in Annex B, 18 semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted with medium- to high-ranking employees in the same departments. 
Most were the direct superiors of the civil servants covered by the survey. 
They were, however, interviewed in a conversation and not like their sub-
ordinates via a printed, anonymous questionnaire. 
The interviewees included: 
— Five employees at the Central Office Building of the Municipality of 
Greater Amman (MGA: the directors of the Customer Care Depart-
ment, the Professional Licensing Department, the Naming and Num-
bering Department, and the Tendering Department as well as the 
deputy director of the Human Resources Department), 
— Three employees at the Al-Marka District Office of the Municipality 
of Greater Amman (the District Director as well as the Directors of 
the Knowledge and the Engineering Departments), 
— Three at the Jubeiha District Office of the Municipality of Greater 
Amman (the District Director and the Directors of the Engineering 
Department and the Registration Department), 
— Four from the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Administration 
(ASEZA: the Directors of the Human Resources Department, the 
Taxation Department and the Company Registration Department / 
Aqaba One-Stop-Shop as well as the Administrative and Financial 
Department),  
— Two from the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT: the Directors of 
the Trade Directorate and the Competition Directorate) and 
— The Director of the One-Stop-Shop at the Jordan Investment Board 
(JIB).47 
                                                          
47  In some interviews, several people were interviewed at a time. They were nevertheless 
counted as only one interview and only the highest-ranking person is listed above. For a 
complete list see p. 189. 
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The focus of the interviews was on interactions between entrepreneurs and 
the state on the administrative level and on the role of wasta in these inter-
actions. However, some civil servants were also asked how public sector 
employees were currently recruited and promoted. At the end, all inter-
locutors were asked for reform proposals. 
Quality of state-business relations 
The interviewees had very diverse opinions on the quality of state-business 
relations. The majority said that much has improved in the last few years, 
i.e. that procedures have become much easier, the public administration 
more customer-oriented, and services faster than in the past. Some, how-
ever, admitted that some serious problems prevail. 
Five of the 18 civil servants stressed that procedures in their departments 
are now much faster and less complicated than in the past. For example, it 
allegedly takes only one hour to get a professional license and only one or 
two weeks to register a company (the duration seems to be about the same 
in Aqaba and in Amman). Four other interviewees, however, claimed that 
the procedures still take too much time; two said that employees are still 
not well trained, and one said that there is a lack of planning everywhere. 
Four civil servants said that the official guidelines for their work were still 
very unclear and too complicated, while five others stated that the rules 
were now very clear and simple and that room for discretion no longer ex-
ists. Nevertheless, the same people stated that their customers did not un-
derstand the rules.  
This shows how important it is to inform business people about the proce-
dures and rules of the public administration. All of the institutions studied 
here have now started to spread information about their work in the form 
of brochures and via the internet. In addition, the ASEZA holds several 
meetings per year to discuss its procedures with investors, and it trains its 
employees in explaining the rules to customers. In the MGA, the MoIT 
and the ASEZA, customers have the possibility to complain about the ser-
vice provided. 
In general, the services of the ASEZA are alleged to be better than those 
provided in the rest of the country. All those interviewed in Aqaba said 
that ASEZA would be a good model for the rest of the country because its 
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procedures are easier, its authorities better co-ordinated, and its public sec-
tor employees better trained for their jobs.  
Nevertheless, three interview partners complained that none of the three 
One-Stop-Shops (one in the JIB, one in the MoIT and one in the ASEZA) 
can make decisions on its own because the applications of investors are 
still sent to the different ministries involved. In addition, six interview 
partners criticised overlaps of responsibilities among the various ministries 
and other public authorities. In Aqaba, for example, two different customs 
departments co-exist, one working for the ASEZ and the other for im-
ported goods destined for the rest of the country. 
Another problem frequently mentioned is that many business people do 
not comply with the rules. Four respondents said that many customers try 
to use wasta to speed up the procedures or even to by-pass the laws. These 
people “just do not trust the public sector” and some of them are “always 
asking for extras”. Three respondents regretted that business people did 
not co-operate with them, whereas one said that he had “excellent rela-
tions” with the private sector. 
With respect to future reforms, one interviewee said that the e-government 
initiative of the Jordanian government will make procedures easier and 
more transparent, while another stressed that every entrepreneur would ac-
cept the rules if they are fair, even though they may be complicated. 
The role of wasta in state-business relations 
The second phase of the interviews in this study focused on the importance 
of wasta in state-business interactions. A very ambiguous picture emerged. 
Seven interviewees said that there was “some wasta everywhere”. Two 
others, however, stated that wasta was “not everywhere”. Seven stressed 
that there was no wasta at all or at least only very little in their depart-
ments, while six others admitted that there was “also some wasta here”. 
Two interview partners found that there was “less wasta in Aqaba than in 
Amman”, and eight said that the role of wasta in the country was generally 
diminishing.  
The civil servants interviewed also had very contradictory opinions on 
what the term wasta includes. Five stated that wasta was used to speed up 
procedures, not to break the law (which they considered a criminal act and 
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thus not wasta). Three others, however, said that wasta was needed only 
when official papers were not O.K., i.e. in order to by-pass a rule. 
As a consequence, the civil servants were also asked what they thought 
personally about wasta. Here too, the picture was very mixed. All inter-
viewees agreed that wasta is bad when used to obtain official approval for 
people who do not meet the relevant conditions or to obtain jobs for un-
qualified people. However, only six felt that it was always bad for them to 
use wasta – five because it resulted in unfair outcomes, and one because it 
was “annoying and embarrassing”. One also said: 
“Wasta is something illegal and unjust. I am a Muslim and my religion 
forbids wasta.” 
Eight others, however, stated that wasta is sometimes good – for example 
when it speeds up procedures (4 respondents), corrects mistakes of the bu-
reaucracy (3 respondents) or helps poor people (1 respondent). Neverthe-
less, one added at once – almost regretfully: “But then it is still against 
ISO 9001.”  
Some of the interview partners tried to explain the frequent use of wasta in 
Jordan. Most of them hinted at socio-cultural factors, such as tribalism and 
the strong role of the family in the Jordanian society. One of them said that 
if an employee is not ready to use wasta for his relatives he is seen as a 
bad person. Another complained that “all civil servants have their own 
agenda” (i.e. to favour their relatives). A third expressed it like this: 
“Wasta is in the culture: personal relations are very important in all 
parts of life.” 
Others, however, provided political explanations for the prevalence of 
wasta: four said that the Mayor of Greater Amman, the Members of Par-
liament and the Ministers also use wasta. One stressed that this sets a bad 
example for lower-level employees, and three complained that no one con-
trols politicians. Three others found that the government does too little 
against the use of wasta in public administration, and two felt that it was 
too seldom punished, i.e. only when it was obvious that the law had been 
severely violated. 
Some employees also blamed the structure of the administration itself. 
One said that he urgently needed wasta to obtain any document from an-
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other ministry. One complained that the minister had the last word in 
every little issue. Another said: 
“All decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of the head of 
a department, so documents cannot be issued by the employees. There-
fore, people use wasta to get to the top more quickly.” 
Three employees stressed how difficult it was to do anything against the 
use of wasta. One of them said that an employee who was not ready to 
give preferential treatment to people with good wasta was considered a 
bad person. The second reported that when he once said something against 
the use of wasta he was called a bureaucrat who wanted to slow down pro-
cedures and reduce the flexibility of the department. The third declared, “if 
you follow the law you are always accused”. 
The role of wasta in the recruitment and promotion of public sector em-
ployees 
Many of the public sector employees interviewed stressed that a major 
reason for the inefficiency of state-business relations in Jordan is “re-
cruitment under a mask”. This expression refers to the widespread phe-
nomenon that people are hired for the public sector merely because of their 
wasta and not because of their qualifications. As a result, public sector of-
fices are completely overstaffed, offices are crowded, only some employ-
ees work and they are disturbed at their tasks by others who do not. 
Five respondents stated that recruitment for the public sector is still ef-
fected mainly by wasta, and three admitted directly or indirectly that they 
had gotten their own jobs only because they had wasta. Only two believed 
that wasta was used much less now in the recruitment and promotion of 
public sector employees than in the past. One interviewee said: 
“The large number of employees who don’t really have work to do is 
maybe the biggest obstacle to making progress on the e-government ini-
tiative. Because they would be made completely obsolete if nothing 
were to be done manually anymore.” 
Several interview partners tried to find explanations. Four mentioned that 
they were often compelled by a minister or a Member of Parliament (MP) 
to employ someone. One said: 
“If the minister tells you to employ someone you can't say no.” 
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Two others argued: 
“The MPs must give jobs to their supporters.” 
“The mayor is also under pressure, he must always negotiate the with 
MPs.” 
Three also took into consideration that they were sometimes forced to hire 
people because of social considerations.  
Fighting the use of wasta  
Some interview partners made numerous suggestions on how to fight the 
use of wasta in Jordan. These suggestions fall into three main groups. 
The first group concerns public sector reform: five interview partners 
stated that higher salaries in the public sector would be helpful in reducing 
the influence of wasta on state-business relations. Three others said that 
employees in the public sector should be better trained. Five proposed ad-
ditional efforts to simplify procedures in public administration, thus mak-
ing the use of wasta obsolete. One argued that the e-government initiative 
would bring about the needed change, and four others believed that public 
administration rules should be better explained to clients. One respondent 
called for better controls in the public sector and for more severe punish-
ment of violators of the rules, while two others preferred positive incen-
tives to make civil servants obey the law. These persons argued that the 
prizes now awarded by some authorities for best employees of the year 
have already led to a substantial change in the behaviour of their subordi-
nates.  
Likewise, the interlocutors also talked about measures to limit the influ-
ence of wasta on the recruitment and promotion of civil servants. Two re-
ported very good experience with job descriptions. One mentioned that 
much progress has been made by better screening of job applicants and by 
employing them on probation only. Another said that they had perform-
ance evaluations had been introduced but had thus far been of little value 
in reducing the role of wasta in the promotion of public sector employees. 
The second group of suggestions focused on the role of politicians in the 
fight against the use of wasta. One interview partner said that “the gov-
ernment must act”; another believed that “the government must take the 
political decision to remove wasta”, and a third argued: 
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“Politicians should contribute by changing their mentality: they should 
fight wasta with political means and stop using it for their own benefit.” 
Three others, however, believed that the government would never do any-
thing: 
“The King has the right vision for the country, but he is not successful 
in getting the right people to implement the visions.” 
Another answered: 
“The National Agenda has the potential to reduce wasta but I am not 
sure whether it will ever be implemented.” 
The third and last group of suggestions referred to the socio-cultural 
framework: five persons said that the general mentality would have to 
change and that the media (two respondents) or a better education system 
(three respondents) would contribute to this goal. One believed that things 
would change automatically with the coming of the next generation, and 
two stated that the most important thing to do was to raise people’s aware-
ness about the negative aspects of using wasta. 
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Focus Solutions: Jabari, Samer, CEO. Amman, 9 March 2006 
Integrated Technology Group (ITG): Ajlouni, Batoul, Vice President. Amman, 13 
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Jordanian Automate Co. Ltd.: Ghairabeh, Faris, General Manager. Amman, 14 
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Naya Informatics: Elias, Jean-Claude, Director General. Amman, 6 March 2006 
Pharmaceutical industry: 
Jerash Pharmaceuticals Co.: Khraim, Abdul Rahman, General Manager. Amman, 
12 March 2006 
Nutri Dar: Finan, Walid, Managing Director. Amman, 14 March 2006 
Ram Pharma Co.: Al-Malakh, Amer, Deputy General Manager for Technical Af-
fairs, and Al-Najami, Mahmoud, Deputy CEO. Sahab, 8 March 2006 
Spezialized Medical Supplies Co. Ltd.: Shamayleh, Manal Qarain, Sales and Mar-
keting Director. Amman, 13 March 2006 
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International Plastic Co. Ltd.: Othman, Fayez, Sales Manager. Amman, 22 March 
2006 
International Storage Battery Co. Ltd./ Hoppecke: Abu Shaar, Alaa, Production 
Manager, Azzam, Manuel, General Manager, Makijian, Nishan, Quality As-
surance Manager. Amman, 9 March 2006 
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Kasih Food Production Co.: Kasih, Khaled, General Manager. Amman, 19 March 
2006  
Maani Ventures: Taher, Abdulraouf, Business Development Manager. Amman, 20 
March 2006 
Madaen Industrial Co.: Fannoush, Faraj, Executive Manager. Sahab, 15 March 
2006 
Master National Stationeries Industries Co. Ltd.: Al-Assi, Muneer, Managing Di-
rector. Amman, 7 March 2006 
Neram Sin Kalau & Partner Company: Al-Kurdi, Amer, Product Designer, and 
Kalau, Neram Sin, Company Manager. Amman 21 March 2006 
SABCO5 Producer of Ladies Quality Fashion: Saleh, Marwan, Director. Sahab, 15 
March 2006 
Würth Jordan Co. Ltd.: Dentel, Norman, Managing Director. Amman 29 March 
2006 
Khafaldeh, Khaled, start-up entrepreneur (computer screens) supported by the 
Young Entrepreneurs Association (YEA). Amman, 12 March 2006 
N.N.2: Owner of a car garage specialised on Mercedes. Amman, 8 March 2006 
N.N.3: Owner of a small repair shop that produces small metal pieces for cars. 
Amman, 8 March 2006 
N.N.5: Owner of small bakery. Amman, 8 March 2006  
N.N.7: Taylor for army clothes. Zarqa, 21 March 2006 
N.N.11: Owner of bakery ‘Al-Sharq’. Zarqa, 21 March 2006 
Consultancy and marketing: 
Abyad Research and Marketing Consultancy: Abyad, Issa, General Manager. Am-
man, 19 March 2006 
Advertising and Event Management Solutions: Kashd, Arvin, Managing Partner. 
Amman, 13 March 2006 
Arch Enterprise Solutions: Abu-Gharbieh, Chaled, Managing Partner. Amman, 12 
March 2006  
Compubase International: Qtaishat, Khaled, General Manager. Amman, 15 March 
2006 
DDB Worldwide Communications Group Inc.: Matouk, Suleiman, Managing Di-
rector. Amman, 13 March 2006 
Energy Management Services: Al-Zatari, Nedal, General Manager. Amman, 19 
March 2006 
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J-Gate: Hamdan, Mohammed, General Manager, Kamal, Zaid, IT & Website Co-
ordinator, and Abu-Rashid, Samer, Sales Manager, start-up entrepreneurs 
(information service for venture capital) supported by the Young 
Entrepreneurs Association (YEA). Amman, 12 March 2006 
Ketab: Saad Eddin, Tawfeeq, Business Developer, start-up entrepreneur supported 
by the Young Entrepreneurs Association (YEA). Amman, 12 March 2006  
Maisam Architects and Engineers: Batayneh, Maisam, Principal Architect. 
Amman, 14 March 2006 
Med Grant Medical Marketing Consultants: Burgan, Sana, General Manager. 
Amman, 14 March 2006 
Tactic Consultant Est.: Al-Thaher, Mohammad, General Manager, Aqaba, 28 
March 2006  
Trainedge; Creative Consultants: Hourani, Walid, General Manager and Managing 
Director. Amman, 19 March 2006 
Trade: 
ADASCO Ship Chandeliers: Zaitoun, Jamal, General Manager. Aqaba, 29 March 
2006 
Alissar Garden: Mzayek, Charif, Managing Director, Alissar Garden. Amman, 12 
March 2006 
Al Zughiar Sons Trd. Est.: Zughiar, Abdul Rahim, General Manager. Amman, 13 
March 2006 
Aqaba Processing Co.: Al-Ghzawi, Laith, Operations Manager, and El-Shyoukh, 
Zuheir, Customs and Shipping Coordinator. Aqaba, 29 March 2006 
Heidelberg Jordan Printing Development Co.: Habesch, Rudy, Managing Director. 
Amman, 20 March 2006 
Orient International Metal Trading Co. Ltd.: Ayyad, Wael, Managing Director. 
Amman, 15 March 2006 
Superior Heavy Equipment Trading Co.: Kakish, Moussa, General Manager. Am-
man, 27 March 2006 
Vital Edition: El-Uteibi, Nawaf, Managing Partner. Amman, 20 March 2006 
N.N.1: Owner of small shop for oil products. Amman, 8 March 2006 
N.N.4: Owner of a small shop for mobile phones. Amman, 8 March 2006 
N.N.6: Owner of a small printing press shop in Wihdat. Amman, 8 March 2006  
N.N.8: Small computer trader. Zarqa, 21 March 2006  
N.N.9: Small trader of household utensils and gifts. Zarqa, 21 March 2006 
N.N.10: Trader of miscellaneous goods with 12 employees. Zarqa, 21 March 2006 
The Impact of Favouritism on the Business Climate: a Study on Wasta in Jordan 
German Development Institute  193
Tourism: 
Ayla Oasis Development: Dudin, Sahl, Managing Director,. Amman, 19 March 
2006 
Delta Airlines: Twal, Maher, Executive Manager and Twal, Jeries, General Sales 
Agent. Amman, 6 March 2006 
Dive Aqaba: Mauna, Leila, Owner. Aqaba, 29 March 2006 
Garden Village Hotels Camp and Resort: Al-Reyati, Jamal, Owner. Aqaba, 29 
March 2006 
Gelato Uno Best Italian Ice Cream: Muasher, May, Owner. Aqaba, 28 March 2006 
Jordan Projects for Tourism Development: Al-Khaldi, Nasser, CEO,. Amman, 13 
March 2006 
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List of interviewed public sector employees by institution 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA): 
Ahmad, Dr. Taha, Commissioner for Administration and Finance. Aqaba, 28 
March 2006 
Al-Daboubi, Ghazi, Director, Human Resources Department. Aqaba, 27 March 
2006 
Al-Farajat, Suha, Head of Company Registration Division / One-Stop-Shop. 
Aqaba, 30 March 2006 
Al-Hurini, Amera, Investor Services Officer, Investor Services Directorate. Aqaba, 
27 March 2006 
Al-Jbour, Jihad, Senior Officer, Investment Directorate. Aqaba, 30 March 2006 
Al-Reyati, Mohammed Hasan, Revenue, Taxes and Audit Director. Aqaba, 28 
March 2006 
Jordan Investment Board (JIB): 
Al-Asfar, Jamil, Engineer, Director of Studies and Research Department. Amman, 
23 March 2006 
Alowneh, Adnan, Head of One Stop Shop. Amman 29 March 2006 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT): 
Abbadi, Luna, Director of Competition Directorate. Amman, 27 March 2006 
Ali, Maha, Director of Foreign Trade Policy. Amman, 27 March 2006 
Municipality of Greater Amman / Central Office: 
Al-Huniti, Hatem, Assistant Manager, Human Resources Department. Amman, 27 
March 2006 
Al Naser, Salameh, Manager, Customers Care Department. Amman, 23 March 
2006 
Elayyan, Marwan, Director, Naming and Numbering Department. Amman, 28 
March 2006 
Hendawi, Moa’atasem, Director of Tendering Department. Amman, 28 March 
2006 
Shammout, Izzeddin, Director of Profession and Advertisement Department. Am-
man, 28 March 2006 
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Municipality of Greater Amman / Jubeiha District Office: 
Abu Orabi, Zeyad, Appointed District Director. Amman, 26 March 2006 
Al-Dweiri, Wasif, Manager. Amman, 26 March 2006 
Al-Nsour, Wesam Mohammed, Civil Engineer, Engineering Department. Amman, 
26 March 2006 
Al-Sahouri, Ahlam, Head of Registration Department. Amman, 26 March 2006 
Hajjaj, Ibraheem, Director, Engineering Department. Amman, 26 March 2006 
Lozi, Omar S., Manager. Amman, 26 March 2006 
Municipality of Greater Amman / Marka District Office: 
Abdallat, Maisa, Department of Knowledge and Quality Control, ISO Section. 
Amman, 30 March 2006 
Abu Rasa’a, Shaher, District Director. Amman, 30 March 2006 
Al-Refa’e, Ahmad, Head of Engineering Department. Amman, 30 March 2006 
Al Srour, Mohammad, Appointed East District Director. Amman, 23 March 2006 
 
 
 
Please mind that most of the aforementioned stake-holders in medium to higher 
ranks of the public sector have been interviewed as experts as well and are there-
fore also listed above. In addition to them, 180 public sector employees in lower to 
medium ranks were covered by a standardised survey of printed questionnaires to 
be filled in anonymously by the employees (see Annex B). 
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